









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Wanjala, B. (2016). Can the big push approach end rural poverty in Africa? Insights from Sauri millennium
village in Kenya. CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
 
 
 Can the Big Push Approach End Rural Poverty in Africa?  
 











Can the Big Push Approach End Rural Poverty in Africa? 











ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan 
Tilburg University 
op gezag van de rector magnificus, 
prof. dr. E.H.L. Aarts, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een 
door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie 
in de Ruth First zaal van de Universiteit 
 
op maandag 18 april 2016 om 10.15 uur 
 
door 
Bernadete Mukhwana Wanjala, 









Promotor: Prof. dr. M.J. James 
Co promotor: Dr. R.P. Muradian Sarache 
 
Overige leden van de promotiecommissie: 
Prof. dr. A.S. Bedi 
Prof. dr. A.G. Dijkstra 
Dr. M.H. ten Raa 




















© Bernadete Mukhwana Wanjala, 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication 
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any 
other means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without 









To my parents, Daria and Michael, for believing in the education of a girl child and for 
supporting me throughout my education. 
i 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The choice of study area and data collection methods ......................................... 7 
1.2 Structure of the thesis ........................................................................................... 11 
References ...................................................................................................................... 13 
Chapter 2: Can Big Push Interventions Take Small-scale Farmers out of Poverty? * ..... 18 
2.1   Introduction ......................................................................................................... 18 
2.2  Methodology ........................................................................................................ 24 
2.2.1    Analytical framework ................................................................................. 24 
2.2.2  Method of analysis ....................................................................................... 26 
2.2.3 Definition of variables .................................................................................. 31 
2.3 Empirical Findings .............................................................................................. 33 
2.3.1   Description of household characteristics ................................................... 33 
2.3.2   Estimation of propensity scores and matching procedure ......................... 36 
2.3.3   Estimation of treatment effects ................................................................... 39 
2.3.4   Testing for spillover effects .......................................................................... 44 
2.3.5  Sensitivity analysis for propensity score matching ..................................... 45 
2.3.6   Estimation using the doubly robust estimator ............................................ 46 
2.3.7  Testing for heterogeneity of effects ............................................................. 47 
2.4   Discussion ........................................................................................................... 48 
References ...................................................................................................................... 51 
Chapter 3: The Role of Diversification in Enhancing Household Income and Reducing 
Poverty among Rural Smallholder Farmers ..................................................................... 60 
3.1  Introduction ........................................................................................................ 60 
3.2 The Millennium Villages Project and interventions aimed at enhancing 
diversification of activities in Sauri ............................................................................... 64 
3.3 Review of literature on diversification and its impact on household income and 
poverty reduction ........................................................................................................... 67 
3.3.1  Conceptual framework ................................................................................. 67 
3.3.2  Empirical evidence ....................................................................................... 69 
3.4  Methodology ....................................................................................................... 77 
3.4.1  Measuring the degree of diversification ...................................................... 77 
ii 
 
3.4.2   Determinants of income diversification ..................................................... 78 
3.4.3   Assessing the effect of diversification on household income and poverty . 81 
3.4.4   Assessing the effect of diversification on MVP income effect .................... 83 
3.5   Research Findings ............................................................................................... 84 
3.5.1   Descriptive statistics ................................................................................... 84 
3.5.2  Determinants of diversification ................................................................... 86 
3.5.3   Impact of diversification on household income and poverty ...................... 87 
3.5.4  Impact of diversification on MVP income effect .......................................... 90 
3.6  Discussion ............................................................................................................ 91 
References ...................................................................................................................... 94 
Chapter 4:  Institutional Change and Effectiveness of Rural Development Interventions
 101 
4.1   Introduction ....................................................................................................... 101 
4.2 The Millennium Villages Project’s interventions in market institutions.......... 106 
4.3   Review of literature .......................................................................................... 108 
4.3.1  Theoretical considerations......................................................................... 108 
4.3.2  Empirical evidence on market failures ....................................................... 113 
4.4 Methodology ...................................................................................................... 120 
4.4.1   Analytical framework .................................................................................. 121 
4.4.2  Method of analysis ..................................................................................... 124 
4.4.3  Definition and measurement of variables ................................................. 128 
4.5 Research Findings ............................................................................................. 129 
4.5.1 Enhancing access to input markets ............................................................ 130 
4.5.2 Enhancing access to output markets and role of collective action in the 
marketing of produce ............................................................................................... 132 
4.5.3 Enhancing access to financial services ....................................................... 138 
4.6 Discussion .......................................................................................................... 144 
References .................................................................................................................... 150 
Chapter 5: Conclusions, Lessons and Areas for Further Research ................................ 160 
Appendix 1: Gem Poultry Farmers’ Co-operative Society Limited By-Laws ................. 165 






Writing this note brings a lot of joy because it marks the end of a long journey, an era 
that took almost 7 years. First, I would like to thank the almighty God for guiding me 
throughout my studies and for granting me the strength and perseverance to soldier on 
even when the situation seemed unbearable.  
 
I am greatly indebted to Nuffic for the financial support that covered tuition, travel and 
living expenses in the Netherlands. I also thank Nuffic for granting me an extension that 
enabled me to take care of my newborn son, who had health issues in 2011. I would also 
like to thank the African Economic and Research Consortium (AERC) and the Poverty 
Reduction, Equity and Growth Network (PEGNet) for providing additional financial 
assistance for research, which enabled me to collect primary data in Sauri millennium 
village (Kenya). 
 
This thesis would not have been completed without the valuable input of my supervisor, 
Prof. Dr. M.J. James, and my co-supervisor, Dr. R.P. Muradian Sarache. I thank Dr. 
Muradian for accepting my application as a student at the Development Research 
Institute (IVO) of Tilburg University. Even though IVO had a lot of challenges, Dr. 
Muradian offered great support in ensuring that I remained on course and really helped 
in shaping my initial thoughts on the thesis. I am greatly indebted to Prof. James for 
agreeing to take me onboard when I became part of the CentER Graduate School after 
IVO closed in 2012. Despite retiring during my final year of study, Prof. James was 
always available almost on a daily basis to read through my lengthy drafts and give 
guidance. Even though I faced a lot of challenges combining full-time work, studying 
and family obligations, especially while back in Kenya, Prof. James and Dr. Muradian 
were quite understanding and always supportive. I am deeply grateful to both of them 
for believing in me and never allowing me to give up. They have greatly nurtured my 




I cannot forget the important role that has been played by Dr. Bertha Vallejo since 2011. 
She was instrumental in organizing my transfer to the School of Economics and 
Management after IVO was closed. She also worked hard to arrange a supervisor for me 
after the transfer. In addition, she has handled all the logistics related to travel, 
accommodation, medical insurance and subsistence allowance. I also cannot forget all 
the work that she has done in facilitating the finalization of the thesis, including making 
arrangements for its editing, liaising with the graduate board and my supervisor to 
appoint the promotion committee and making arrangements for the pre-defense and 
final defense. She has enabled my stay in Tilburg to be very smooth and memorable. I 
will forever be grateful to her, for she has been a God-sent angel. In the same line, I am 
also grateful to both the Economics and CentER secretaries for their support in 
arranging my travel and my office space in Tilburg. 
 
Special thanks go to my employer, the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and 
Analysis (KIPPRA), for supporting me during my studies. They granted me leave to 
travel to Tilburg to work with my supervisors in 2014 and 2015. 
 
I would also like to thank my fellow PhD students in Tilburg who made the journey 
more bearable. Thanks to Primrose Nakazibwe and Moina Rauf, who welcomed me 
during my first visit to Tilburg and took the time to show me around. Thanks to my 
other colleagues from Ethiopia (especially Rahel, Edna, Meskerem and Belaynesh), who 
were also quite supportive and welcoming, and to Reni, who always lit up the mood with 
her PhD comics and her photography.   
 
Special thanks go to my friend Judy, who played a big role in facilitating my data 
collection in Sauri. I am also greatly indebted to my family for supporting me 
throughout my studies. Special gratitude goes to my son for coping with my absence and 
for giving me peace while away. I would also like to thank my sisters Christine and 
Ursula and my cousins Everlyne and Stella for taking over my motherly responsibilities 
during my absence. I would also not have managed without Joan, the long-serving and 
supportive nanny to my child. I am very grateful for her support. I cannot forget to 
thank my friends (especially Jacinta, Isaac, Mary, Lenah and Andrew), who were not 
v 
 
only there for my son while I was away but also kept pushing me to finish my studies. 
Special thanks go to my neighbors and friends Christine, Eunice and Loyce, who always 
checked on my family during my absence. 
 
Bernadete Mukhwana Wanjala 
Nairobi, November 2015 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The greatest development challenge facing the low-income countries, especially Sub-
Saharan African countries, has been making progress towards achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Sub-Saharan Africa still faces significant 
challenges in almost all dimensions of poverty and is not on track to achieve most of the 
goals, even as the MDGs are transitioned into Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Meeting the goal of halving poverty by 2015 has been a serious challenge, despite 
experiencing positive growth rates since 2001. Recent trends indicate that poverty levels 
for Africa (excluding North Africa) declined from 56.5 percent in 1990 to 48.4 percent in 
2010, representing a 14 percent reduction, which was below the MDG target of 28.25 
percent (United Nations, 2015). Some countries like Kenya, Zambia, Mauritania and 
Nigeria recorded notable increases in poverty rates between 1990 and 2010.  
 
It has often been argued in the development discourse since the 1950s that poor 
countries are caught up in poverty traps and need a “big push” in terms of increased aid 
and investments to be able to increase their incomes (Sachs, 2005; Sachs et al., 2004). 
The term “big push” in this context refers to (a) the combination of multiple 
interventions targeting a few and small-scale locations; (b) the relative massive 
mobilization of external resources (in relation to available domestic resources); and (c) 
the assumption that after the “push,” the system (community) will shift to another state 
in which further development would not depend on external support. These “massive” 
investments are expected to spur savings and to encourage private investment through 
two main channels. First, household savings and micro finance become feasible as a 
result of increased household income above subsistence. Second, the existence of good 
infrastructure is expected to attract additional external private investment.  
 
The big push argument was based on the assumption that poor countries are caught up 
in a vicious circle of poverty and experience a low-level equilibrium trap where higher 
income does not increase savings. Foreign aid was thus considered necessary to break 
this vicious circle, increase productivity and launch a takeoff into self-sustained growth 
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(Easterly, 2003; Dollar and Easterly, 1999; Erixon, 2005). “Big push” ideas were first 
developed by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, who advocated large-scale and externally funded 
investment in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). Within this 
stream, several years later Walt Rostow argued that countries could emerge out of 
stagnation into self-sustained growth through an aid-financed increase in investment 
(Rostow, 1959). Big push ideas were therefore initially applied at a much higher scale 
than rural villages (i.e. at the national level).  
 
Early critics of the big push approach argued that the aid process was so heavily laden 
with motives of self-interest on the part of donors that it was not clear “who is helping 
whom,” leading to ineffective outcomes (Kaplan, 1967; Mehmet, 1971). The discussion 
about the effectiveness of big push approaches has been always intertwined with the 
debate about the effectiveness of foreign aid. More recently, support for big push 
propositions in development have been common among academics, who also argue that 
foreign aid plays a role in fostering growth and poverty reduction, though under certain 
conditions, such as good policies and properly functioning institutions (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Sachs et al., 2004; 
Sachs, 2005). On the other hand, more recent arguments against big push approaches 
have centered around (i) the lack of evidence about the existence of poverty traps 
(Easterly, 2005) and (ii) the proposition that aid has been largely ineffective in 
promoting growth and development (Dichter, 2005; Easterly 2005), based on the 
observation that a great number of development projects have fared poorly, especially 
the large-scale and government-initiated projects in sectors such as education, health, 
credit and infrastructure (Platteau, 2003).  
 
This argument lost credibility for about five decades but made a comeback in the new 
millennium, motivated mainly by the need for developing countries to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals. For instance, the UN Millennium Project 
recommended that “escaping the poverty trap requires a Big Push of basic investments 
in public administration, human capital and key infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, 
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water and sanitation, affordable housing and environmental management” 1  (UN 
Millennium Project, 2005; Sachs et al., 2004). The IMF and World Bank also called for 
implementation of the big push through the doubling of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) between 2005 and 2010 to support MDGs in low-income countries 
and Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF and World Bank, 2005). 
 
The launch of the Millennium Village Project (MVP)2 coincided with the return of the 
big push approach to development. The MVP was introduced in 2004, following the 
realization that Sub-Saharan Africa was unlikely to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) by 2015. The first millennium village (Sauri) was set up in Kenya in 
August 2004, with other additional villages across Africa. The MVP operates in 80 
villages organized in 15 clusters3 in Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. There were additional MVP sites4 that were 
initiated in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, Guinea 
and Liberia. Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea have multiple projects, while Niger, 
Chad and Sudan have the Sustainable Villages Program, which was an initiative of the 
Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development (ISFD)5. See Figure 1.1 for the countries in 
Africa where millennium villages are located. 
 
                                                           
1 This argument is quite similar to the takeoff hypothesis and the stages of economic growth of the ‘60s 
(Rostow’s stages of development). The only difference is the level of state intervention. 
2 The concept was developed by a team of scientific experts at The Earth Institute at Columbia University 
and the UN Millennium Project, headed by Jeffrey Sachs. 
3 The villages include: Sauri, Kenya; Dertu, Kenya; Koraro, Ethiopia; Mbola, Tanzania; Ruhiira, Uganda; 
Mayange, Rwanda; Gumulira, Malawi; Mwandama, Malawi; Bonsaaso, Ghana; SADA, Ghana; Tilby, Mali; 
Toya, Mali; Potou, Senegal; Ikaram, Nigeria; and Pampaida, Nigeria. See 
http://millenniumvillages.org/the-villages/ [Accessed July 2014]. 
4 These include: Sambaina millennium village site in Madagascar; Konkola in Zambia; Etoro and Obaba in 
Congo Brazzaville; Maroua and Mevomessi in Cameroon; Banikoara in Benin; Kountoire and Naki East in 
Togo and Kokoyah in Liberia. See http://millenniumvillages.org/the-villages/ [Accessed July 2014]. 
5 See 
http://isfd.isdb.org/EN/publications/Documents/Corporate%20Brochures/Sustainable%20Villages%20




Figure 1.1: Millennium Villages Project sites in Africa 
Source: Millennium Promise, 2012  
 
The aim of the Millennium Villages Project was to demonstrate how an integrated 
approach to community-level development can translate the MDGs into ground-level 
breakthroughs throughout rural Sub-Saharan Africa (MVP, 2011). The core task of the 
millennium villages was to “create a community-based implementation system to 
achieve the MDGs in impoverished rural African populations across many distinct agro-
ecological zones while operating within the per capita budget envelope as defined by the 
international ODA targets and national budget capabilities” (McArthur, Pronyk and 
Sachs, 2011). The MVP had three broad goals (MVP, 2011). The first and most basic goal 
was to ensure that all the millennium village communities and local governments 
achieve all the millennium development goals by 2015. Secondly, the MVP aimed at 
creating a system of success, which illustrates a well-defined pathway to achieve the 
MDGs and a toolkit that can be applied in other millennium villages in rural Africa. 
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Third, the MVP aimed at working with African governments to scale up MVP 
interventions and achievements and also ensure that the MVP achieves a very important 
impact on policy design and implementation. 
 
The MVP was based on the assumption that the rural poor in Africa could achieve the 
MDGs by increasing the stock of capital to the point of self-sustaining growth (UN 
Millennium Project, 2005; Sachs, 2005; Sachs et al., 2004). Substantial finances 
(mainly donor-funded – the “big push”) have been used in implementing these projects, 
with an average estimated cost of US$ 110 per person6 (MVP, 2006). From our sample, 
the mean income for Sauri was KES 4,737.8 – about US$ 55 (Table 2.2), which shows 
that the big push was twice as much as the household income. The idea was to increase 
rural agricultural productivity through targeted public sector investments in natural 
assets, human capital, infrastructure and financial stocks (Sanchez et al., 2007). In 
addition to increased agricultural productivity, enhanced diversification into higher 
value crops and the nonfarm sector would enhance household income, which would in 
turn spur increased savings and private investment. To enable households to pursue 
these livelihood strategies, the MVP also emphasized the role of market institutions in 
both the implementation and sustainability of the investments. There were also 
interventions in health that were aimed at improving child and maternal health; 
preventing and treating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; and improving nutrition 
and providing reproductive health care services. Interventions in health included 
development and rehabilitation of health centers, hiring and training of health 
personnel (including community health workers) and distribution of mosquito nets. 
Interventions in education were aimed at achieving universal completion of primary 
education and increased access to secondary and tertiary education, especially for girls 
(Sanchez et al., 2007). Lastly, interventions in infrastructure included development of 
                                                           
6 Each millennium village required a donor investment of US$ 300,000 annually for 5 years to cover the 
cost of the interventions (estimated at US$ 50 per villager) and the cost of logistics, community training 
and monitoring and evaluation (Millennium Villages Project, 2006). Other evidence on funding reveals 
that the MVP had targeted about 400,000 individuals for 2 and a half years (MVP, 2008). With an 




water sources (such as protected springs), rehabilitation of rural access roads and 
connection of local institutions to the electric grid. 
 
Implementation of the MVP was carried out in two five-year phases. The first phase 
mainly focused on achieving quick wins, especially in staple crop production and disease 
control, and establishing basic systems for integrated rural development that would help 
communities escape the poverty trap and achieve the MDGs (MVP, 2011; Nziguheba et 
al., 2010; MVP, 2008). The interventions in the first phase included: use of subsidized 
mineral fertilizers to reverse depletion of soil fertility; provision of subsidized improved 
seeds; provision of agricultural extension services; construction of grain storage 
facilities to minimize post-harvest losses; support to schools aimed at increasing 
primary school enrollment (school feeding programs, provision of sanitation facilities, 
building of classrooms and provision of school fees bursaries); and access to health, 
water and sanitation (through construction and equipping of health facilities, 
construction of protected water springs and construction of sanitation facilities). There 
were also efforts to enhance access to credit in the first phase through both microfinance 
and formal banking institutions. The second phase focused more on commercialization 
of agriculture, promotion of nonfarm activities (especially small-scale entrepreneurship) 
and enhanced access to output markets (with more focus on collective marketing 
initiatives).  
 
While substantial resources (about US$ 7 million per village per year – MVP, 2006) 
have been spent on the project, with substantial scaling-up (to 20 countries in 2014 – 
Millennium Promise, 2012), there has been no rigorous evaluation of the project to 
assess whether it was meeting the desired goals. The MVP has over time provided 
evidence of project quick wins, which have mainly been derived using before and after 
comparisons (Millennium Promise, 2006; Millennium Promise, 2010). They state that 
“simple solutions like providing high-yield seeds, fertilizers, medicines, drinking wells, 
and materials to build school rooms and clinics are effectively combating extreme 
poverty and nourishing communities into a new age of health and opportunity”7, yet no 
                                                           
7 http://millenniumvillages.org/the-villages/ [Accessed 12 October 2015]. 
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rigorous evaluation has been carried out to support this conclusion. The MVP, however, 
is implementing an end of project final evaluation in 2015 and 2016 with an aim of 
assessing the MVP’s effectiveness in achieving the MDGs by analyzing the associated 
costs, processes and systems (MVP, 2015). They intend to analyze the project impact by 
developing the counterfactual using samples of control villages, which is a similar 
approach to what was adopted in this study. They acknowledge that the project was not 
designed as a controlled experiment and therefore did not include a control sample in 
their design. In addition to the lack of rigorous evaluation of the project, key criticisms 
of the MVP’s approach of measuring the quick wins have been due to the lack of 
attribution of project effects, which has led to calls for rigorous impact evaluation 
(Clemens and Demombynes, 2010). Other criticisms have regarded the ineffectiveness 
of using the big push approach to overcome Africa’s vicious circle of poverty (Cabral, 
Farrington and Ludi, 2006; Carr, 2008; Easterly, 2005, 2006), the fact that the MVP 
was more of a top-down blueprint that was applied across several countries (Rich, 2007) 
and the MVP’s similarities with past rural development initiatives that proved 
ineffective in promoting and sustaining rural development (Cabral, Farrington and 
Ludi, 2006; World Bank, 1982; Adelman, 1984; Mellor and Johnston, 1984). 
 
This study sought to provide the first independent rigorous evaluation of the MVP. The 
study is an ex-post evaluation and therefore applies non-experimental methods 
(propensity score matching and doubly robust estimator) to assess the impact of the 
interventions. The use of non-experimental evaluation approaches is widely supported 
in literature, with previous evidence on impact evaluations of agricultural projects 
showing that 94 percent of the evaluations used non-experimental approaches (World 
Bank, 2011). It has also been shown that most evaluations have been in the areas of land 
titling and technology adoption projects, with limited evidence on the effectiveness of 
agricultural projects (IDB, 2010). 
 
1.1 The choice of study area and data collection methods 
The selection of Sauri as a millennium village was based on the incidence of poverty and 
hunger in the area (Pronyk et al., 2012; MVP, 2011). The villages reflected a diversity of 
agro-ecological zones and also represented a range of challenges to income, food 
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production, disease ecology, infrastructure and health system development. Sauri has 
been coined as a success story of the MVP across Africa, with major achievements in 
agricultural productivity, estimated at over a 200 percent increase by the MVP 
(Millennium Promise, 2006). This therefore makes Sauri an ideal case study to assess 
the impact of the MVP interventions. The Sauri cluster is located in western Kenya, in 
Yala Division, Gem District and Siaya County of Kenya. It is located in the Kenya 
highlands, 1400-1500 meters above sea level, west of the Rift Valley and 30 kilometers 
north of Lake Victoria. The equator lies just to the south of Sauri (0o 06N). Sauri is 
located 40 kilometers from Kisumu, the nearest city. The cluster consists of a 
conglomerate of 11 villages, which administratively are sub-locations. These include: Bar 
Sauri, Anyiko, Nyamninia, Jina, Marenyo, Nyawara, Nyandiwa, Gongo, Ramula, Uranga 
and Lihanda. The Sauri cluster has a total population of about 60,234 individuals and 
13,923 households (Republic of Kenya, 2010). The poverty level8 for Siaya County, 
where the Sauri cluster is located, was estimated at 35.6 percent in 2005 (Kenya Open 
Data, 2014). The county ranks 10 out of 47 counties in terms of poverty (with an average 
national poverty rate of 47.2 percent) and is therefore not the poorest county. 
Subsistence agriculture is the primary economic activity among the residents of 
Sauri. The average farm size is 0.58 hectares, with most households being subsistence 
farmers (MVP, 2007). The main crop is maize, and other crops include beans, sweet 
potatoes, bananas, plantains, cassava, kale, tomatoes and onions. In terms of other 
indicators, Siaya County compares favorably with other counties in its region. For 
instance, the poverty rates for the neighboring counties, namely, Migori, Kisumu and 
Homabay counties are 46.7 percent, 47.8 percent and 44.1 percent respectively 
(Republic of Kenya, 2011). Siaya County also has the highest proportion of population 
with primary education in its region, which was estimated at 70.3 percent in 2011, 
compared to a national average of 66.6 percent, Migori county at 68 percent, Kisumu 
county at 62 percent and Homabay county at 65.6 percent. 
 
                                                           
8 The Kenya poverty line in 2005 was 1,562 Kenya shillings (KES) per month (about US$ 19 at an 




Data collection for this study was carried out between July and September 2009. A 
sample of respondents was randomly drawn from 9 of the 11 millennium villages (all 
except Ramula and Uranga). These two villages were excluded mainly because of 
logistical reasons, i.e. the villages were far apart. Given that these two villages did not 
have any features distinctive from the others, we assumed that no significant 
information was lost by their exclusion.  
 
Respondents for the control group were randomly selected from five neighboring 
villages, namely Maliera, Siriwo, Malanga, Lundha and Wagai. This sample was 
considered as a good non-experimental control group mainly for three reasons: (i) it was 
drawn from the same agro-ecological zone as the millennium villages, (ii) it is within the 
same administrative unit as the millennium villages (Yala Division, Gem District) and 
(iii) it would be the next group to be incorporated into the MVP project in any future 
scaling-up. Data were collected from 236 households within the MVP (out of a 
population of 11,333 households) and 175 respondents from the control group (out of a 
population of 6,444 households). Table 1.1 shows the total population and the size of the 
sample by village. 
 
Additional qualitative data was collected from key informants and focus group 
discussions, with respondents including MVP local facilitators (2), MVP committee 
members drawn from the community (5), individual farmers (109), input and output 
suppliers (5, including the National Cereals and Produce Board, which was located 
within Sauri), farmers’ groups (5 groups), microfinance institutions (2 formal – SAGA 
and Rabuor Sinaga Community Fund – and 2 informal money lenders) and local 
government administration (the District Commissioner, the District Officer and 2 local 
chiefs (heads of locations)). Given that this study is an ex-post evaluation, the study 
relied on historical information collected from key informants and focus group 
discussions to assess the before situation, especially for institutional analysis. We had 
                                                           
9 One was an elite farmer whom the MVP used to showcase its activities, even though his activities were 
not MVP-related. He got his own grants to initiate projects and train farmers within Sauri, independently 
from the MVP. 
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five focus group discussions separately with selected farmers, farmers’ groups and MVP 
committee members. 
 










Bar Sauri 5,696 1,316 30 
Anyiko 4,351 1,015 25 
Nyamninia 7,723 1,770 23 
Jina 5,381 1,263 23 
Marenyo 7,930 1,811 28 
Gongo 3,951 871 24 
Nyandhiwa 5,059 1,156 33 
Nyawara 3,669 858 27 
Lihanda 5,612 1,273 23 
Uranga 4,381 1,010 0 
Ramula 6,481 1,580 0 
Total millennium villages 60,234 13,923 236 
Control group 
Maliera 6,048 1,363 56 
Malanga 6,523 1,517 50 
Lundha 4,460 1,058 26 
Siriwo 4,368 990 27 
Wagai 6,504 1,516 16 
Total control group 27,903 6,444 175 
Source: Compiled from Republic of Kenya. 2010. Kenya population and housing census: 





1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis includes three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) 
seeks to estimate the magnitude of the changes induced by the MVP interventions in 
agricultural productivity, production margins, food self-consumption and different 
sources of household income. Given that the study is an ex-post evaluation, the study 
uses propensity score matching and a doubly robust estimator to estimate the impact of 
MVP interventions on agricultural productivity and household income (disaggregated 
into income from: sale of agricultural surplus, small-scale business, wage employment 
(farm and nonfarm) and remittances). Further analysis is carried out to assess (i) the 
sensitivity of the analysis to the choice of covariates, (ii) whether spillover effects were 
significant, which has an implication on the magnitude of the estimated treatments 
effects, and (iii) the heterogeneity of treatment effects. We find significant MVP effects 
on agricultural productivity and total household income (including self-consumption) 
but insignificant cash income effects. The missing link between increased agricultural 
productivity and household cash income is due to the small sizes of land and large 
household sizes, with a bigger proportion of production being consumed at home. The 
chapter concludes that there is a need to test assumptions on which the theories of 
change are based in order to ensure effectiveness of the interventions. 
 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) builds upon Chapter 2 by assessing whether 
the MVP effects could be explained by the level of diversification of sources of income. 
The chapter assesses whether households that diversified their sources of income had 
higher income, lower poverty levels and higher/lower MVP income treatment effects. 
The analysis is sub-divided into three sections. The first section estimates the level of 
diversity and assesses the determinants of diversification (using a tobit model). The 
second section uses an indirect approach of checking for common causality (because the 
relationship between household income and the level of diversity is bi-directional) to 
assess the relationship between the level of diversity and household income and poverty. 
The last section also uses observed and predicted levels of treatment effects to assess 
whether households that diversified their sources of income had higher MVP income 
treatment effects. We find that (i) the average level of diversity in the millennium 
villages was not significantly higher than the control villages and was quite low in both 
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groups (a Simpson Index of Diversity of 0.29 for millennium villages and 0.25 for the 
control group); (ii) the main push factors into diversification were the small sizes of land 
and large household sizes; (iii) similar variables (especially size of land, household size, 
dependency, education and access to credit) also explained variations in income and 
poverty, with the MVP dummy also insignificant for both household income and 
poverty; and (iv) households that diversified more had lower MVP effects, which likely 
related to the MVP’s focus on agricultural interventions as opposed to the nonfarm 
economy. The chapter concludes that the insignificant cash income MVP treatment 
effects were partly determined by the low level of diversification among Sauri 
households. The chapter lends further support to the argument that the nonfarm 
economy is important in enhancing household income and reducing poverty. 
 
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) builds upon Chapters 2 and 3 by assessing 
whether the performance of market institutions promoted or undermined the 
achievement of the MVP goals. The focus of the analysis is on the institutional 
environment that is relevant to agricultural development within the millennium villages, 
which includes interactions within (i) input markets, (ii) output markets and (iii) credit 
markets. We develop a framework that links institutional changes that were induced by 
the MVP to the key development outcomes. Institutional changes are measured as 
differences in institutions between the before and after of the MVP (although we 
acknowledge the limitation of using before and after comparisons due to lack of 
attribution). This chapter largely uses qualitative research methods, which are 
supplemented by econometric estimation of (i) the effect of transaction costs on output 
market access and (ii) the factors affecting access to formal credit. We find that (i) 
increased access to inputs enhanced agricultural productivity in the first year, but the 
gains could not be sustained after the phasing out of the input subsidy; (ii) enhancing 
collective marketing of produce through cereal banks was not successful, given that 10 of 
the 11 cereal banks collapsed within the first 3 years of operation. Thereafter, there was a 
transition from cereal banking to marketing cooperatives, which were likely to suffer 
from the same problems experienced by the cereal banks. Only transaction costs that 
were associated with the time when prices were known by the seller, the damage to 
goods during transportation and when actual payment for the goods were made 
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significantly determined market access; and (iii) interventions in the credit market were 
not successful, given the low repayment rates of microfinance loans and low uptake of 
credit financing from commercial banks. Constraints to access to credit (especially lack 
of collateral and cost of borrowing) were still prevalent in Sauri. The chapter 
underscores the need for understanding the role of local structural factors that could 
undermine the effectiveness of interventions. We conclude that institutional bottlenecks 
in input, output and credit markets also undermined the effectiveness of the MVP 
interventions. 
 
The last chapter (Chapter 5) provides a key summary of the findings, identifies key 
emerging issues and provides areas for further research. It also cites the limitations of 
the study as mainly a lack of baseline and longitudinal data and the use of a small 
sample. There are three key emerging issues: the design of the project, which is 
important in facilitating more accurate impact evaluation of the project (random 
experimental designs are more desirable); the failure to test the assumptions of the 
theory of change; and whether the gains of the project can be sustained beyond the 
project period. Areas for further research include an independent end-term evaluation 
of the MVP and a detailed cost effectiveness analysis of the MVP. 
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Chapter 2: Can Big Push Interventions Take Small-scale Farmers 




*A version of this chapter is published in World Development. See Wanjala, B. M. and 
Muradian, R. 2013. Can big push interventions take small-scale farmers out of poverty? 




2.1   Introduction 
 
The Millennium Villages Project (MVP) is based on the assumption that Africa’s poverty 
trap could be overcome and the MDGs achieved by 2015 by means of raising the capital 
stock to the point of self-sustaining growth (UN Millennium Project, 2005; Sachs, 2005; 
Sachs et al., 2004). It assumes that targeted public sector investments in millennium 
villages can be used to raise rural productivity, which would increase private savings and 
investments. This requires a “big push” of basic investments in natural assets (soil 
nutrients), human capital (skills and health), infrastructure (roads, power and 
telecommunication) and financial stocks, such as household assets, collaterals and 
micro finance (Sanchez et al., 2007).  
 
The MVP had an estimated budget of US$ 110 per person. Implementing the 
intervention in a village like Sauri — with about 60,000 people — costs about US$ 7 
million (MVP, 2006). Scaling up such interventions would require a very large 
mobilization of resources, which would mainly be achieved through foreign inflows. 
Even though the proponents of the MVP do not explicitly relate their arguments to any 
particular theory, a closer examination of their approach shows a resemblance to the big 
push theory, as earlier pointed out by Cabral, Farrington and Ludi (2006), Carr (2008) 





One of the key underlying assumptions of the MVP is that the increase in agricultural 
productivity would lead to a rise in cash income, which will in turn trigger “self-
sustained” local development processes. This causal model assumes that a positive 
relationship between productivity and cash income will be achieved through two main 
channels – (i) directly through higher revenues from agricultural sales (in the presence 
of efficient markets as discussed in Chapter 4) and (ii) indirectly through lower food 
prices, employment and wage effects in agriculture and employment, wage and income 
effects in other sectors through production, consumption and savings linkages (Sachs, 
2005; Sachs et al., 2004 – summarized in Figure 2.1). These two channels have been 
identified by a number of studies (Mellor, 1999; Sarris, 2001; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2002; Minten and Barrett, 2008). In addition, it is reasonable to expect that a higher 
level of productivity would allow households to allocate a higher amount of production 
to self-consumption. The latter might also induce secondary positive economic effects if 
less food expenditure (due to higher self-consumption) enables higher investment in 
productive assets, for instance.  
 
The MVP is based upon two key sets of assumptions: (1) the effectiveness of “big push” 
ideas applied to rural villages and (2) taking the agricultural sector as a major driver of 
economic development. The debate about the role of the agricultural sector in the 
process of economic development is very old, and the dominant visions have changed 
considerably over time. During the 1950s, the influential ideas of Arthur Lewis led many 
scholars to assume that the process of economic development consisted of relocating 
factors of production from an agricultural sector characterized by low productivity and 
the use of traditional technology to a modern industrial sector with higher productivity 







Figure 2.1: Channels through which MVP interventions in agriculture are expected to 






















































Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
During the 1960s, nonetheless, these ideas were challenged, and new arguments for 
giving agriculture a central role as a driver of economic growth were developed, based 
on stressing its contribution to food supply, national income through exports and farm 
production, on which a large proportion of the population in developing countries relies 
(Johnston and Mellor, 1961). An agriculture-led development strategy gained further 
prominence during the 1980s, following the Asian Green Revolution. Several programs 
addressing the problems of small farmers were supported through capital and technical 
assistance from Western donors (World Development Report, 1982). At that time, 
academic contributions arguing in favor of strong support for the agricultural sector 
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included the works of Adelman (1984), who proposed an agricultural demand-led 
industrialization (ADLI) program, and Mellor and Johnston (1984), who stressed that 
agriculture plays a dominant position as a source of income and employment in low-
income countries. Increased agricultural growth was seen not only as a means for 
providing food to the poor but also as a means of promoting a favorable employment-
oriented demand structure (Hazell and Haggblade, 1990). Nonetheless, during the 
1990s, when the neoliberal policy agenda gained a prominent place among governments 
of developing countries, many agricultural support programs were dismantled as part of 
structural reforms, and the emphasis of the development agenda again shifted away 
from agriculture.  
 
As stated above, by the mid-2000s policy ideas changed again in favor of massive 
support for the agricultural sector. Since the publication of the World Development 
Report in 2008 (World Development Report, 2008), the proposition that agricultural 
policies and interventions are vital development tools, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, has gained momentum. The latter shift was supported by new empirical evidence 
showing that GDP growth in agriculture is more effective in reducing poverty as 
compared to GDP growth in other sectors (Khan, 2000; World Development Report, 
2008; Christiaensen, Demery and Kühl, 2006) and that agriculture has strong forward 
linkages, mainly with agro-processing and service industries, and backward linkages 
with industries that produce agricultural inputs (Anríquez and Stamoulis, 2007). The 
MVP has coincided then with the return of both (1) the emphasis on the agricultural 
sector as a major driver of economic development and (2) the “big push” ideas about 
development. 
 
Nonetheless, another stream of literature has stressed the notion that asset 
accumulation and income diversification play a major role in rural economic 
development (Barrett, Reardon and Webb, 2001; Freeman, Ellis and Allison, 2004; 
Bahiigwa, Mdoe and Ellis, 2005). According to this vision, households are expected to 
reach a level of asset accumulation above which they can escape poverty (Adato, Carter 
and May, 2006; Carter and May 2001; Barrett, Carter and Ikegami, 2008; Carter and 
Barrett, 2006). These studies argue that a combination of productive diversification and 
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asset accumulation (including land) contributes to the sustainability of rural livelihoods 
because it improves their long-term resilience to adverse trends or sudden shocks. 
Furthermore, nonfarm income has been reported to play a significant role in enhancing 
agricultural productivity, food security and overall household income (Evans and Ngau, 
1991; Zerai and Gebreegziabher, 2011; Owusu, Abdulai and Abdul-Rahman, 2011; 
Gladwin et al., 2001; Omotesho, Adewumi and Fadimula, 2007). Therefore, scholars 
from this stream tend to be skeptical about interventions and development theories 
overemphasizing the role of agricultural activities as a tool to take rural households out 
of poverty. According to Ellis (1999), for instance, it is not reasonable to expect that 
farm output growth would create plentiful nonfarm income opportunities in the rural 
economy (via linkage effects) because farming on its own is unable to provide a 
sufficient means of survival for many poor rural families. Hence, a relevant question is 
whether the scarce resources of rural interventions should be allocated to enhancing 
agricultural output or rather to promoting income diversification (particularly from the 
nonfarm sector). The present study aims to contribute to this policy debate by means of 
assessing the effects of the MVP interventions.  
 
Agricultural interventions under the MVP in Sauri were primarily aimed at increasing 
crop yield and reducing food shortages through the training of farmers in improved 
agricultural techniques and the provision of improved seeds and fertilizers. 
Implementation of the inputs subsidy program was carried out in phases. During the 
first year, there was a 100 percent subsidy on inputs, during the second year 50 percent, 
and during the remaining years no subsidy. Loans from microfinance and formal 
banking institutions financed the acquisition of inputs during the third, fourth and fifth 
years. Implementation across the 11 villages was done in two steps. In the first year 
(2005), a full agricultural subsidy was introduced in Bar Sauri village. In the second year 
(2006), Bar Sauri received half the agricultural subsidy, with the project being scaled 
out to the next 10 villages at the same time. This implies that heterogeneity across 
households in the different villages resulting from differences in the design of program 
implementation is not large, given that implementation was carried out almost at the 
same time. In the field of education, MVP interventions have included rehabilitation of 
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school facilities and the introduction of a school feeding program (cost-shared between 
the MVP and the community).  
 
There has been an expansion and scaling-up of the program over time, and the 
interventions have been replicated in other villages across several countries. The MVP 
uses the before-and-after comparison to attribute changes in the villages to the effects of 
the project (Millennium Promise, 2010). Success has mainly been measured by an 
improvement in several indicators, key among them agricultural productivity, health 
and education outcomes (Millennium Promise, 2006, 2010). However, the major 
limitation with the MVP’s way of measuring impact is that it does not address the issue 
of causality, i.e. to what extent the outcomes can be attributed to the interventions. 
Rigorous impact evaluation is therefore needed to show the net effects of this type of 
integrated intervention (Clemens and Demombynes, 2010). A major issue, however, is 
that as far as we know, control groups have not been identified by the project before 
implementation, and therefore any intended evaluation study will face attribution 
problems.  
 
The present study seeks to carry out an impact evaluation of the MVP at the household 
level. In particular, it aims to estimate the magnitude of the changes induced by the 
interventions in agricultural productivity, production margins, food self-consumption 
and different sources of household income. Given that the study is an ex-post evaluation 
following a non-experimental design (with no baseline data), propensity score matching 
and doubly robust estimator methodologies are used t0 net out the impact of the 
program. We use a control group that is drawn from neighboring villages to estimate the 
counterfactual. The millennium villages study group conducted an impact evaluation by 
comparing the agricultural yields of millennium villages to those of a control group, with 
the control group being drawn from households that did not use inputs within the 
millennium villages (Nziguheba et al., 2010). However, we think that this way of 
identifying control households is problematic due to possible high spillover effects 
derived from the project’s investments in public goods (infrastructure, education, 
health). A more recent study by the millennium villages study group (Pronyk et al., 
2012) also indicated that non-consideration of spillover effects was a major limitation in 
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their study. We tried to minimize these problems by choosing a control group that is 
outside but neighboring the millennium villages and also controlling for spillover 
effects. In addition, we tried to correct for selection bias using a number of econometric 
techniques, as explained below.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the analytical 
framework and methodology used. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical findings, and 
Section 2.4 discusses the results.  
 
2.2  Methodology 
 
2.2.1   Analytical framework 
As stated above, all households in the millennium villages are targeted by the 
interventions of the MVP, which makes selection of a control group problematic. The 
control group was thus set by means of randomly selecting households in neighboring 
villages. Propensity score matching (PSM) is used to net out the effect of the 
interventions. PSM can only be applied when several essential pre-conditions are met 
(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Cook, Shadish and Wong, 2008; Glazerman, Levy 
and Myers, 2003). Such pre-conditions are: (i) Data is collected using identical 
questionnaires for both groups during the same period, (ii) treatment and comparison 
observations share a common economic environment and (iii) participants and non-
participants have the same distribution of observed and unobserved attributes. The 
approach adopted in this study satisfies the pre-conditions because (i) data for both 
treatment and control groups were collected using the same questionnaire and at the 
same time; (ii) both groups share similar poverty incidence and also fall within the same 
agro-ecological zone, so we can expect that the two groups would have similar 
productivity levels without the intervention; and (iii) the propensity score function 
includes similar relevant independent variables for both groups. However, we 





PSM has been used to evaluate the impacts of different programs related to agriculture 
and food security. For instance, Abebaw, Yibeltal and Belay (2010) examined the impact 
of a food security program on household food consumption using PSM to control for 
pre-intervention differences. Using a non-parametric pscore matching technique, 
Mendola (2005) showed that improved agricultural technology positively affected 
households’ well-being by increasing their income and reducing their propensity to fall 
below the poverty line. Cunguara and Darnhofer (2011) applied three techniques 
(regression and matching, sub-classification and regression and the doubly robust 
estimator) to estimate the impact of improved agricultural technologies on household 
income in rural Mozambique. Overall, they found that using improved agricultural 
technologies did not have a statistically significant impact on household income. 
 
To assess the impact of the MVP on an outcome variable (Z), the impact of the 
intervention is measured as the change in the outcome (∆Z) that can be attributed to the 
program (Ravallion, 2005) (See Figure 2.2). Suppose the treatment status is denoted by 
T, which implies that Ti = 1 if household i participates in the program and Ti = 0 if the 
household does not participate in the program (the counterfactual, represented by the 
control group). The potential outcomes are   for the outcome of the household 
participating in the program and  for the counterfactual. The change in the outcome 
that is induced by the program is given by ∆ = 	 −	 (see Figure 2.2). The 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET), which is the mean impact on the 
outcome variable among those households participating in the program, is given by: 
 
 = ∆| = 1 = | = 1 − 	| = 0 
 
Even though PSM can be used alone to measure average treatment effects, 
incorporating regression methods is expected to eliminate remaining biases and to 
increase precision (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Glazerman et al., 2003). In order to 
















Source: Adapted from Ravallion (2005) and Adam (2006) 
 
The main hypotheses of this analysis are: 
(i) The MVP interventions result in an increase in agricultural productivity. 
(ii) The MVP interventions result in an increase in agricultural productivity and 
household income (homogeneous effect).  
(iii) The impact on household income varies across households (heterogeneous 
effect). 
 
2.2.2  Method of analysis 
 
2.2.2.1   Propensity score matching 
A standard logit model10 is used to calculate propensity scores for each participant and 
the control group (Abebaw, Yibeltal and Belay, 2010; Ravallion, 2005; Ravallion, 2001; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The model is given by  
 
Di = f (Xi)  
                                                           
10 There is little guidance on the choice of the functional form of the model that is used in PSM. However, 
any discrete choice model can be used, even though logit and probit models are preferred over linear 
probability models (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
Outcome Z 
   
   =1                                                        Treatment 
 
		=0                                                      Comparison 
                                                               
      Z0                                                       
 
                             t0                             t1        time 
Impact:  ∆ = =1 − =0 
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where Di is the dummy for participation in the MVP and Xi represents the covariates11 
listed in Table 2. Thus, 
  
Di = f(sex, age, education of household head, household size, dependency, land, house, 
employment status of household head, marital status of household head, main source 
of livelihood) 
 
For PSM to be applied, two conditions must hold, namely the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) and the common support requirement (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). Under the CIA, it is assumed that given a set of observable covariates (X), which 
are not influenced by the treatment, the potential outcomes are independent of the 
treatment assignment. This implies that participation in the program is based solely on 
observable characteristics. The choice of independent variables in this study satisfies 
this condition, given that they are not influenced by the outcome (participation in the 
MVP or not). The common support requirement, on the other hand, ensures that 
households with similar X values have an associated probability (propensity score) of 
being both participants and non-participants. 
 
To determine the region of common support, this study adopts the minima and maxima 
comparison, where all the observations below the minimum and above the maximum 
are deleted. After checking for the conditional independence assumption and common 
support conditions, each participant i is paired with a group of comparable non-
participants (on the basis of propensity scores). The choice of the matching algorithm is 
important in small samples, because there is usually a trade-off between bias and 
variance (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997). We adopt three different matching 
                                                           
11 It is likely that some of the covariates such as employment status of household head, type of house, 
household size and source of livelihood would be influenced by the treatment. However, following our 
field experience, we hypothesize that there were no significant changes in these parameters following the 
implementation of the MVP. Furthermore, to ascertain whether exclusion of these variables significantly 




algorithms to check whether the outcomes are comparable (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008): kernel, nearest neighbor (with replacement) and caliper and radius.  
 
The quality of matching was assessed using the standardized bias approach, which 
compares the bias before and after matching. Checking the quality of matching is 
necessary to establish whether the distribution of variables is balanced both in the 
treatment and control groups. If differences between the treatment group and the 
control group still exist after matching, then it is likely that the matching was not 
successful, which would be explained by either misspecification of the model or failure 
of the CIA and common support requirements. There is no standardized measure of 
success with regard to this approach, but empirical evidence indicates that from three to 
five percent reduction in bias is satisfactory (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
 
The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) is calculated as the mean of the 
specific outcome variable (Z) for participants less the mean for the matched control 
household, as shown below. The treatment effects were estimated mainly for the 
following outcome variables: agricultural productivity, production margins, self-








In addition, ATET was estimated for the various sources of cash income, including: 
agriculture, small-scale business and self-employment, farm wage employment, 
nonfarm wage employment and remittances. 
 
Given that PSM does not take into consideration the effects of unobserved variables, the 
key question is whether unobserved factors can alter the inference about treatment 
effects. To get insights into this problem, we undertake a bounds test as proposed by 
Rosenbaum (2002). The bounds test provides evidence of the degree to which the 
significance of the results hinges on the untestable assumption of insignificant 
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unobserved effects (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). The matching approach will not be 
applicable if the results turn out to be sensitive. 
 
To test for the presence of spillover effects, we assess the relationship between the 
outcome variables (agricultural productivity, production margins, self-consumption and 
household income) and the distance from the control villages to the nearest millennium 
village. If strong spillover effects are present, we expect the regression coefficient to be 
negative and statistically significant, implying that the farther away from the 
millennium village a control household is, the lesser the productivity or income effect 
resulting from the intervention. In addition, to estimate spillover effects, we re-
estimated the impact by excluding the millennium villages and control villages that are 
close neighbors. The excluded villages are: Nyawara, Gongo, Lihanda, Siriwo and Wagai. 
The resulting sample includes 154 MVP and 140 control households. Note that exclusion 
of these villages reduces the sample size from 412 to 294, which can affect the 
robustness of the results. 
 
2.2.2.2   Sensitivity analysis 
In order to assess how the PSM method influences the outcomes of the evaluation, 
sensitivity analysis was carried out using different combinations of the covariates. Diaz 
and Handa (2006) argue that the type of covariates used likely do not influence the 
outcomes, but may lead to large biases if uncorrected. Bias in this case is mainly reduced 
by combining regression and matching methods.  
 
2.2.2.3   Doubly robust estimation 
According to Funk et al. (2011), the doubly robust estimator requires modeling the 
relations between confounders and the outcome within each group. The resulting 
parameter estimates are then used to calculate the predicted outcomes (e.g. income for 
MVP as Ŷ1 and income for control group as Ŷ0) both for the MVP (T=1) and the control 
group (T=0), given covariate values X. The treatment is then modeled as a function of 
the covariates (as discussed in section (a) above) to derive the propensity scores. The 
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Here, DR is doubly robust; PS is propensity score; T is exposure to treatment and ZT=0 
and ZT=1 are observed outcomes among individuals with T=0 and T=1, respectively.  &= 
E(Z/T=1, X) and &= E(Z/T=0, X). 
 
From above, DR1 is a function of an individual’s observed outcomes when exposed to 
treatment (ZT=1) and predicted outcomes under exposure given the covariates (& ) 
weighted by a function of the propensity score. DR0, on the other hand, is the 
household’s predicted response (&) had they not been exposed to treatment. Finally the 
means of DR1 and DR0 are calculated across the study population.  
 
2.2.2.4   Heterogeneity of effects 
Heterogeneity has to do with whether the effect of the program varies according to the 
household characteristics. We follow the same approach as Abebaw, Yibeltal and Belay 
(2010) to estimate heterogeneous effects. The individual household treatment effects 
(TETi) were regressed against the covariates using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation technique. In addition to the covariates, we included an asset index to assess 
the effect of asset accumulation on the treatment effects. Derivation of the asset index 
follows from Adato, Carter and May (2006), whereby the well-being of a household 
(measured as the ratio of household expenditure to the poverty line) is regressed against 
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a bundle of assets held by the household. The asset index is then derived by weighting 
the household assets by their marginal contribution to the household welfare and 
summing across the assets. We use two key productive assets that are used in the 
millennium villages in the production process, namely land and human capital (using 
the level of education as a proxy for human capital). Equations were estimated for the 
different outcome indicators, which included: agricultural productivity, production 
margins, self-consumption, household cash income and total income. 
 
2.2.3 Definition of variables 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the key household characteristics (covariates) and 
outcome variables that were used in the analysis, along with their definition and 
measurement. Key outcome indicators that are measured include: (i) agricultural 
productivity, which is measured by maize yield per hectare; (ii) production margins (net 
productivity), which is measured by the (surrogate) monetary measure of agricultural 
production less production costs; (iii) self-consumption, measured by the (surrogate) 
monetary value of maize output that is allocated to own consumption; (iv) cash income, 
which is the amount of monetary income that a household earns in a month; and (v) 
total income, which includes both the cash income and the surrogate income measure 
from self-consumption. 
 
Table 2.1: Definition and measurement of variables 
Variable Type and definition Measurement 
Dependent variable 
Treatment  Dummy variable representing 
participation in MVP 
1 if in MVP, 0 if not in MVP 
Covariates 
Sex of household 
head 
Dummy, sex of household head 1 if male, 0 if female 
Age of household 
head 







Level of education of household 
head 
1 for no education and basic education, 
0 for higher education (including 
secondary school, college and 
university) 
Household size Discrete, household size Number of household members 
Dependency Discrete, level of dependence 
within household 
Derived by taking the ratio of 
economically inactive over active 
members of the household 
Land Discrete, size of land holding The size of land owned by household in 
hectares 




Dummy, employment status of 
household head 
1 for employed, 0 for not employed 
Marital status of 
household head 
Dummy, marital status of 
household head 
1 for married, 0 for 
single/widowed/divorced 
Livelihood Dummy, source of livelihood 
(using major source of income as 
proxy) 
1 for agriculture, 0 for non-agriculture 
(small-scale business, self-employment 
wage employment, pension, 
remittances) 
Outcome indicators 
Productivity Discrete, average yield per 
hectare of main staple crop per 
harvest season, which is mostly 
one season per year (proxied by 
maize) 







Discrete, surrogate measure of 
income from household 
consumption of self-produced 
food, valued at self-reported 
market selling prices 





















Discrete, average monthly cash 





Discrete, average monthly 
income for the household, 
includes market value of self-
consumption 
Discrete, level of dependency on 
agriculture 
Discrete, measure of net value of 
productivity 
Amount of income in KES, 
disaggregated into different sources 
[agriculture – sale of agricultural 
surplus, small scale business, wage 
employment (farm and nonfarm) and 
remittances] 
Amount of income in KES, derived by 
summing total cash income and 
surrogate measure of income from self-
consumption 
Derived by the ratio of agricultural 
income to total household income 
Derived by taking the approximate 
monetary value of total production of 
maize less total costs of production 
 
2.3 Empirical Findings 
 
2.3.1  Description of household characteristics 
There are significant differences between the MVP and non-MVP (control group) 
households along a number of variables: education level of household head, household 
size, dependency ratio, type of house, source of livelihood, size of land and also the level 
of income derived from the sale of agricultural production (Table 2.2). MVP households 
tend to have better educated heads, a higher number of members, a higher dependency 
ratio and better housing (more semi-permanent and permanent structures), and to be 







Table 2.2: Summary of test of significance of the difference of means between MVP and non-MVP households  
Variables MVP households Non-MVP households Difference in means [diff = 
mean(no) - mean(yes)] 
t-value 
Mean STD SE Mean STD SE Mean STD SE 
Sex 0.7 0.5 0 0.7 0.5 0 0 0.1 0 -0.2 
Age 52.7 14.4 1 50.1 16.4 1.2 -2.6 1.5 1.5 -1.7*** 
Marital status 0.7 0.5 0 0.7 0.5 0 0 0.1 0.1 -0.8 
Education 0.7 0.5 0 0.8 0.4 0 0.2 0 0 3.5* 
Household size 5.9 2.7 0.2 4.7 2.3 0.1 -1.2 0.3 0.3 -4.6* 
Employment status 0.3 0.5 0 0.3 0.5 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Dependency ratio 1.8 1.5 0.1 1.4 1.3 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.1 -3.0* 
Type of house 0.2 0.4 0 0.3 0.5 0 0.1 0 0 3.3* 
Livelihood 0.9 0.3 0 0.7 0.4 0 -0.1 0 0 -3.6* 
Land 0.5 0.6 0 0.4 0.4 0 -0.1 0.1 0.5 -2.4* 
Agricultural productivity 24.8 15.3 1.1 13.6 12.5 1 -11.2 1.4 1.5 -7.8* 
Agricultural income 1,449.80 2,086.90 144 843.2 1,884.90 144.1 -606.7 203.8 205.9 -3.0* 
Farm employment income 343.8 708.3 48.8 299.4 690.9 52.8 -44.4 71.9 72.1 -0.6 
Self-employment income 1,128.50 2,125.70 146.3 1,228.80 2,947.90 225.4 100.3 268.8 260 0.4 
Nonfarm wage employment 
income 
1,126.10 2,520.70 173.5 905 5,531.70 423 -221.1 457.2 426.8 -0.5 
Remittances 695.3 1,577.10 108.6 712 1,612.30 123.3 16.7 164.3 163.9 0.1 
Self-consumption 17,204.00 11,043.00 737.9 8372 8790.1 648 -8832 982 1,003.90 -8.8* 
Cash income 4,737.80 3,928.00 271.1 3,988.40 8,224.80 628.9 -749.4 684.9 642 -1.2 
Total income 21,972.50 13,182.30 888.7 12,390.70 14,144.90 1,048.50 -9,581.00 664.7 1,365.30 -7.0* 
Production margins 16,661.83 19159.81 1,280.17 4,979.97 8,708.37 641.99 -11681.7 1432.1 1527.9 -7.6* 
Agricultural cash income to           
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production ratio 123.8 12.0 177.6 290.2 48.1 648.9 166.4 45.8 49.6 3.64* 
Savings 1234.2 149.1 1738.7 1619.3 792.9 7179.7 385 88.5 644 0.6 
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  





Furthermore, there are also significant differences between MVP and non-MVP 
households with regard to the level of agricultural productivity (using maize, which is 
the staple crop, as a proxy), maize self-consumption (measured by its surrogate market 
value), cash income derived from the sale of agricultural production and total income 
(which includes cash income and self-consumption), with MVP households having 
higher values. However, in both groups the average land size is very small in absolute 
terms (0.5 hectares for MVP and 0.4 hectares for the control group). In addition, we did 
not find significant differences between MVP and non-MVP across all the cash income 
categories (small-scale business/self-employment, farm wage employment, nonfarm 
wage employment and remittances). The differences reported above cannot, however, 
be easily attributed to the MVP, due to the possible incidence of selection bias. 
 
2.3.2   Estimation of propensity scores and matching procedure 
Three different specifications of the logit model were adopted for the estimation of the 
propensity score. The results are shown in Table 2.3. Regression results using 
specification one indicate that households with heads who have no education or only 
basic education are less likely to be participants in the MVP, while those households 
with more household members are more likely to be participants in the MVP. In 
addition, the older the household head, the more likely the chances of being a 
participant in the MVP.  
 
For specification two, the results are similar to specification one in terms of education of 
the household head and household size. Furthermore, households with temporary 
houses (which can be seen as a measure of wealth) are less likely to be participants in 
the MVP. For specification three, more educated households living in semi-
permanent/permanent houses and more reliant on agriculture are more likely to be 








Table 2.3: Specification of the logit model for estimating propensity scores 
Variables 







Sex of household head -0.131 (0.458) 0.117 (0.4885) -0.086 (0.496) 
Age of household head 0.014 (0.007)*** 0.007 (0.008) 0.037 (0.050) 
Marital status 0.014 (0.450) -0.189 (0.475) -0.036 (0.490) 
Education of head -0.717 (0.255)* -0.583 (0.263)** -0.549 (0.273)** 
Household size 0.137 (0.056)** 0.131 (0.061)** -0.113 (0.219) 
Employment status of head -0.152 (0.243) -0.210 (0.260) 0.039 (0.276) 
Dependency ratio 0.116 (0.096) 0.119 (0.098) 0.290 (0.220) 
Type of house   -0.651 (0.272)** -0.648 (0.276)** 
Source of livelihood   0.131 (0.249) 0.899 (0.317)* 
Land size   0.281 (0.261) 0.794 (0.515) 
Age of household head 
squared     -0.000 (0.000) 
Household size squared     0.002 (0.019) 
Land size squared     -0.184 (0.169) 
Dependency ratio squared     -0.027 (0.036) 
Constant -0.773 (0.572) -0.531 (0.640) -1.553 (1.442) 
Sample size 405 405 385 
Psuedo-R2 0.06 0.067 0.088 
LR χ2 value 32.76 35.44 46.02 
Log-likelihood -257.477 -246.74 -241.44 
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 1 percent (most significant), 5 percent and 10 
percent (least significant) significance levels, respectively. 
 
For estimating propensity scores, specification three is chosen mainly because it yields a 
higher explanatory power (through higher pseudo R2) and also because polynomial 





Figure 2.3 shows a graphical representation of propensity scores for both the treatment 
and control groups. The ranges for the treatment and control group are given as: 
Treatment: 0.1452196 ≤ pscore ≤ 0. 9459737 
Control: 0.1400403 ≤ pscore ≤ 0.8851157 
Invoking the common support (using the minima and maxima comparison condition) 
results in the exclusion of only three observations from the treatment group and none 
from the control group, which is an indication that the common support condition is 
well satisfied. 
 
The matching procedure was implemented using the psmatch2 command in STATA, as 
developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). After matching and testing for matching 
quality, the results indicate that there is a significant reduction in the mean bias, from 
21.466 (before matching) to 6.941 (after matching), representing a 72 percent reduction. 
There is also a significant reduction in standard deviation and variance after matching. 
We can thus conclude that matching was successful. 
 
Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of propensity scores 
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2.3.3   Estimation of treatment effects 
The results for the estimation of the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATET) 
of MVP households on agricultural productivity, production margins, self-consumption, 
cash income and total income are shown in Table 2.4. There are no significant 
differences in the estimated impact using the three matching techniques (nearest 
neighbor, radius and kernel matching techniques), which is an indication of robustness. 
After matching, MVP households have about 70 percent higher productivity (around 
10.1 bags per hectare more than the control group). The increase in productivity may be 
attributed to the use of improved seeds and fertilizer. MVP households spent KES 
(Kenyan shillings) 1,604 and 3,654 on seeds and fertilizers, respectively, while these 
figures were KES 1,041 and 1,904 among non-MVP households.  
 
Table 2.4: Estimation of average treatment effects on the treated (ATET) 
  ATETa 
Agricultural productivity 10.1* 
Self-consumption 6,501.5* 
Production margins 9,760.7* 
Cash income from agriculture 446.5 
Cash income from farm employment  -6 
Cash income from self-employment/small scale business 52.1 
Cash income from nonfarm wage employment 444.5 
Cash income from remittances -766.0* 
Total cash income -1896 
Total income (cash income + self-consumption)  6,242.2**  
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  
* and ** stand for significance at 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. 
aMatching was carried out using the following: Neighbor (one neighbor), Caliper (0.05, 
0.1) and Kernel (0.08, 0.1, 0.25, 0.3).  
 
The effects on production margins, self-consumption and total income (when summing 
up cash income and self-consumption) are significant, while the effect on cash income is 
insignificant. The average effects resulting from MVP interventions are: an increase in 
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self-consumption for MVP households by about 78 percent, an almost 200 percent 
increase in production margins and a 50 percent increase in total income. The results on 
production margins should be interpreted carefully, since a surrogate market value of 
production is used to calculate this variable. However, most households allocate a 
significant proportion of production to self-consumption, which implies that actual cash 
margins are not reaped. Decomposing the cash income into various components reveals 
that there was a significant reduction in remittances – almost 100 percent, which could 
be due to a perception by relatives that the MVP households are better off due to the 
implementation of the program and therefore do not require income transfers.  
 
In order to shed some light on the gap between productivity gains and cash income 
increase, we look at factors explaining the ratio of agricultural cash income to 
production, as well as at the determinants of other sources of cash income. The 
agricultural cash income to production ratio is significantly higher among control 
villages (see Table 2.2). We think that a reasonable explanation is that a considerable 
share of the productivity gains is allocated to self-consumption among millennium 
households, thus increasing proportionally more the denominator of the ratio.  
 
Furthermore, we conducted a multiple regression analysis, taking agricultural cash 
income, non-agricultural cash income, total cash income and agricultural cash income 
to production ratio as dependent variables. We take as independent variables the asset 
index, the source of livelihood and household size. The analysis was done for both 
control and treatment households. The results, which are summarized in Table 2.5, 
reveal some consistent patterns. Millennium households with a higher asset index are 
more able to translate higher productivity into increased agricultural cash income.  
 
On the contrary, households with more members tend to have lower agricultural cash 
income to production ratio, which is likely explained by the fact that they have to 
allocate a higher proportion of their production gains to feed their members. Household 
size, however, has a positive effect on non-agricultural cash income and total cash 
income among millennium households.  
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Table 2.5: Exploring the relationship between household characteristics, sources of cash income and the agricultural cash 
income to production ratio 
  Agricultural cash income Non-agricultural cash 
income 
Total cash income Agricultural cash 
income to production 
ratio 
MVP Control MVP Control MVP Control MVP Control 
         



















         
Household size -53.5 1.6 314.4* 200.9 260.9* 202.4 -10.7** -4.9 
         
Constant -587.6 -1092.2* 1520.6*** 438.9 933 -653.3 84.0*** 132.4 
         
Number of observations 222 180 222 180 222 180 219 180 
         
R-squared 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.24 0.13 0.04 0.07 
         
Prob>F 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.01 
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  




The latter is also affected positively by the asset index, but negatively by specialization in 
agriculture (households that are not specialized in agriculture tend to have higher total 
cash income). The positive effect of household size on non-agricultural cash income and 
total income is only seen among millennium households (not in the control group). This 
could be an indication that household members have more labor opportunities among 
millennium villages.  
 
Put simply, our results indicate that households with a higher level of asset 
accumulation and fewer household members are more able to transmit the productivity 
gains resulting from the MVP into higher agricultural cash income. The issue is, 
however, that in Sauri the proportion of households with high levels of assets and small 
family size is very small. Most households then use the sizeable positive effects of the 
interventions on agricultural productivity to feed their members. By no means should 
this be considered a negligible effect. First, the project seems to have contributed 
significantly to food intake through increased production for self-consumption. 
Secondly, the resources saved from buying food could be available for investment in 
productive assets or other basic needs. It is worth noting, however, that a difference in 
means test for savings (see Table 2.2) shows an insignificant difference between MVP 
households and the control group, implying that the resources saved from purchasing 
food will not necessarily translate into higher levels of savings. Third, the positive effect 
of household size on total cash income among millennium households (which is not the 
case among control households) probably indicates that the project is inducing positive 
income effects through labor. This proposition, however, requires further and more 
appropriate testing.  
 
It is worth noting that among both groups, having non-agricultural activities as the main 
source of livelihood has a significant positive effect on total cash income. This calls for 
paying attention to the role of diversification in the economic performance of 
households. This result suggests that interventions among very small farmers that are 
mainly focused on productivity enhancement (and neglect the promotion of nonfarm 




local processes of economic growth. The role of diversification is discussed more in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Table 2.6. Bounds test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 . . . . 
1.5 -0.061156 . 0.524383 . 
2 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
2.5 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
3 . . . . 
3.5 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
4 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
4.5 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
5 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
5.5 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
6 -0.061156 . 0.524383 . 
6.5 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
7 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
7.5 -0.061156 -0.061156 0.524383 0.524383 
Gamma: odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+: Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment 
effect) 
Q_mh-: Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment 
effect) 
p_mh+: significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh-: significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  
 
The results for the bounds test are summarized in Table 2.6. The results are stable and 
consistently show an insignificant effect of the MVP on household cash income across all 




understate the income effects do not have significant implications on the inferences that 
are drawn from the propensity score matching. 
 
2.3.4   Testing for spillover effects 
The results of testing for spillover effects are summarized in Table 2.7. The results 
indicate that there are no significant spillover effects in agricultural productivity, self-
consumption and cash income.  
     
Table 2.7: Testing for spillover effects 






Cash income Total income 
Distance to nearest 
millennium village 
-0.52 -1,095.35* -818.38 -1,027.76 -1,846.14*** 
Asset index -1.61** 3,582.19* 4,441.31* 2,438.07** 6,879.39* 
Sex  4.37 3,838.46 3,413.42 1,281.16 4,694.58 
Age  20.43** 7,213.70 2,426.21 -8,451.66*** -6,025.45 
Marital status 3.12 2,139.80 3,349.16 1,289.62 4,638.78 
Household size 1.99** 1,642.39* 664.72 515.61 1,180.33 
Employment  1.57 -328.96 87.44 1,454.71 1,542.15 
Dependency -2.06 -2,222.05 185.7 -2,397.38 -2,211.68 
Type of house -1.22 113.36 -1,041.95 -2,532.97 -3,574.92*** 
Livelihood 2.56 1,634.04 1,795.17*** -3,092.39 -1,297.21 
Age squared -5.29** -1,698.16 -240.05 2,036.07 1,796.02 
Household size 
squared 
-0.09*** -141.88* -44.89 -18 -62.89 
Dependency squared 0.08 498.66 50.28 455.61 505.89 
Constant -9.64 -14,338.03 -8,795.39 16,075.92 7,280.54 
Number of 
observations 
169 169 169 169 169 
R squared 0.14 0.23 0.39 0.21 0.38 




*, ** and *** stand for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
However, statistically significant spillover effects were found for production margins 
and total income at a 10 percent significance level. Re-estimation of the production 
margins and total income using the sample that excludes neighboring villages yielded an 
ATET of 9,961.24 for production margins (significant at 1 percent) and 5,254.96 
(significant at 10 percent). These results thus show significant differences between the 
groups along these two variables, indicating possible spillover effects. 
 
2.3.5  Sensitivity analysis for propensity score matching 
Sensitivity analysis, using different combinations of covariates, ensures that the impact 
estimates are consistent. Table 2.8 below shows the results of the estimation of the 
average treatments effects on agricultural productivity, self-consumption, cash income 
and total income using different combinations of covariates. Even though there are 
some differences in the magnitude of the impact, the overall result, indicating a 
significant impact on agricultural productivity, self-consumption and total income and 
an insignificant impact on cash income, is stable regardless of the type of covariates 
used in the analysis.  
 










Sex, age, marital status, household size, 
dependency, land, land squared, age 
squared, household size squared, 
dependency squared 
10.4*  8,705.3* -1,388.50 9345.0* 
Sex, age, marital status, education, 
household size, dependency, land, land 
squared, age squared, household size 
squared, dependency squared 




Sex, age, marital status, education, 
dependency, land, land squared, age 
squared, dependency squared 
11.0*  8,305.1* 931.1 9585.0* 
Sex, age, marital status, household size, 
dependency, land 
9.4*  8,417.6* -782.2 9381.8* 
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  
* and ** stand for 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
2.3.6   Estimation using the doubly robust estimator 
The doubly robust estimation, showing a highly significant impact on agricultural 
productivity, self-consumption, production margins and total income but an 
insignificant impact on cash income, conforms to the results from propensity score 
matching (Table 2.9). The variations in the magnitudes of the impacts by the propensity 
score matching technique and the doubly robust estimator are minimal.  
 
Table 2.9: Estimation using the doubly robust estimator 
Covariates Variable Effect 





Agricultural productivity 10.6* 
Production margins 8941.8*  
Income from agriculture 190.8 
Income from farm employment 81.9 
Income from small scale business -98.5 
Income from nonfarm employment -62.9 
Remittances -297.8 
Self-consumption 5913.7* 
Total cash income -193.6 
Total income 5280.7* 




Agricultural productivity 10.8* 
Production margins  9882.3* 
Income from agriculture 337.9 




Income from small scale business -211.0 
Income from nonfarm employment -125.1 
Remittances -200.1 
Self-consumption 6495.1* 
Total cash income -145.9 
Total income 5807.3* 




house, livelihood, land 
squared, age squared, 
household size squared, 
dependency squared 
Agricultural productivity 10.8* 
Production margins  8405.3* 
Income from agriculture 144.5 
Income from farm employment 90.6 
Income from small scale business -51.4 
Income from nonfarm employment -45.7 
Remittances -281.1 
Self-consumption 5780.2* 
Total cash income -152.3 
Total income 5406.5* 
Source: Author’s own computation 
* stands for 1 percent significance level. 
 
2.3.7  Testing for heterogeneity of effects 
The results of the analysis of the heterogeneity of effects across households are 
summarized in Table 2.10. They reveal that the increase in agricultural productivity is 
significantly larger for households with a household head who is married. Production 
margins were found to be significantly higher for wealthier households, those with 
employed male household heads and those with more productive assets. Households 
with married male heads and larger household sizes were found to have higher effects 
on self-consumption. We found that only marital status and the main source of 
livelihood are significant in explaining heterogeneity in the effect on total cash income. 
Households with married household heads derived more cash income benefits, while 
households that relied more on agriculture as a source of livelihood derived less income 




sources. In addition, male-headed households with less dependency and more 
productive assets derived more total income benefits from the MVP. 
 
Table 2.10: Heterogeneity of treatment effects 









Asset index -2.92 6,802.15* 1,566.06 -485.69 3,440.52** 
Sex  7.19 8,037.58* 6,639.80** -469.23 10,997.89*** 
Age  13.52 -9,827.80 -4,159.70 575.41 -534.04 
Marital status 10.04** 6,149.13 6,391.29** 2,419.27*** 9,253.84 
Household size 2.85 4,086.75** 2,260.31*** -388.2 2,763.21 
Employment -3.45 -7,603.32** -1,131.72 515.24 -2,725.44 
Dependency 2.12 -5,871.86 -7,256.59* -1,019.75 -9,054.31** 
Type of house -2.32 -7,468.34** 1,649.10 -1,655.33 5,660.64 
Livelihood 4.5 3,561.95 -4,751.84 -3,729.77* -10,582.33** 
Age squared -3.32 2,235.74 1,482.53 10.61 584.68 
Household size 
squared 
-0.09 -267.28*** -145.09 17.08 -123.53 
Dependency squared -1.07 828.51 1,264.80** 182.22 1,641.20*** 
Constant -22.28 -1,804.95 -10,235.53 7,016.29 -29,856.64*** 
Number of 
observations 
212 212 212 212 212 
R squared 0.06 0.18 0.1 0.07 0.1 
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance 
levels, respectively. 
2.4   Discussion  
 
The high impact on productivity — which has resulted in a higher level of access to 
staple food — of the MVP is very remarkable, particularly if we consider that these 




The awareness of the importance of using improved seeds and fertilizer, created by the 
MVP through training, seems to have played an important role in inducing these 
changes. Sauri was chosen as a millennium village on the basis of being a hunger spot, 
where households experienced food shortages for several months in a year (Pronyk et 
al., 2012; Nziguheba et al., 2010). Our data reveal that about 57 percent of the 
households within the MVP had enough maize supply for 10-12 months per year, as 
compared to only 29 percent of the households in the control villages. This finding is in 
line with the results obtained by Pronyk et al. (2012). 
 
The MVP also significantly increased total income (which includes cash income and self-
consumption). A decomposition of total income into self-consumption and cash income 
revealed a highly significant effect on self-consumption but an insignificant effect on 
cash income. This finding is also in line with the results obtained by the millennium 
study group, who found an insignificant effect of the project on wealth creation, based 
on an asset index (Pronyk et al., 2012). The insignificant effect on cash income can be 
attributed to the structural constraints faced by small-scale farmers. First, our analysis 
reveals that, as expected, household size and an asset index are significant factors 
affecting the allocation of outputs to self-consumption. Households with larger 
accumulation of assets and smaller household sizes are more able to allocate agricultural 
outputs to the market (instead of to self-consumption). We conclude that given the very 
small size of plots in the study area, only very few households would meet the conditions 
(enough assets, small family size) to be able to translate productivity increase into 
higher cash income from agriculture.  
 
 As Nziguheba et al. (2010) point out, based on their study of millennium villages, 
households with very small land sizes have difficulties in meeting their caloric needs 
even if they use improved seeds and fertilizer and produce yields in the highest quartile. 
Sachs (2005, p.6) and MVP (2007) also acknowledge the challenges posed by small land 
sizes in achieving food security and income growth. Several studies (Kuyiah et al., 2006; 
Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003; Kibaara et al., 2008) have found that small land sizes could 
become a significant constraint for increasing the income of farmers. In summary, our 




particularly land — is fundamental for poor households to increase their income and 
escape poverty (Adato, Carter and May, 2006; Carter and May 2001; Barrett, Carter and 
Ikegami, 2008; Carter and Barrett, 2006).  
 
Nonetheless, despite the gap between productivity and agricultural cash income here 
described, our results also show that the MVP can induce positive indirect effects on 
economic welfare. First, households with higher productivity would likely have lower 
expenditure on food items, implying that more cash is available for investment in 
productive assets or other basic needs. Secondly, though household size has a negative 
effect on the agricultural cash to production ratio, we have found that it has a positive 
effect on nonfarm and total cash income among millennium villages (which is not the 
case among control households). This probably indicates that there are more sources of 
nonfarm income among millennium villages. Our data, however, do not allow for testing 
these hypotheses. Both issues need further investigation with more appropriate 
methods. 
 
According to our results, specialization in agriculture as the main source of income 
negatively affects total cash income. As well, households relying more on agriculture 
benefited less (in terms of total income) from the MVP. As mentioned in the 
introductory section, several scholars have found evidence supporting the proposition 
that reducing reliance on agriculture favors income increase and thus provides a 
pathway out of poverty (Ellis, 1999; Freeman, Ellis and Allison 2004; Bahiigwa, Mdoe 
and Ellis, 2005; Maltsoglou and Rapsomanikis, 2005; Kuyiah et al., 2006). There is 
abundant evidence showing that income from nonfarm employment is crucial for food 
security and poverty alleviation in rural areas of developing countries (Zerai and 
Gebreegziabher, 2011; Owusu, Abdulai and Abdul-Rahman, 2011; Gladwin et al., 2001; 
Omotesho, Adewumi and Fadimula, 2007). Our results are line with the proposition 
that interventions among small-scale farmers that combine productivity enhancement 
measures in agriculture with the creation of new nonfarm sources of income would 
likely be more effective in promoting local economic growth as compared to 
interventions exclusively focused on increasing agricultural productivity. This is 





A positive relationship between agricultural productivity and cash income among small-
scale rural dwellers in developing countries seems to be a logical assumption. However, 
our empirical results indicate that this key step in the theory of change on which the 
MVP approach relies might not hold. This has significant implications for a wide range 
of policies and development interventions in rural areas, particularly for those assuming 
productivity as a key determinant of cash income in a context of very small land-holding 
per capita. Our results call for a more careful examination of the mechanisms through 
which the impacts of agricultural productivity enhancement interventions take place. In 
general, the risk of large social costs might be high when policies or interventions are 
rapidly up-scaled without due empirical testing of the key elements of their theory of 
change. We join Ludwig, Kling and Mullainathan (2011) in their call for a policy 
evaluation agenda that pays more attention to testing mechanisms – specifically, to 
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Chapter 3: The Role of Diversification in Enhancing Household 





3.1  Introduction 
 
The role of diversification in increasing household income and reducing poverty is 
supported by a stream of literature that argues that asset accumulation and income 
diversification play a major role in enhancing household incomes and reducing poverty12 
(Barrett, Reardon and Webb, 2001; Freeman, Ellis and Allison, 2004; Bahiigwa, Mdoe 
and Ellis, 2005). Some scholars have argued that farming alone cannot provide the 
expected additional linkage effects through creation of nonfarm income opportunities, 
given that it cannot even provide sufficient means of survival for many poor rural 
families (Ellis, 1999). For rural households with a high incidence of poverty and a largely 
dominant agriculture sector, increasing household income through diversification is a 
necessary condition for the implementation of any poverty-oriented development 
strategy (Minot et al., 2006). In addition, productive diversification and asset 
accumulation not only provide the means to escape poverty but also contribute to the 
sustainability of rural livelihoods by improving their long-term resilience to adverse 
shocks (Adato, Carter and May, 2006; Carter and May, 2001; Barrett, Carter and 
Ikegami, 2008; Carter and Barrett, 2006). Income diversification also plays a significant 
role in reducing risk for rural households, especially where consumption and crop 
insurance markets and safety nets are weak or lacking (Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001).  
 
                                                           
12 We also note that income and poverty play a key role, too, in enhancing diversification. Thus, a bi-




There is also research evidence that has shown that nonfarm incomes play a significant 
role in enhancing rural household income and reducing poverty (de Janvry, Sadoulet 
and Zhu, 2005; Ellis, 2000). Nonfarm activities have become central to rural livelihoods 
and should therefore not be regarded as supplementary to the main business of farming 
(Rigg, 2006). Further, Rigg (2006) argues that the rural south 13  has experienced 
transformation over time, with changes including the diversification of livelihoods and 
occupations, the shift of household income from farming to nonfarm activities and the 
delinking of livelihoods and poverty from farming. There is further evidence that has 
shown that rural nonfarm income is an important factor in enhancing food security by 
providing farmers with additional income to invest in productivity-enhancing inputs 
(FAO, 1998). In addition, development of rural nonfarm agriculture-related activities 
such as agro-processing, distribution and the provision of farm inputs could increase the 
profitability of farming by enhancing access to farm inputs and output markets.  
 
While the Millennium Villages Project’s (MVP) key underlying assumption was that 
increased agricultural productivity would enhance household income, they also 
acknowledged the need to invest in commercial agriculture and nonfarm activities as a 
means of achieving poverty reduction and rural development (Sachs, 2005; Sachs et al., 
2004). The MVP can be seen to be based on two arguments. First, it is argued that 
agriculture plays a key role in jump-starting growth and increasing household income 
among smallholder famers. From literature, agriculture has been seen as a vital 
development tool that can be used to reduce rural poverty through improved 
agricultural income, increased food security and also through the indirect effect on food 
prices and employment (Mellor, 1999; Sarris, 2001; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2002; 
Minten and Barrett, 2005).  
 
Second, despite the initial focus on agriculture, the MVP also emphasizes that 
diversification would increase household income and consequently lead to increased 
savings and self-sustaining commercial activities. Nziguheba et al. (2010, p. 108, 
paragraph 2) assert that:  
                                                           




Nobody is likely to escape the one-dollar-per-day absolute poverty trap by 
growing maize on half or one hectare no matter how high the yield. The way 
forward is crop and enterprise diversification.  
Further, MVP (2006) also outlines the development model by showing that increased 
diversification (mainly into the nonfarm sector14) is expected to lead to higher savings 
and investments in human capital. It is stated that: 
This financing model is built on the premise that, with modest support, 
Millennium Village economies can transition over a period from subsistence 
farming to self-sustaining commercial activity. Over time, household incomes 
will rise due to increased productivity, diversification into higher value crops 
and expanded off-farm employment. Higher incomes will raise household 
savings, accelerating economic diversification and household investments in 
human capital.  
The MVP Annual Report (MVP, 2008) also emphasizes the transition from single crop 
farming to a more diversified farming portfolio and business initiatives, which are 
largely agro-based. They state that: 
Traditionally, farmers in the Millennium Villages focused on producing a single 
staple crop. In its first years, the MVP prioritized dramatically on increasing 
the production of these crops through subsidized fertilizers, improved seeds, and 
intensive training in farming techniques. In 2008, increased agricultural yields 
were sustained, and the project increased its focus on crop diversification to 
improve both income and nutritional outcomes for farmers and their families 
(p. 4, paragraph 3). 
The MVP initiated an intensive investigation to identify viable agricultural 
production and agro-business development opportunities across the Millennium 
Villages, including existing businesses that can be enhanced and new businesses 
that can be launched. Given the rural, agricultural nature of the Millennium 
                                                           
14 Sauri households are dominantly smallholder farmers with small sizes of land. Therefore, having a 





Villages, most business opportunities are agro-business initiatives (p. 6, 
paragraph 3). 
Sanchez et al. (2007) also show the MVP’s focus on diversification of agricultural crops, 
commercial farming and business development. They state that: 
Some of the interventions by MVP in the second phase include a more robust 
and diversified agriculture and commercial farming (p. 5, bullet 6) and business 
development through diversifying farm enterprise toward high-value products 
and linking producer groups to markets and enterprise development through 
capacity building, access to microfinance and microenterprise institutions (p. 6, 
bullet 4). 
 
The MVP asserts that the project will be successful if it demonstrates the feasibility, 
practicality and effectiveness of integrated investments (mainly financed through global 
public financial flows) in achieving the millennium development goals 15 . Since its 
inception, there have been increased financial flows into the project, with scaling-up of 
interventions across countries. Previous findings in Chapter 2 on the impact of the MVP 
interventions on household income revealed that the effect of the MVP on household 
income was insignificant. The MVP theory of change (discussed in the next section) 
indicates that diversification is the main mechanism through which households can 
increase their income and reduce poverty. We therefore hypothesize that the cash 
income effects as derived in Chapter 2 could partly be explained by the level of 
diversification among Sauri households. Despite the evidence of the MVP’s focus on 
diversification into nonfarm activities as a way of enhancing household income, no 
attempt has been made to assess the extent to which Sauri households diversified their 
sources of income and whether diversification (or the lack of it) enhanced (or 
undermined) the achievement of the MVP goals. This study therefore seeks to fill this 
gap by analyzing:  
(i) the extent of diversification among Sauri households and determinants of 
diversification 
(ii) the impact of diversification on household income and poverty in Sauri  
                                                           




(iii) whether households in Sauri with more diversified income portfolios 
necessarily had greater MVP household income effects. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a background of the 
Millennium Villages Project by highlighting key interventions that are related to 
diversification of activities. Section 3.3 discusses the conceptual framework and reviews 
studies that have been carried out on the extent and determinants of diversification and 
the effect of diversification on household income and poverty. Section 3.4 outlines the 
methods of analysis for estimation of diversity indices, determinants of diversification, 
effects of diversification on household income and poverty and the impact of 
diversification on MVP income effects. Section 3.5 presents the results of the analysis. 
First, we present summary statistics showing the difference in means between 
households that participated in farming alone and those that participated in both 
farming and nonfarm activities. Further, we also present the results of the effect of 
diversification on household income and poverty and MVP income effects. Lastly, 
section 3.6 discusses the findings and concludes the chapter.  
   
3.2 The Millennium Villages Project and interventions aimed at 
enhancing diversification of activities in Sauri  
 
Across all the millennium villages in the Sauri cluster, interventions in the first phase of 
two years were generally aimed at increasing the productivity of the staple crops, while 
interventions in the second phase were aimed at triggering the transition from 
subsistence farming to diversified agriculture and nonfarm activities (Nziguheba et al., 
2010). The focus of the first year was on increasing food security and surplus for income 
generation (MVP, 2006). By the second year, the focus changed to “agriculture as a 
business,” where the farmer was to produce not only surplus for income but also a 
diversity of crops and livestock enterprises (MVP, 2008, 2006). Two particular areas 
were emphasized to promote agriculture for income generation. First, market linkages 




maize cereal was mainly sold to the National Cereals Produce Board and also to 
organizations such as schools (for school feeding programs) and hospitals.  
 
Second, efforts were made to promote crop diversification into high-value crops. The 
main reasons for promoting diversification were to increase household income, to 
provide farmers with multiple sources of income that would mitigate against shocks and 
cushion them against low prices during harvest seasons and also to improve nutritional 
outcomes (MVP, 2008). Diversification from staple crops to cash crops was also 
required to support the transition from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture 
(MVP Sector Strategy, n.d.). This was fundamental for the development of business and 
entrepreneurship, which was regarded as necessary for sustaining the gains of the MVP. 
To support the diversification process, the MVP focused on, first, the identification of 
appropriate crops through market studies, which took into consideration factors such as 
climate and soils, profitability and market demand at the local, national and regional 
scale (MVP Sector Strategy, n.d.). The farmers were then trained in the best agronomic 
practices for each crop. Second, it focused on enhancing access to loans and savings, 
which was essential for farmers to invest in farm diversification and commercial 
farming.  
 
Crop diversification was to be achieved through formation of producer groups, training 
and field demonstrations, with initial producer groups focusing on bananas, tomatoes 
and onions (MVP, 2006). Through producer groups, farmers could access credit and 
produce output that would then be jointly marketed. The MVP provided necessary 
inputs (such as banana plantlets and onion seedlings) and training. In 2005/06, about 
387 farmers were targeted for growing of bananas and a total of 707 tissue culture 
plantlets were procured by the MVP (MVP, 2006). About 159 farmers were trained in 
onion farming and provided with 500 onion seedlings each, while the tomato producers 
group had 58 farmers who were trained and provided with chemicals for spraying but 
had to purchase their own seeds.  
 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the theory of change by the MVP, which highlights the expected 




into increased household income and poverty reduction. Initially, interventions in 
small-scale subsistence agriculture were expected to lead to increased agricultural 
productivity. Increased agricultural productivity would increase unmarketed home 
consumption and also lead to increased household income mainly through sale of 
agricultural surplus.  
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Diversification into commercially-oriented farming (especially higher value crops) and 
nonfarm activities was pursued as a way of enhancing household income. This was 
achieved through MVP subsidies in agricultural inputs for non-staple crops and training 
in improved agricultural practices for commercially-oriented crops. There were also 
efforts to increase access to credit as a way of providing capital for investment in crop 
diversification and nonfarm activities. We also take note of the feedback effects of 
household income into diversification where higher household incomes would 
necessitate more diversification. Lastly, increased household income was necessary to 
spur household savings and investment, which would enhance participation in self-
sustaining commercial activities and lead to poverty reduction and rural development. 
 
3.3 Review of literature on diversification and its impact on 
household income and poverty reduction 
 
3.3.1 Conceptual framework 
This chapter focuses on income diversification, which is a process through which 
households develop a diverse portfolio of activities as a way of improving their 
standards of living and also managing risk (Ersado, 2003). Income diversification is an 
important aspect of livelihood diversification (and vice versa), which comprises 
capabilities, assets (economic and social) and activities that are necessary for achieving 
a means of living (Fabusoro et al., 2010). Following from this view, the theoretical 
framework of the analysis of income diversification can be studied within the 
sustainable livelihoods framework. This framework presents an economic relationship 
between assets, the activities in which households engage in using their assets, and the 
outcomes that result from these activities in terms of improving or deteriorating the 
welfare and well-being of the household (Freeman, Ellis and Allison, 2004). The 
framework places emphasis on access to and ownership of assets, which can be applied 
productively by the poor as a pathway out of poverty. The assets largely comprise land, 
livestock, human capital, farm implements, savings or access to credit, infrastructure 
(e.g. road or electricity) and social capital. This economic relationship is embedded in 



























Source: Modified version of Scoones (1998) and Freeman, Ellis and Allison (2004)  
*The dotted lines represent areas that are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
A commonly used definition of sustainable livelihoods has been provided by Chambers 
and Conway (1991, p. 6, paragraph 2), which states that:  
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and 
access) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable 
if it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the 
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next generation; and if it contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local 
and global levels and in the short and long term. 
 
Following from Scoones (1998), the key question in the analysis of sustainable 
livelihoods is, given a particular setting, what combination of livelihood resources 
(assets) enable pursuance of which combination of livelihood strategies to achieve what 
outcomes? In this context, sustainable livelihoods are achieved through access to a 
range of capabilities, assets and activities, which lead to specific livelihood outcomes, 
such as increased household income and poverty reduction.  
 
Within the context of millennium villages, the focus is on using the available assets and 
capabilities to pursue the available diversification strategies, which largely include: 
subsistence farming, commercial agriculture, farm employment, nonfarm wage 
employment and small-scale business and enterprise development (Figure 3.2). In this 
study, we focus on two key expected outcomes – increase in household income and 
poverty reduction. Other outcomes that are beyond the scope of this paper but are 
relevant in the context of sustainable livelihoods are those that focus largely on the 
sustainability dimension (including the resilience of livelihoods and the natural resource 
base). 
 
3.3.2  Empirical evidence 
This section is divided into two parts, with the first part looking at empirical evidence on 
the extent and determinants of diversification. The second part provides an overview of 
the empirical evidence on the impact of diversification on household income and 
poverty. 
 
3.3.2.1    Extent and determinants of diversification 
Experience has shown that households mostly derive their income from multiple 
sources and also hold their assets in more than one asset (Barrett and Reardon, 2000; 
Ellis, 2000). There are various reasons why households diversify their activities, income 
and assets, key among them: (i) to increase income for the household when income from 




complementarities and synergies between different activities and (iv) to realize 
economies of scope where the same inputs generate greater per unit profit when spread 
across multiple outputs (Barrett and Reardon, 2000; Babatunde and Qaim, 2010; Minot 
et al., 2006).  
 
The decision by a household to diversify is determined by various factors that can 
generally be classified into two categories: push and pull factors. The main push factors 
include the need to reduce risks and smooth consumption (Barrett and Reardon, 2000; 
Barrett, Reardon and Webb, 2001) and the seasonal nature of farming, whereby 
households have to rely on nonfarm income during the dry seasons (Reardon 1997). 
Diversification is used as a risk management strategy due to a lack of social safety nets 
among many African households. De Janvry, Sadoulet and Zhu (2005) also argued that 
because of deficient rural credit and insurance markets in China, participation in 
nonfarm activities is the best alternative, as income from nonfarm activities could be 
used to increase investment in farm activities, mitigate income fluctuations and play the 
role of an insurance system. Bryceson (1996) argues that many African households were 
driven into economic diversification following implementation of structural adjustment 
programs in the ‘80s in a bid to minimize risk. Because of uncertain climatic conditions, 
rural farmers ventured into crop and plot diversification to minimize risk. 
 
There are various socio-economic factors that have also been found to significantly 
determine the choice of livelihood strategies. Minot et al. (2006) found evidence of a 
positive and significant relationship between education of the household head and the 
degree of diversification. This is because education could enhance the chances of 
engaging in different activities through, for instance, enabling participation in wage 
employment and also facilitating the learning about new opportunities. The size and 
composition of the household also matter. Larger households with fewer dependents 
(children and elderly) tend to have more income sources as compared to smaller 
households. This is mainly due to the declining marginal productivity of additional farm 
labor as the household size increases, which makes venturing into alternative sources of 
income more attractive. Also, larger households are expected to have a diversified 




the household level. The amount of labor within a household is also a strong factor in 
pushing households towards nonfarm activities, especially wage employment and non-
agricultural self-employment (Winters et al., 2009). This is because rural households 
with greater labor endowments are likely to have higher labor-to-land ratios. Further, 
more labor is also associated with greater income gains from the nonfarm activities. 
 
Availability of key factors of production, such as land, can be a key push factor for 
households to diversify. Research evidence (Minot et al., 2006; Winters et al., 2009) has 
shown that land availability is a key determinant of income diversification. Households 
with more farm size have been found to have a larger number of crops with more 
marketed surplus, but with less nonfarm income and income diversity. Similarly, 
Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) showed that larger household per capita landholdings 
reduced the probability of an individual engaging in the business sub-sector, which 
implied that large landowners were more likely to engage in agricultural activities than 
small landowners. However, they found that very large landholdings (of above 8.8 
hectares) were associated with a higher probability of engaging in business activities. 
Lay and Schüler (2008) argued that both the total amount of land and land per adult 
equivalent should be considered while looking at the effect of land on diversification. 
This is because total land is an important asset that allows the household to overcome 
entry barriers into both farm and nonfarm activities. On the other hand, farm land per 
adult equivalent measures the ability of the household to adequately provide land and 
food to its members. It is expected that the likelihood of diversifying into the nonfarm 
sector increases with the size of land, while in contrast, households are likely to be 
pushed into nonfarm diversification with less land per adult equivalent.  
 
It is argued that poorer households tend to have less access to nonfarm activities than 
better-off households and are therefore less diversified (Ersado, 2003; Shwarze and 
Zeller, 2005; Ellis, 2000; Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001). A review by Reardon (1997) 
based on 27 studies in Sub-Saharan Africa confirmed the argument that the share of 
nonfarm income in total income is greater among higher-income rural households in 
Africa, which is largely attributed to their higher skill levels and greater access to capital. 




evidence that diversification increases with overall household income, whereby richer 
households tend to have more diversified income sources than poorer households, who 
have a larger reliance on only farming. This is because poorer households are more 
likely to face entry barriers to higher-income earning activities, such as inadequate 
access to credit. Because of the entry barriers, activities with the highest potential tend 
to be concentrated among the middle and upper income classes (Rigg, 2006). 
Haggblade, Hazell and Reardon (2010) and Barrett, Bezuneh and Aboud (2001) also 
argue that wealthier households who are more endowed with productive assets are 
better able to take advantage of high productivity opportunities in the rural nonfarm 
economy than the poorer households. Thus, removal of economic and social barriers 
that limit the poor households’ participation in the rural nonfarm economy should be 
addressed in order for the growth of the rural nonfarm economy to be pro-poor. Loison 
(2015), in her review on rural livelihood diversification in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
concluded that relatively better-off smallholders with sufficient assets achieved 
successful livelihood diversification mainly by exploiting opportunities and synergies 
between farm and nonfarm activities. Agyeman, Asuming-Brempong and Onumah 
(2014), in their study of the determinants of income diversification of farm households 
in the western region of Ghana, found that ownership of productive assets was a 
significant determinant of diversification. 
 
Other studies such as Dercon and Krishnan (1996) argue that differences in portfolios, 
especially of high return activities, across households are largely explained by 
comparative advantage and constraints to entry into particular activities. They argue 
that the ability for households to diversify depends on access to means to diversify, such 
as skills, access to capital and credit. Limited access to credit restricts the ability of 
poorer households to invest in non-agricultural activities, thereby restricting them to 
agricultural activities and wage labor. Minot et al. (2006) support this argument by 
noting that diversification into high-value crops is mainly constrained by lack of credit 
and information about production and marketing, risk aversion and poor infrastructure. 
Such constraints can, however, be minimized through institutions that support vertical 
coordination, such as contract farming and farmers’ associations. Shwarze and Zeller 




endowed in agricultural production decrease in relation to the returns from non-
agricultural activities. This implies that the ability to diversify depends on access to the 
different types of assets.  
 
Pull factors, on the other hand, are mainly associated with an increase in opportunities 
for diversification that are linked to: higher sources of income resulting from rural 
development, increased commercialization of agriculture, increased urbanization and 
better market access, etc. Babatunde and Qaim (2010) showed that while poor 
households could pursue distress-push diversification, there seemed to be a significant 
element of demand-pull diversification (Barrett and Reardon, 2000), which, for 
instance, could result from: (i) increasing household income, which provides the means 
to overcome investment entry barriers and also generates an increased demand for 
nonfarm goods and services; (ii) shifting from traditional goods and services to 
commercially-oriented farming and nonfarm activities as the rural economy develops, 
which stimulates diversification; and (iii) increased urbanization resulting from long-
term population growth and density and infrastructural development, which could lead 
to the development of the nonfarm sector, thereby promoting diversification. Dercon 
and Krishnan (1996) also argue that differences in household portfolios can also be 
explained by access to public infrastructure such as marketplaces and roads and 
proximity to towns and common property resources.  
 
Barrett, Bezuneh and Aboud (2001) underscore the importance of assessing the effect of 
policy shocks in shaping diversification decisions, given that diversification is important 
for enhancing household income and as a safety net. They argue that smallholder 
households must be able to overcome barriers (which include working capital, skills and 
market access) to participation in nonfarm activities that offer higher incomes. These 
barriers can be addressed through policy change, although failure to recognize the 
barriers to entry during policy reform can undermine the poor households’ ability to 
benefit from the activities that arise as a result of the policy change. These authors 
showed that in Cote D’Ivoire, households that were less endowed with assets were less 
able to take advantage of emerging and attractive farm and nonfarm opportunities that 




benefitted from the food-for-work transfers encountered less liquidity constraints, 
which enabled them to diversify into higher return agricultural production and nonfarm 
activities. Thus, interventions must explicitly address poor households’ constraints in 
terms of working capital, skills and market access in order for them to be able to pursue 
superior livelihood strategies and escape poverty traps. 
 
3.3.2.2  Effect of diversification on household income and poverty 
There exists empirical evidence showing that diversification leads to higher household 
income and reduces the likelihood of being poor. Freeman, Ellis and Allison (2004) 
used data from rural Kenya to show that households that relied heavily on agriculture 
were poorer than those that combined food crop agriculture with livestock keeping and 
engagement in nonfarm activities. They provided evidence that rural poverty reduction 
efforts require a broader focus that encourages and facilitates diversity and mobility. 
Ellis, Kutengule and Nyasulu (2003) also argue that securing a better living standard for 
rural households in Malawi requires an ability to accumulate assets and to diversify 
sources of income into both farm and nonfarm activities. They argue that rural poverty 
in Malawi can only be tackled through a combination of raising agricultural 
productivity, diversifying farm output to reduce risk, shifting towards higher value crops 
and diversifying into nonfarm activities. Awotide, Kehinde and Agbola (2010) also 
showed that engagement in a diversified livelihood portfolio reduced the risk of being 
poor among Nigerian households, while Bigsten and Tengstam (2008) showed that 
rural households in Zambia who participated in nonfarm activities had a higher level of 
income as compared to those who participated in farming alone. 
 
Ellis and Bahiigwa (2003) and Ellis and Mdoe (2003) also lend support to the argument 
that less reliance on agriculture is important for poverty reduction and that those 
households that rely on more diversified sources of livelihood are less likely to be poor. 
Further, rural poverty is also strongly associated with the lack of productive assets and 
the inability to access nonfarm activities. They show that poorer households in Uganda 
and Tanzania largely depended on food crop agriculture, seasonal wage income and 
remittances for their livelihoods, while better-off households relied on food crop 




show that nonfarm income accounted for 11 percent of total income in the bottom 
quartile, while it accounted for 44 percent in the top quartile in Tanzania. In addition to 
the important role played by the nonfarm economy, the rural poor also require an 
enabling institutional framework in order to construct pathways out of poverty. 
 
De Janvry, Sadoulet and Zhu (2005) provide evidence that not only did households who 
participated in nonfarm activities in rural China have higher incomes than those that 
participated only in farming, they also absorbed a large quantity of surplus rural labor 
and improved their standards of living. Further, participation in nonfarm activities 
notably reduced rural poverty, in addition to reducing the depth and severity of poverty 
by narrowing the income gap among rural poor households and improving the income 
of the poorest households. De Janvry, Sadoulet and Zhu (2005) estimated that about 87 
percent of the decline in poverty between 1980 and 1995 in rural China could be 
attributed to participation in nonfarm activities, while farm activities accounted for only 
13 percent of the reduction in poverty.  
 
Mat, Jalil and Harun (2012) show that nonfarm income reduced the level, depth and 
severity of poverty in Kedah (Malaysia). Their results show that the poverty headcount 
for households that derived their income from both farming and nonfarm income 
declined by 42.94 percent as compared to a decline of only 14.72 percent for households 
that relied on farm income and remittances. In addition, the poverty gap for households 
that derived their income from both farming and nonfarm income declined by 55.71 
percent as compared to a decline of only 23.35 percent for households that relied on 
farm income and remittances. 
 
Karugia et al. (2006) support the argument that integration of farm and nonfarm 
investments is required to enable households to generate sufficient incomes to escape 
poverty in rural Kenya. This is because after initial investments in farming, expected 
returns to land investments decline, especially with declining land sizes, which calls for 
investments into the nonfarm economy. They also support the argument that 
households that rely heavily on food crop production and seasonal wage labor activities 




assets (such as land and human capital) and use their assets to engage in diverse 
livelihood strategies that are less risky and offer higher returns.  
 
Evans and Ngau (1991) show that while poor households in rural Kenya relied only on 
subsistence farming as a single source of income, richer households relied on multiple 
sources of income, including farming, wage income and nonfarm activities. They found 
that while only 18 percent of poorer households earned income from nonfarm activities, 
67 percent of richer households earned income from nonfarm activities and were 
therefore more diversified than poorer households. In addition, richer households 
tended to have more liquid assets than poorer households. They argue that narrow 
sectoral approaches aimed at raising agricultural productivity are less effective in 
reducing poverty and due attention should be paid to the role of the nonfarm activities, 
especially small scale businesses and nonfarm employment opportunities. Thus, 
agricultural sector development programs should be part of a broad development 
strategy that encompasses both the farm and nonfarm sectors. Riggs (2006) further 
supports this argument by arguing that the best means of promoting pro-poor growth in 
rural areas has very little to do with supporting smallholder farming but should focus 
more on endowing poor people with skills that can help them move out of farming. 
There is a need for smallholder farmers to move beyond peasantry to being agrarian 
entrepreneurs who are commercially oriented towards the demands of the market.  
 
Haggblade, Hazell and Reardon (2010) argue that nonfarm incomes play an important 
role as a safety net by preventing households from falling further into poverty, especially 
during crisis. They argue that the rural nonfarm economy can play an important role in 
reducing poverty, but only in regions that have a strong rural economic base or adequate 
access to growing urban economies. The rural nonfarm economy will contribute to 
poverty reduction only if it leads to an increase in income, which can be achieved 
through investment in productive capacity and productivity of rural tradable goods that 
ensures competitiveness in external markets. Within a favorable policy environment, 
increasing agricultural output and productivity is expected to spur growth of nonfarm 






There is also research evidence that shows that diversifying into nonfarm activities 
enhances agricultural productivity, thereby increasing household income. Freeman, 
Ellis and Allison (2004) argue that income from nonfarm activities boosts agricultural 
production by financing access to inputs, which enables poor households to escape 
poverty. Babatunde (2015), in his study on the impact of nonfarm income on 
agricultural production and efficiency in the Nigerian state of Kwara, also found that 
nonfarm income contributed to higher farm production and larger expenditure on 
purchased inputs, while it decreased the use of family labor. Evans and Ngau (1991) also 
argue that nonfarm income enables farmers to become more productive, which leads to 
an increase in household income. Agricultural productivity can be enhanced by 
spending more money on purchases of farm inputs required for production. They 
showed that richer households invested in production inputs (such as hired labor, 
agrochemicals and equipment) five times more than poorer households. 
 
 3.4  Methodology  
 
This section provides an overview of the method of analysis. The section is sub-divided 
into three sections. Section 3.4.1 discusses the methods that were used to derive the 
diversification indices. Section 3.4.2 outlines the methods that were used to examine the 
factors that affect the level of diversification at the household level. Section 3.4.3 
discusses the methods for estimating the impact of diversification on household income 
and poverty. Lastly, section 3.4.4 discusses the methods for assessing the impact of 
diversification on MVP income effects. 
 
3.4.1  Measuring the degree of diversification 
There are various methods that have been applied in the literature to measure the 
degree of concentration or diversification. We apply two types of diversification 






The first measure is the Simpson Index of Diversity (SID) as applied by Joshi et al. 
(2003). SID measures the degree of diversity and ranges from 0 to 1, where movement 
towards zero indicates complete specialization, while movement towards 1 indicates a 
higher degree of diversification. SID is computed as follows: 




where n can be interpreted as the number of income sources and Pi is the proportionate 
value of ith activity in the total income. 
 
A second measure of diversification is the Shannon-Weaver Index (SWI). Following 





where n can be interpreted as number of income sources and Pi is the proportionate 
value of ith activity in the total income. The index increases with diversity. The SWI has 
been found to be less sensitive to the degree of dominance of the largest categories than 
the SID (Minot et al., 2006). 
 
3.4.2   Determinants of income diversification 
The analytical framework of the model is based on a standard rural household model of 
the determinants of income diversification, which follows from Escobal (2001). The 
household seeks to maximize its utility subject to several constraints, including: (i) cash 
constraints, (ii) production technologies, (iii) prices, (iv) an equilibrium condition for 
self-sufficiency of farm production and (v) an equilibrium condition for family labor. 
Labor allocation between farm and nonfarm sectors is determined using the first order 
conditions of the maximization problem through the factor supply and demand 
functions. The reduced form of the model is given as: 
 / 	= 01 
where / represents income shares from farm and nonfarm sectors and X represents 
factors affecting income diversification such as input and output prices and asset 





A tobit model, which is mainly used for censored data, is used to assess the 
determinants of diversification (as applied in Shwarze and Zeller, 2005 and Minot et al., 
2006). The dependent variables are diversity indices, while the independent variables 
are as defined in Table 3.1. We estimate separate equations for the total sample and 
millennium villages. We do not estimate separate equations for the control group 
because the sample size of those with above average diversity is very small. The a priori 
expectations on the direction of causality are indicated in the last column, which shows 
whether the expected coefficient (α) is positive or negative. The expectations are mainly 
guided by previous empirical evidence as discussed in the literature. 
 
Table 3.1: Definition and measurement of variables 
Variable Type and definition Measurement A priori expectation 
Dependent variables  
Diversity index SID censored between 0 
and 1; SWI censored 




Derived using SID 
and SWI as discussed 
in part (a) above 
 
Total income Discrete, total amount 
of cash income for the 
household 
Amount in Kenya 
shillings (KES) 
 
Poverty Dummy variable, 
poverty status of 
household 
1 for poor, 0 for non-
poor: based on rural 
poverty line of 1562 









Discrete, effect of MVP 
on cash income for the 
household 
Computed as the 
difference between 
the income of a 
household and its 
counterfactual (as 
estimated in Chapter 
2) 
 
Independent variables  
MVP A dummy variable, 
participation in MVP 
1 for MVP, 0 for 
control group 
α>0, households within 
millennium villages are 
more diversified 
Sex of the 
household 
head 
A dummy variable, sex 
of household head 
1 if male, 0 if female α<0 or α>0, effect is 
indeterminate 
Age of the 
household 
head 
Discrete, age of 
household head 
Number of years of 
completed 






Marital status of 
household head 
1 for married 
household heads, 0 





household heads tend 




Discrete, number of 
years of schooling by 
the household head 
Number of years of 
schooling by the 
household head 
α>0, the higher the 
coefficient of the 
education variable, the 
higher the diversity 
index 
Household size Discrete, number of 
members in a 
household 
Number of household 
members 
α>0, the larger the 
household, the higher 




Dependency Discrete, level of 
dependence within 
household 
Derived by taking the 
ratio of economically 
inactive over active 
members of the 
household 
α>0, the higher the 
dependency, the higher 
the diversity index 
Type of house Dummy variable, type 
of house 
An indicator of wealth 
status, 1 is temporary, 
0 is semi-permanent 
and permanent house 
α<0, those with 
temporary houses are 
expected to have lower 
diversity indices  
Land size Discrete, size of land 
holding 
The size of land 
owned by household 
in hectares 
α<0, the larger the land 
size, the lower the 
diversity index 
Credit Dummy variable, access 
to formal credit 
1 for access to formal 
credit, 0 for access to 
informal sources of 
credit 
α>0, the more access to 
formal credit, the 




Dummy variable, type 
of investment over the 
past three years 
1 for investment in 
agriculture and farm-
related activities, 0 
for investment in 
nonfarm activities, 
e.g. small scale 
businesses 
α<0, the more 
investment in 
agriculture and related 
activities, the lower the 
diversity index 
 
3.4.3   Assessing the effect of diversification on household income and 
poverty  
In this section, we assess whether households that diversified more in nonfarm activities 
had higher household incomes and lower poverty levels. Consider a linear model that 
relates household income (the dependent variable Z) to the level of diversification and 
other exogenous variables (the x) as follows: 




   where 6	is the random error term and is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed, with a normal distribution where:  
E(6 = 0	       Var(6 ) = 7+   Cov(xn) = 0                 
 
As shown in figure 3.1, household income and diversification have a bi-directional 
relationship, implying that the level of diversification is endogenous. Estimation of 
equation (i) by ordinary least squares would lead to inconsistent estimators because 
Cov(xn)≠0 (Wooldridge, 2010). The solution is to use instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation. To use the IV approach, we need a variable V that is not part of x and 
satisfies two conditions: (i) it must be uncorrelated with the error term 6 i.e Cov(V,	6 =
0 and (ii) the variable must be partially correlated with the endogenous variable.  
 
Given the difficulty in fulfilling the exclusion restrictions, we instead estimate reduced 
form relationships and test for common causality in the determinants of diversification, 
household income and poverty as applied in Walle and Cratty (2004). Common 
causality is identified by exogenous explanatory variables having the same sign in 
regressions for diversification, household income and poverty. A trade-off is indicated 
by opposing signs. Even though this approach does not answer the question of whether 
diversification enhances household income and reduces poverty, the method sheds light 
on whether diversification, household income and poverty are explained by the same 
covariates. We therefore estimate the income equation using OLS and the poverty 
equation using probit, with the same covariates as those applied in section 3.4.2. 
 
The derivation of poverty indices follows Foster, Greer and Thorbeck (1984). Let 
8	 = 8, 8+, ……… . . , 8  be a vector of household incomes in increasing order, and 
suppose ,	 > 0 is a predetermined poverty line. In addition, the income shortfall of the 
ith household is	= 	= ,	 −	8; the number of households with income below the poverty 
line is given by >	 = >	8;@ and the total number of households is given by 	 = 8. 
The poverty measure of the households will be defined as: 







3.4.4   Assessing the effect of diversification on MVP income effect 
The question is whether those who diversified benefited more from the MVP by deriving 
higher income treatment effects. Following from Chapter 2, we estimate the impact of 
the MVP on household income measures (observed and counterfactual) for both 
regimes o and 1 as discussed in Chapter 2 using propensity score matching. Suppose the 
treatment status is denoted by T, which implies that Ti = 1 if household i participates in 
the MVP program and Ti = 0 if the household does not participate in the program (the 
counterfactual, represented by the control group). Recall that the potential outcomes are 
T
iY  for the income of a household participating in the program and 
C
iY  for the 
counterfactual. The change in income gain of the program is given by ∆Y = TiY  - 
C
iY . The 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET), which is the mean impact on 
household income among those households participating in the program, is as derived 
in chapter two and given by: 
 
          = ∆E| = 1 = EF = 1 − E| = 0 
 
Thus, 
          =	 ∑ E∈ −	E∈  
 
We then estimate an equation using ATET as the dependent variable and the level of 
diversity as one of the independent variables, for regime 0 and 1. The other dependent 
variables are as defined in section 3.4.2. We tested for endogeneity to determine 
whether to apply the Ordinary Least Squares or instrumental variable estimation 
techniques.  
 
The next stage of the analysis follows from De Janvry, Sadoulet and Zhu, (2005), 
whereby, using the regression results as derived above, we estimate the expected MVP 
income effects for two different levels of diversification. We identify two separate 
regimes: regime 0 for households with below average diversity indices (i.e. SID ≤ 0.5) 
and regime 1 for households with above average diversity indices (i.e. SID >0.5). To 




equations from observed values for each regime, (b) use the equations to predict 
expected MVP income effects for households in regimes 0 and 1 and (c) compare the 
predicted and observed MVP income effects. To predict the MVP income effects, for 
instance for regime 0, the MVP income effect for regime 0 would be their observed MVP 
income effect, while the income effect for regime 1 would be the predicted income effect 
that they would derive if they were not participating in nonfarm activities. Average 
observed and predicted household MVP income effects are summarized as shown in 
Table 3.2.  
 
The hypothesis is that households with higher levels of diversity would have 
higher/lower MVP income effects as compared to those with lower diversity indices, i.e.  
 H0: ATETregime 0 = ATETregime 1 
 Ha: ATETregime 0 ≠ ATETregime 1 
 
Table 3.2: Average observed and simulated household income and poverty 
 Regime 0: Households with 
lower diversity index (Pi = 
0) 
Regime 1: Households 
with higher diversity index 
(Pi = 1) 
Regime 0: Households 
with lower diversity index 
(Pi = 0) 
8G|H = 0, observed MVP 
income effect 
#8G|H = 0, expected  MVP 
income effect 
Regime 1: Households 
with higher diversity index 
(Pi = 1) 
#8G|H = 1, expected MVP 
income effect 
8G|H = 1, observed MVP 
income effect 
 
3.5   Research Findings 
 
3.5.1  Descriptive statistics 
The test of significance of the difference in means for the total sample and the 




that are less diversified and those that have higher levels of diversification (Table 3.3). 
The diversity indices (both SID and SWI) are significantly different between the two 
groups. Other differences are with regard to the household size, dependency ratios, size 
of land and poverty status of the household. We also carried out a difference in means 
test for the level of diversification between the millennium villages and the control 
villages. We found that the differences between the millennium villages and control 
villages were insignificant. 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of test of significance of the difference of means  

















Sex of household head 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.06 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.05 
Age of household head 51.7 50.3 51.5 -1.39 53.2 50.7 52.7 -2.5- 
Marital status 0.67 0.71 0.67 0.04 0.69 0.74 0.70 0.05 
Education of household head 8.0 8.9 8.2 0.83 8.6 9.2 8.7 0.56 
Household size 5.2 6.5 5.4 1.29* 5.6 7.1 5.8 1.5* 
Dependency ratio 0.76 1.21 0.83 0.44* 0.85 1.21 0.92 0.35** 
Type of house 0.24 0.2 0.23 -0.04 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.02 
Land size 0.49 0.42 0.48 -0.07 0.57 0.39 0.53 -0.18** 
Access to credit 0.11 0.05 0.11 -0.07 0.16 0.07 0.14 -0.94 
Type of investments 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.02 0.51 0.44 0.50 -0.72 
Total income 4305.4 4622.5 4351.6 317.13 4752 4,863.8 4,709 111 
Poverty status 0.27 0.15 0.25 0.12** 0.18 0.12 0.17 -0.06 
Simpson Index of Diversity 0.22 0.61 0.26 -0.25* 0.21 0.61 0.29 0.40* 
Shannon-Weaver Index 0.32 0.93 0.41 0.60* 0.33 0.94 0.44 0.62* 
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009) 
* and ** stand for significance at 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
From the summary statistics, households that have higher levels of diversity have larger 
household sizes, higher dependency and smaller land sizes. There is also a significant 




lower levels of diversity and more diversified households. The difference in household 
income is not significant. While we can deduce that the level of diversity is influenced by 
the household size, level of dependency and land size, more analysis is carried out in 
section 3.5.2 to determine the magnitude of the effects.  
 
3.5.2  Determinants of diversification 
The tobit model for the determinants of diversification was estimated for the total 
sample and for millennium villages using both indicators of diversification. The results 
are shown in Table 3.4. For the total sample, the estimation results using both SID and 
SWI indicate that household size, level of dependency and land size were the main 
drivers of diversification.  
 
For the MVP sample, an increase in household size by one member increases the 
expected value of SID by 0.029 and SWI by 0.054. For the total sample, an increase in 
household size by one member increases the expected value of SID by 0.021 and SWI by 
0.038. Similarly, households with higher dependency ratios were found to diversify 
more than households with fewer dependents for the total sample. An increase in the 
level of dependency by one member increases the expected value of SID by 0.059 and 
SWI by 0.077.  
 
The size of land was also found to be a significant determinant of diversification, with an 
inverse relationship between land size and diversification. This shows evidence of land 
being an important push factor into diversification, whereby households with smaller 
parcels of land are forced to look for alternative nonfarm means of generating additional 
income. Increasing the size of land by one hectare reduces the expected SID by 0.075 
and expected SWI by 0.139 for millennium villages. Similarly, it reduces expected SID 
and SWI by 0.089 and 0.150, respectively, for the total sample. 
 
The MVP dummy was insignificant for both SID and SWI. This shows that the level of 
diversification was not significantly different between the millennium villages and the 
control villages. Thus, we can deduce that the MVP did not succeed in enhancing 




Table 3.4: Determinants of diversification 
  
MVP Total sample 
SID SWI SID SWI 
MVP dummy     -0.024 -0.024 
Sex of household head -0.064 -0.123 -0.021 -0.053 
Age of household head 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  
Number of years of education 0.007  0.020  -0.001 0.002  
Household size 0.029*  0.054*  0.021**  0.038*  
Marital status 0.059  0.121  0.080  0.145  
Dependency 0.053  0.060  0.059**  0.077***  
Size of land -0.075*** -0.139*** -0.089** -0.150** 
Access to formal credit 0.023  0.031  -0.034 -0.059 
Land ownership 0.083  0.120  0.061  0.093  
Type of house -0.046 -0.055 -0.026 -0.036 
Type of investment -0.027 -0.078 -0.015 -0.066 
Amount of investment -0.000 -0.000 0.000  0.000  
Constant 0.096  0.033  0.127  0.144  
Number of observations 133  134  221  222  
LR chi2(12) 22.780  24.860  24.400  28.860  
Prob > chi2 0.030  0.016  0.028  0.013  
Pseudo R2 0.1931 0.114  0.130  0.078  
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance 
levels, respectively. 
 
3.5.3   Impact of diversification on household income and poverty 
The regression results for the income and poverty equations (with similar covariates as 
those in the equation on the determinants of diversification) are shown in Table 3.5. For 
the MVP sample, income is significantly determined by sex of the household head, 
number of years of education, marital status, dependency, whether the household head 




results show that female-headed households have a lower mean income than male-
headed households by KES 1,633.6. Increasing the number of years of education by 1 
year increases household income by KES 319.2. Married household heads also have 
higher household income, estimated at KES 1,801.4, which is most likely due to the 
higher likelihood of having more than one income earner. Dependency negatively affects 
income, whereby increasing the number of dependents by one reduces income by KES 
582.2. Comparing the effect of having more dependents on diversification to its effect on 
household income, we see a trade-off effect (as the variable has opposing signs in the 
estimations). Access to formal credit also increases household income by KES 1,947.7. 
As for the type of house, wealthier households (with permanent houses) have higher 
incomes of about KES 2,138.4.  
 
The probability of being poor is explained by the household size and the size of land. 
Increasing the household size by one member increases the probability of being poor by 
0.036. This relationship is similar to that in the determinants of diversification, thus 
indicating common causality. However, increasing the size of land by one hectare 
reduces the probability of being poor by 0.259. This variable also shows common 
causality, as households with larger land sizes diversified less. These findings 
corroborate the earlier findings in Chapter 1, which revealed that large household sizes 
and smaller land sizes undermined the translation of increased agricultural productivity 
into higher household incomes. 
 
For the total sample, we find that the MVP dummy for both the income and poverty 
equations is insignificant, which implies that there were no significant differences in 
income and poverty between the millennium villages and the control villages. This 
finding is in line (i.e. also shows common causality) with the findings in section 3.5.2, 
which also showed that there were no significant differences in the level of 
diversification between the millennium villages and control villages. We can thus 
deduce that the MVP did not significantly enhance diversification and household 
income, which corroborates our findings in Chapter 2 regarding the insignificant cash 





Table 3.5: Determinants of household income and poverty 
  















Sex of household head -1,633.6*** 0.028 -936.0 0.073 
Age of household head -25.2 0.000 -17.8 0.002 
Number of years of education 319.2* -0.018 1,387.1** -0.021** 
Household size 177.7 0.036*** 257.6 0.015 
Marital status 1,801.4** -0.136 159.8** -0.083 
Dependency -582.2*** 0.052 -137.0 0.076*** 
Size of land 772.1 -0.259** 1,898.8*** -0.015 
Access to formal credit 1,947.7** 
 
1,137.2 
 Land ownership -535.7 0.121 -621.3 0.065 
Type of house -2,138.4* -0.062 -1,129.7** -0.060 
Type of investment -255.7 -0.110 198.9 -0.221** 




 Number of observations 134 115 222 194 
F statistic 8.5 
 
80.6 
 Prob>F 0.0 
 
0.0 
 R squared 0.5 
 
0.8 
 Root MSE 2,836.4 















Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  





Other factors that explain variations in household income for the total sample are 
number of years of education, marital status, size of land, type of house (wealth status) 
and amount of investment. The probability of being poor is explained by education, the 
level of dependency, type of investment and amount invested. Increasing the level of 
education by one year reduces the probability of being poor by 0.021, while increasing 
the number of dependents by one increases the probability of being poor by 0.076. 
Investing in agriculture and farm-related activities reduces the likelihood of being poor 
by 0.221, while higher amounts of investment reduce the likelihood of being poor but by 
a very small margin. 
 
3.5.4  Impact of diversification on MVP income effect 
An important aspect of this study was to assess the impact of diversification on the 
MVP’s household income effect. The question was whether enhanced diversification 
would have led to higher household income and consequently higher MVP income 
effects. The results are shown in Table 3.8.  
 
Table 3.8: Average observed and simulated MVP effects on household income 
 Regime 0: Households with 
lower diversity index (Pi = 
0) 
Regime 1: Households 
with higher diversity index 
(Pi = 1) 
Regime 0: Households 
with lower diversity index 
(Pi = 0) 
8G|H = 0, observed income 
effect 
383 
#8G|H = 0, simulated 
income effect 
357.2 
Regime 1: Households 
with higher diversity index 
(Pi = 1) 
#8G|H = 1, simulated 
income effect 
-4,085.6 
8G|H = 1, observed income 
effect 
-4085.6 
Source: Author’s own computation from original survey data (2009)  
 
From this analysis, we can deduce that: 
i. Higher levels of diversification would have led to lower MVP income effects for the 




reduction in income effects following increased diversification is an indication of the 
MVP’s focus on interventions in agriculture as opposed to intensification of 
diversification of activities. Even though the MVP advocated for diversification, our 
statistics reveal that the average diversity index was very low (0.29 for millennium 
villages and 0.26 for the total sample). Further, the tests of the difference in means 
also reveal that the difference in mean SID between the millennium villages and the 
control villages was insignificant. 
ii. Households that had higher levels of diversity would have had no change in average 
income effects (but differences in minimum and maximum expected income values) 
if they had increased their reliance on farming. This is also explained by their land 
size constraints, which would have hindered them from benefiting from MVP’s 
agricultural interventions. 
 
3.6  Discussion  
 
There is evidence from literature that has shown that most rural households diversify 
their sources of income (Barrett and Reardon, 2000). For Sauri millennium village and 
the control households, the level of diversification was relatively low, with an average 
SID of 0.29 for millennium villages and 0.25 for the control group (considering that 0 
represents no diversification and 1 represents the highest level of diversification). We 
also found that the difference in means between the millennium villages and control 
group was not significant. 
 
There are various factors that drove households to diversify their activities. Among the 
key push factors for diversification was the size of land. Our results further corroborate 
earlier findings of an inverse relationship between land size and participation in the 
nonfarm economy (Minot et al., 2006; Winters et al., 2009). Households with smaller 
pieces of land have to look for alternative sources of income to supplement their farm 
income, while those with large farms tend to have a larger number of crops with more 
marketed surplus, but with less nonfarm income and income diversity. Statistics from 




hectares of land. With the small pieces of land, our findings echo the arguments by 
Nziguheba et al. (2010) that households are unlikely to escape the poverty trap by 
practicing small-scale subsistence agriculture on a 0.5 hectare piece of land regardless of 
the level of agricultural productivity. Thus, diversification into the nonfarm economy is 
the key to escaping the poverty trap in Sauri. 
 
Our findings also reveal that smaller households with fewer dependents have a higher 
probability of participating in farm activities. But large households would require a 
diversity of activities to meet the household demands. Larger households could also 
imply more abundant labor, which has largely been associated with greater income 
gains from the nonfarm activities (Winters, 2009). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
larger households greatly undermined the transmission mechanism between increased 
agricultural productivity and income, given that a bigger proportion of output was 
allocated to self-consumption, leaving a smaller proportion to be sold as surplus to 
generate income. For Sauri, the combined effect of large household sizes and higher 
dependency are an indication of the need for a more diversified portfolio for higher 
household income.  
 
Our findings also reveal that there were no significant differences in the level of income 
and poverty between the millennium villages and the control villages. The insignificant 
effect on income and poverty could partly be explained by the insignificant effect of the 
MVP on the level of diversification. The factors that were found to significantly affect the 
level of diversification, household income and poverty were household size, dependency 
and the size of land. This finding is supported widely in literature, where proponents of 
diversification argue that diversification into the nonfarm economy is important in 
enhancing household incomes and providing a pathway out of poverty (Ellis, Kutengule 
and Nyasulu, 2003; Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003; Ellis and Mdoe, 2003; De Janvry, 
Sadoulet and Zhu, 2005). There is also evidence showing that most poor households in 
Africa rely largely on subsistence farming and lack productive assets that can enable 
them to venture into nonfarm activities (Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003; Ellis and Mdoe, 





Further findings also revealed that the effects of the MVP interventions on income were 
less for the households that had higher levels of diversity. These findings are largely an 
indication of the MVP’s major emphasis on agricultural interventions, despite having 
advocated for diversification to enhance household income and reduce poverty levels. 
Even though the level of diversity was significantly higher in the millennium villages as 
compared to the control villages, the level of diversity on average was too low to enable 
significant income gains. Taking note of the low levels of diversification among Sauri 
households, we can therefore partly attribute the insignificant MVP income effect to the 
insufficient diversification of activities.  
 
These results point to the importance of emphasizing a broad-based rural development 
strategy that not only seeks to raise agricultural productivity but also promotes 
diversification of farm output, enhances commercialization and promotes diversification 
into the nonfarm economy. We have also shown that the design of interventions should 
have a clear evaluation of local level characteristics that might undermine the 
effectiveness of the interventions. In this case, land size and household size have been 
shown to be significant determinants of (i) the translation of increased agricultural 
productivity into higher household incomes (as shown in Chapter 1) and (ii) the level of 
diversification of a household. Thus, we also conclude that testing of assumptions and 
mechanisms in the theory of change are important to ensure the effectiveness of the 
interventions. 
 
Lastly, we take note of the limitations of the study approach. One key limitation is that 
the study analyzed partial effects of diversification on household income and poverty. 
We take note of the presence of important feedback effects of poverty and household 
income on diversification. Thus, an area for further research would be to examine the 
effect of poverty and household income on diversification and also to assess general 
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4.1   Introduction 
 
Over time, rural development initiatives that are aimed at poverty reduction have not 
only focused on the role of agriculture and the nonfarm economy, but also recognized 
the important role played by institutions in shaping rural livelihood outcomes (Rodrik, 
2004; De Laiglesia, 2006). The compounding role of institutions is necessitated by the 
multidimensional nature of poverty, which calls for holistic solutions that address the 
symptoms and causes of poverty (IFAD, 2009). One of the ways through which 
institutions affect the performance of the economy is through their effect on the cost of 
exchange (transaction costs) and production (North, 1990; Eaton and Meijerink, 2007; 
Dorward et al., 2009). High transaction costs lead to market failure, which further 
increases the risks and the costs of exchange. Further, all social interaction in which 
people exchange resources, information and services and implement activities is 
embedded in institutions, which determine the distribution of power and access to and 
control over resources and services (Bastiaensen, De Herdt and Vaessen, 2002). Thus, 
developing rural institutions that are responsive to the needs of the poor is a “crucial 
question for economic policy-making as governments try to accelerate rural 
development and poverty reduction in economies that are increasingly market-based” 
(IFAD, 2003a, p.4). Improving market access is of importance to all rural households, 
“and assisting rural poor people in improving their access to markets must be a critical 
element of any strategy to enable them to enhance their food security and increase their 
incomes” (IFAD, 2003b, p.5). 
 
It is evident that the Millennium Villages Project (MVP) underscored the importance of 




boosting household income. To enable households to pursue these livelihood strategies, 
the MVP emphasized the role of market institutions in both implementation and 
sustainability of the investments (Sanchez et al., 2007). In the MVP concept note (see 
MVP, 2008 and Millennium Promise, 2010), it is noted that effective institutions are 
necessary to facilitate the implementation and sustainability of the investments. It is 
stated that: 
Rural development requires community-based investments in priority sectors 
including agriculture, health, education, water, transport infrastructure, 
energy services, and the environment, and effective institutions at the 
community-level capable of implementing and sustaining these investments 
(MVP, 2008, p.55; Millennium Promise, 2010, p.9).  
 
Another report by Millennium Promise underscores the importance of enhancing access 
to markets if the poor are to escape from extreme poverty. They state that: 
The core idea is that impoverished villages, in partnership with donors, can 
escape from extreme poverty if they are empowered with proven and powerful 
technologies to improve their farm productivity, health, education, and access 
to markets (Millennium Promise, 2005, p.2). 
 
UN Millennium Project (2005) also observes that marketing of agricultural produce is 
vital for creation of the linkage between increased agricultural productivity and 
household income. They also emphasize the importance of networks with agro dealers, 
provision of storage facilities and enhancing access to credit. They state that:  
To further improve farmers’ ability to market their products and access 
markets, national strategies can focus on building storage facilities, 
encouraging networks of agro dealers, and improving credit and savings 
facilities. All these investments will succeed when smallholder farmers and rural 
communities are empowered to establish their own institutions — for example, 
farmer field schools to gain access to new agricultural technologies, village 
banks to gain access to financial services, and farmers’ associations to negotiate 





There are various definitions of institutions in literature, key among them North (1990), 
who defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. These institutions include 
both formal and informal constraints and are either created or evolve over time. Lin and 
Nugent (1995) define institutions as a set of humanly devised behavioral rules that 
govern and shape the interactions of human beings, in part by helping them to form 
expectations of what other people will do. “Institutional arrangement” is used 
interchangeably with institutions, while "institutional change" refers to a change from 
one institutional arrangement to another. 
 
Given that agriculture is a key source of livelihood for the majority of people in rural 
Africa, effective institutions are a sine qua non for agricultural growth (Eicher, 1999). 
Well-functioning agricultural markets, in particular, are essential for rural growth and 
poverty reduction. However, markets for inputs (seeds and fertilizer) in Africa have been 
shown to be inefficient, with demand for inputs being seasonal and weaker due to the 
possibility of farmers growing varieties whose seed can be saved from the harvest and 
replanted for several cropping seasons (World Bank, 2007). The access to output 
markets is also limited, which has been viewed as an impediment to households’ 
attempts at increasing their standards of living (IFAD, 2001). Most rural households 
have limited connection with markets, with only between one- and two-fifths of the 
rural population being significant participants in agricultural markets (IFAD, 2010). For 
the smallholder farmers to escape poverty, they need to gain access to remunerative and 
reliable produce markets that can enable them to commercialize their production 
systems and increase their farm incomes. Lastly, financial constraints are also pervasive 
in African agriculture, with the financial contracts in rural areas involving higher 
transaction costs and risks than those in urban settings (World Bank, 2007). This is 
because of the greater spatial dispersion of production, lower population densities, 
lower quality of infrastructure and the seasonality and often high covariance of rural 
production activities. 
 
It has been argued that the effectiveness of agricultural interventions for rural 




of farmer behavior and inadequate consideration of the role played by institutions when 
designing rural interventions (Roumasset, 2004; Bastiaensen, De Herdt and Vaessen, 
2002). Meinzen-Dick, Di Gregorio and McCarthy (2004) also support this view by 
emphasizing the importance of small-scale community collective action either through 
indigenous institutions or external programs in explaining the failures of earlier 
community-based development programs. Thus, maximizing the poverty reducing 
effects of rural development interventions requires an in-depth understanding of key 
local institutional features, which were also relevant for the MVP (Christiaensen, 
Demery and Kühl, 2006; FAO, 2011; Eaton and Meijerink, 2007).  
 
Institutions tend to be well-defined to perform specialized functions, which implies that 
traditional institutions may no longer be optimal as the structure of the economy 
changes (Lin and Nugent, 1995). Institutional change is necessary for development to 
occur, as institutions could become obstacles to development over time (Ruttan, 1985). 
But institutional rigidity and inertia may limit the efficient evolution of institutions, 
which implies that the institutions will not always be efficient. Dysfunctional institutions 
may persist because of distributive conflicts and asymmetries in bargaining power 
among social groups (Bardhan, 2005) or due to the importance of existing path-
dependent processes, which makes some arrangements non-viable because of 
incompatibility with other existing arrangements in the structure (Bardhan, 1989). 
Institutional innovation, which can be defined as a way of removing institutional 
barriers that constrain smallholder farmers from escaping the poverty trap (Tenywa et 
al., 2011), is important in facilitating institutional change. Institutional innovation is 
about formulating and entrenching alternative arrangements that help to minimize 
existing constraints to improved access to services and markets for inputs and outputs 
(Tatwangire, 2013). Even though a lot of institutional innovation has taken place over 
the last decade, there are still a lot of institutional bottlenecks, especially for smallholder 
agriculture in Africa (World Bank, 2007).  
 
This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the performance of 
institutions and institutional change in a broader framework of impact evaluation of 




institutional outcomes (specifically in access to input, output and credit markets) to the 
effectiveness of interventions in smallholder agriculture for rural development. Even 
though there is consensus in literature that institutions matter for rural development, 
most of the literature only focuses on specific aspects of institutions (such as credit 
markets, property rights and farmers’ marketing cooperatives). In addition, there have 
also been no attempts by the MVP to evaluate the performance of the interventions in 
markets and their effect on project outcomes, despite their recognition of the 
importance of efficient markets in fostering agricultural growth and rural development. 
Further, most studies that carry out impact evaluation of development interventions 
only focus on economic outcomes, with minimal attention given to the role played by 
institutions in shaping the outcomes. This study attempts to fill this gap by using Sauri 
as a case study to analyze the effect of institutional changes resulting from MVP 
interventions on the achievement of the MVP goals of increasing agricultural 
productivity, enhancing household income and reducing poverty.  
 
The specific objectives of the study are to analyze: 
i. The performance of market-related institutional changes that were implemented 
by the MVP interventions. These include changes in relation to: 
a) Input markets 
b) Output markets 
c) Credit markets 
ii. Whether the institutional changes promoted or undermined the success of the 
MVP interventions in agriculture and the nonfarm economy. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the 
Millennium Villages Project, with particular focus on specific interventions in market 
access (input, output and credit markets) and collective action. Section 4.3 presents a 
discussion on theories that explain the functioning of markets and also reviews studies 
on markets’ performance and their implication for rural development. Section 4.4 
discusses the analytical framework that guides the analysis of market-related 
institutions and their implication for rural development (more specifically, the success 




sources. Section 4.5 presents the analysis and findings of the chapter, which are then 
discussed in section 4.6.  
 
4.2 The Millennium Villages Project’s interventions in market 
institutions 
 
In addition to interventions discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, the MVP implemented 
various interventions that were aimed at enhancing access to input, credit and output 
markets (Nziguheba et al., 2010; MVP, 2008). Some of the institutional interventions 
included:  
(i) Initiatives to enhance access to inputs through creation of linkages between 
farmers and input suppliers (especially agro-dealers). 
(ii) Enhanced collective action in the production of higher value crops as a means of 
promoting crop diversification. 
(iii) Initiatives to enhance access to credit (both microfinance and other formal sources 
of finance) from the second year of operation to enable the transition from the 
input subsidy to a credit-based system. By the fifth year, the focus was more on the 
mobilization of resources through organization of communities into cooperative-
run microfinance institutions or partnerships with other financial institutions for 
management of micro credit.  
(iv) Enhanced collective action in access to input, credit and output markets. 
(v) Enhancing access to output markets through creation of cereal banks for both 
storage and joint marketing of produce, and creation of marketing cooperatives. 
 
The theory of change was that enhanced access to input, credit and output markets 
would facilitate higher agricultural productivity and production, which could be 
translated into higher household income. The theory of change is summarized in Figure 
4.1, which highlights the expected mechanisms through which increments in 
agricultural productivity and diversification could be translated into increased 
household income and poverty reduction and the role of market institutions. Access to 




small-scale subsistence agricultural farmers. Increased agricultural productivity would 
increase self-consumption of agricultural produce and also lead to increased household 
income, mainly through the sale of agricultural surplus. 
 

















Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
The link between agricultural productivity and household income in this model depends 
on access to efficient output markets. Households can generate additional income from 
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enhanced through diversification into commercially-oriented farming (especially higher 
value crops) and nonfarm activities (including nonfarm employment). There were also 
efforts to increase access to credit as a way of providing capital for investment in crop 
diversification and nonfarm activities. Diversification into high-value crops was also 
carried out through promotion of collective action among farmers, whereby farmers 
accessed inputs and credit, produced output and accessed output markets jointly. Lastly, 
increased household income was necessary to spur household savings and investment 
and also to enhance participation in self-sustaining commercial activities by households, 
as well as poverty reduction and rural development. 
 
4.3   Review of literature 
 
This section provides a review of main theories that are relevant in explaining the 
performance of the input, output and credit markets. The section also provides a review 
of empirical literature on the importance of markets for rural development. 
 
4.3.1  Theoretical considerations  
Understanding the conditions under which markets fail or function at an inefficient 
level is important, especially for guiding the determination of relevant policies for fixing 
the inefficiencies (Ray, 1998). Various theories help in providing an understanding of 
the functioning of these markets. The theoretical foundation of the analysis of markets is 
mainly based on New Institutional Economics (NIE). NIE uses the neoclassical 
framework but takes transactions as the unit of analysis, relaxes the hypothesis of 
perfect information and emphasizes the importance of institutions as a means to reduce 
high transaction costs. The transaction cost literature goes back to the 1937 article by 
Coase, “Nature of the Firm,” where he argues that market exchange is not costless and 
the cost of a transaction has an important role in the organization of firms and contracts 
(Williamson, 2000). High transaction costs lead to coordination problems and market 
failure, which further increases the risks and the costs of exchange (North, 1990; Eaton 





NIE includes two broad but overlapping approaches, namely those of transaction costs 
and collective action (Lin and Nugent, 1995). The transaction cost approach has been 
useful in analyzing the comparative demand for alternative institutional arrangements. 
The collective action approach, on the other hand, emphasizes free-rider problems 
(which are the consequence of transaction costs) and has been useful in analyzing the 
supply of alternative institutional arrangements. Transaction costs and collective action 
have over time been developed separately, even though they are complementary. 
 
The transaction costs theory 
Transaction costs include the costs of organizing, maintaining and enforcing the rules of 
an institutional arrangement. The direct costs of an exchange could include the cost of 
(i) obtaining the information that the various parties need to assess the quantities and 
qualities of what is exchanged and the benefits and costs of the contract, (ii) negotiating 
among the parties to reach an agreement on the provisions of the contract and (iii) 
monitoring and enforcement of the contract. This third item includes indirect costs in 
the form of output lost due to contractual default. Transaction costs can be ex-ante or 
ex-post. Ex-ante costs include the direct and indirect costs arising from the contract 
selection process, including those of generating the relevant information and of drafting, 
negotiating and safeguarding the agreement. The ex-ante costs also include costs that 
arise from adverse selection. The ex-post transaction costs could include the costs of: 
dispute resolution and the establishment and operation of governance procedures; 
dealing with the maladaptation of the actual provisions of the contract, including its 
renegotiation; monitoring the contract; and bonding the contractual parties to continue 
to work together. The ex-post transaction costs include efficiency losses arising from 
moral hazard, i.e. distortions induced by the terms of contract. 
 
The transaction cost theory suggests that institutional changes mainly result when 
institutional disequilibria exist and the transaction costs of change are not excessive 
(Lin and Nugent, 1995). Transaction costs can therefore be used to explain institutional 
changes, whereby an institutional arrangement is more efficient than other available 
options and requires less in total transaction costs than the other arrangements in the 




increased demand for institutional services or choices among a set of institutional 
arrangements, could render an existing institutional arrangement less efficient than one 
or more other arrangements in the choice set. Institutional change could also be caused 
by an exogenous shock in transaction costs (such as changes in technology, ideology, 
law, etc.). The most important sources of shifts in the demand for institutional service 
are derived from long-term changes in the relative abundance of factors of production. 
For instance, many countries have experienced a gradual evolution from conditions 
characterized by plentiful land and scarce labor to conditions of scarce land and 
plentiful labor in their development process, which has induced the establishment of 
private property rights to land. 
 
The transaction costs analysis provides a framework for analyzing contractual choices 
(Lin and Nugent, 1995). Consider an example of an agrarian setting. If inputs (land and 
labor) are distributed equally, then the possible institutional arrangements are either 
that the households produce independently or they produce collectively as a community. 
For independent production, there are no monitoring costs, but the main disadvantage 
is the lack of possible gains of economies of scale and risk sharing. If inputs are 
distributed unequally, then three different arrangements can exist between the owners 
of land and labor (in addition to a collective arrangement). These are: hire labor at a 
fixed wage (fixed wage contract), rent the land out to the owner of labor at a fixed rent 
(fixed rent contract) or lease it out for a share of output (share contract). The rights and 
obligations of the owners of land and labor differ among these arrangements. 
 
The imperfect information theory  
Given that information costs constitute an important part of transaction costs, another 




information theory. Under the imperfect information theory16, the underlying rationales 
of institutional arrangements and contracts are mainly explained by the strategic 
behavior of parties under asymmetric information (Bardhan, 2000). The main idea is 
that lack of perfect and freely available information leads to risk and uncertainty in 
transactions (Doward et al., 2009). The incomplete and asymmetrical information 
implies that sellers could have more information than buyers regarding the availability 
and characteristics of the supply of products, while buyers could have more information 
than sellers about their demand and their ability and intentions to pay for products. 
Searching for necessary information is necessary to reduce the risks of transaction 
failure, which constitute an important source of transaction costs. The imperfect 
information theory has been fruitfully used in modeling many key agrarian and other 
institutions in poor countries, which are seen to emerge as substitutes for missing 
credit, insurance and futures markets in an environment of pervasive risks, information 
asymmetry and moral hazard (Bardhan, 2000). 
 
Compared with the transaction costs theory, the imperfect information theory is cast in 
a more rigorous framework that clearly defines the assumptions and equilibrium 
solution concepts, fully outlines the implications of strategic behavior under asymmetric 
information and differentiates the impact of different types of information problems 
(Bardhan, 1989). The theory, therefore, yields more concrete and specific predictions 
about the design of contracts, with more attention to the details of terms and conditions 
of varying contractual arrangements under varying circumstances. Imperfect 
information 17  theorists also give more emphasis to ex-ante mechanism design in 
                                                          
16 The dilemma of information asymmetry was well illustrated by Akerlof’s (1970) article on the second-
hand car market in the United States. Given that people buying used cars do not know whether the cars 
are “lemons” (bad cars) or “cherries” (good cars), they are willing to pay an average price (Doward et al, 
2009). If the average price is low, then the suppliers will be more inclined towards a supply of only bad 
cars. 
17 The imperfect information theory is closely related to Williamson’s theory of incomplete contracts, 
which focuses more on adaptive sequential decision-making rather than the comprehensive contingent 




contracts and less to maladaptation costs incurred when transactions drift out of 
alignment ex-post. 
 
Collective action theory 
The transaction cost and imperfect information theories are not clear on the mechanism 
through which new institutions emerge (Bardhan, 1989). The theory of collective action 
seeks to answer questions related to the conditions under which – and the extent to 
which – institutional change takes place. The theory helps explain the composition of 
interest groups, which can affect economic efficiency and long-term development (Lin 
and Nugent, 1995).  
 
There are various definitions of the concept of collective action – “action taken by a 
group in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests,” “joint action for the same 
goal,” “actions to achieve a common objective, when outcomes depend on 
interdependence of members,” etc. (Meinzen-Dick, Di Gregorio and McCarthy, 2004). 
In general, collective action requires the involvement of a group of people with shared 
interest who undertake common action in pursuit of that shared interest. Collective 
action can be used in decision-making (planning and implementation) and also in the 
designing and setting of rules, which determines the level of participation of the various 
agents – which, as discussed earlier, is an important determinant of project success. 
 
Two kinds of collective action problems are relevant in the process of institutional 
change (Bardhan, 2000; Bardhan, 2005): (i) the bargaining problem where disputes 
about sharing the potential benefits from the change may lead to a breakdown of the 
necessary coordination and (ii) the free-rider problem regarding sharing the costs of 
bringing about change. The costs of collective action will be higher where there are 
winners and losers from a productivity-enhancing institutional change with 
concentrated and transparent losses but diffuse gains, and if the potential gainers 
cannot credibly commit to compensate the losers ex-post (Bardhan, 2000). 
 
There are various theories that have been developed to explain collective action. The 




different views (Olson, 1965). The casual view of the traditional theory of groups 
provided that private organizations and groups were ubiquitous mainly due to higher 
human propensities to join groups or associations. Another key contribution was by 
Arthur Bentley, who developed the group theory, which provided that every group, 
regardless of its composition, had shared interests. Olson (1965), in his contribution 
towards the theory of collective action, argued that organizations are usually formed to 
further the common interests of the people. A public or collective good is provided for 
the group whenever a common interest goal is achieved. 
 
The creation of social capital can facilitate or restrain collective action. The most 
popular definition of the concept of social capital is by Putnam (1993), as quoted by 
Bastiaensen, De Herdt and Vaessen (2002), who defines social capital as a society’s 
endowments of voluntary networks, norms of reciprocity and trust. The basic idea of 
social capital is that the processes of social interaction within a society generate 
externalities that affect the development prospects of society as a whole (Bastiaensen, 
De Herdt and Vaessen, 2002). Therefore, a positive sum game18 of social interaction 
between different individuals is very relevant for development interventions and poverty 
alleviation.  
 
4.3.2  Empirical evidence on market failures 
Market failures are prevalent in rural areas, where factor and product markets lead to 
inefficient allocation of resources, which has implications on rural poverty reduction 
(Dercon, 2008). Initial poverty and market failures reinforce each other to keep poor 
people in a poverty trap (Doward et al., 2009; Jayne, Mather and Mghenyi 2010). For 
instance, inefficiencies in input and credit markets will affect output markets mainly 
through smaller marketed surpluses and higher transaction costs and risks. Such 
conditions lead to: (i) failure of insurance markets because of high risks and the costs of 
monitoring behavior to protect against moral hazard and adverse selection, (ii) failure of 
                                                          
18 This refers to a more equal distribution of access to resources, services, information and power that 
would improve the capabilities of the poor, as opposed to a zero sum game where the rich benefit at the 




credit markets because of the inability to insure borrowers, lack of collateral, lower loan 
repayment and limited diversification of local economies, all of which impede the 
development of a sustainable model of rural financial services, and (iii) weaker output 
markets resulting from limited surpluses. 
 
Below is a review of empirical evidence on input, credit and output market failures and 
also on the determinants of success of collective action in access to markets. 
 
Input markets 
African input markets are underdeveloped and fragmented, with most farmers not being 
able to make use of improved seed varieties (AGRA, 2013; World Bank, 2007). Demand 
for inputs is largely seasonal (depends on planting seasons), which hinders the 
development of efficient input supply markets. Small-scale agro-dealers play a big role 
in increasing access to inputs in these rural markets (Odame and Muange, 2010). The 
input markets (mainly seed markets) have two overlapping systems: the formal system 
that represents the organized production and supply of improved seeds and the informal 
system that comprises farmer production systems (especially those retaining seeds from 
previous harvests or seed exchanges among farmers). It has been estimated that about 
80 percent of smallholder farmers rely on seeds that have been saved from previous 
harvest or use the local seeds that are bought from the local market (Wekundah, 2012). 
There are various constraints to access to formal markets, key among them: high retail 
prices of inputs/liquidity constraints, lack of knowledge about the improved seeds, 
inadequate demand for inputs and also inadequate access to input markets (Odame and 
Muange, 2010). It is for these reasons that market failures in input markets are 
pervasive in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2007). Decades of low input use have 
undermined Africa’s efforts to increase agricultural productivity and income (Kelly, 
Adesina and Gordon, 2003). 
 
Previous experience with increasing access to inputs in Africa revealed two key lessons 
(World Bank, 2007; Kelly, Adesina and Gordon, 2003). First, the development of rural 
stockists (agro-dealers) is critical for accelerating the access of the rural poor to quality 




farmers and making the inputs available in required volumes at affordable prices 
(Poulton, Kydd and Doward, 2006; Odame and Muange, 2010). Second, previous 
experience has shown that agricultural inputs can be made more affordable by 
packaging in smaller, affordable sizes, which would improve demand for the inputs and 
also reduce the risks of experimenting with new types of inputs (Poulton, Kydd and 
Doward, 2006; Kelly, Adesina and Gordon, 2003). The theory of change underlying 
packaging of agricultural inputs into small packages is that poor smallholder farmers 
gradually expand their capacity to acquire inputs as yields increase. 
 
A common intervention in input markets has been the provision of input subsidies. 
There has been a resurgence in input subsidies across African countries in recent years, 
with an approximate expenditure of roughly US$ 1.05 billion (about 28.6 percent of 
public expenditure on agriculture) by 10 African countries (Jayne and Rashid, 2013). 
The resurgence has mainly been driven by the input subsidies’ political appeal and also 
because the subsidies are a means of providing social protection to poor farmers (Morris 
et al., 2007; Jayne and Rashid, 2013). Despite the resurgence, there has been little 
consensus regarding the effectiveness of input subsidies. Some have argued that input 
subsidies make economic sense, such as Denning et al. (2009), who argued that the 
evaluation of the input subsidy in Malawi resulted in a cost to benefit ratio of 0.76 to 
1.36. Others have argued that the cost of the subsidies has often been high with modest 
benefits (Morris et al., 2007). There is also empirical evidence showing that fertilizer 
subsidies are likely to be inefficient, costly and fiscally unsustainable (Doward, 2009; 
Morris et al., 2007). Morris et al. (2007) further argues that large-scale provision of 
input subsidies cannot have a lasting impact on agricultural productivity, income and 
poverty unless they are accompanied by investments in public goods. 
 
Output markets 
The expansion of output marketing opportunities is also a key precondition for the 
transformation of agricultural practices beyond subsistence agriculture, which is 
necessary for poverty reduction and rural development (De Laiglesia, 2006; Barrett, 
2008; IDB, 2010). There is evidence showing that most rural households have low levels 




that smallholder farmers mainly produce for self-consumption and participate in 
markets as net buyers (Alene et al., 2008; Jayne, Mather and Mghenyi, 2010; IFAD, 
2001). They have limited and occasional amounts of produce for selling, and when they 
sell, they are faced with high transaction costs, they depend on the nearest local markets 
and they have lower bargaining power, given that they often need immediate cash. Many 
of the poor are also passive participants, who often sell low (immediately after harvest) 
and buy high, with limited choice of where to sell, to whom and at what price. For those 
with a surplus, their inability to market their produce implies a lack of income for 
production inputs, consumer goods, immediate cash requirements and asset 
accumulation. 
 
Agricultural marketing systems in most African countries (see Jayne et al., 1997; 
Poulton, Kydd and Doward, 2006) are generally characterized by: (i) semi-subsistence 
agricultural structure whereby only a small percentage of production is marketed, 
leading to wide fluctuations in volumes traded and prices; (ii) primary forms of 
exchange involving small under-capitalized players, with high transaction costs; (iii) use 
of personalized trading networks, which reduces transaction costs of exchange but limits 
the scope of the market; (iv) volatile markets, mainly caused by inadequate storage 
capacity and also inadequate capacity to absorb shocks; and (v) inadequate mechanisms 
linking the smallholder farmers’ market opportunities with pre-harvest services such as 
access to credit, input supply and extension services. Reduction in transaction costs not 
only ensures increased access to markets, but also results in large potential pro-poor 
growth benefits (Doward et al., 2004).  
 
Credit markets 
Access to credit is very important, given that engaging in productive activities requires 
funds for purchase of inputs and investment, which are necessary for the transformation 
from an agrarian economy into commercial farming and diversification into nonfarm 
activities. Financial constraints in agriculture still remain pervasive in Africa, which has 
mainly been attributed to the lack of collateral for accessing credit (assets) or the 
unwillingness to use the assets that are vital to local livelihoods as collateral, high costs 




Chisasa, 2014). In addition, the risk of income shocks in most rural areas is high mainly 
because of reliance on agriculture, which is greatly influenced by climatic conditions 
(Besley, 1994; Conning and Udry, 2005). The rural credit markets also tend to be 
segmented, which implies that a lender's portfolio of loans is concentrated on a group of 
individuals facing common shocks to their incomes in one particular geographic area. 
Also, different segments of borrowers are systematically sorted across different loan 
types and lending intermediaries according to the characteristics of the borrowers, the 
lenders and the activities financed, among other factors (Conning and Udry, 2005). 
Rural financial markets are also characterized by extreme variability in the interest rates 
that are charged on similar loans across the country, with shorter term interest rates 
being often higher than long-term interest rates despite the scope of moral hazards 
being larger in longer term contracts (Banerjee, 2001). 
 
The most common observable market failure is the failure of rural credit markets to 
conform to the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets, whereby everyone with 
profitable projects is able to access credit at the prevailing interest rates. Efficiency 
failures in credit markets have been attributed to the lack of information, the need to 
provide appropriate incentives and limits to contractual enforcement (Ray, 1998; 
Conning and Udry, 2005). Information imperfections are very important in explaining 
the segmentation of credit markets, whereby information flows are well established over 
relatively close distances and within social groups. The characteristics of individuals 
among small groups tend to be well known, which makes monitoring borrowers' 
behavior less costly. Use of collateral in credit markets is a means of handling the 
problems of asymmetric information (such as moral hazard and adverse selection19) and 
                                                          
19 Adverse selection occurs when lenders do not know particular characteristics of borrowers, such as 
uncertainty about a borrower's preference for undertaking risky projects (Besley, 1994). In the presence of 
adverse selection, lenders could reduce the amount of loanable funds, resulting in credit rationing. Moral 
hazard, on the other hand, could arise when lenders are unable to discern the borrowers' actions, such as 
debtors slackening their efforts in implementation of the projects or changing the type of project. While 
adverse selection leads to inefficiency in credit markets, moral hazard might not necessarily lead to 
market inefficiency if the debtor borrows money from one lender and the lender imposes the cost of 




enforcement problems, which characterize most rural credit systems (Hoff and Stiglitz, 
1990; Besley 1994). Given the lack of collateral among many rural smallholder farmers 
(Besley, 1994; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990) and also the fact that high interest rates will 
discourage good borrowers but might not deter bad borrowers (Ray, 1998), the solution 
has been lending through groups.  
 
Credit market interventions have long been at the center of policy interventions in rural 
development in developing countries over time, with considerable resources being 
devoted to supplying cheap credit to farmers (Dercon, 2008; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). An 
example of an institutional innovation in credit markets that was aimed at increasing 
access to credit was the project for financing Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) in 2005-
2006 in India. The JLGs sought to increase credit flow by identifying collateral 
substitutes like peer pressure and social collateral (Pillarisetti and Mehrotra, 2009). 
JLGs were mainly informal groups of small/marginal farmers and sharecroppers with 
about 4-10 members who could either jointly or singly apply for a loan. Evaluation of 
this project indicated that smallholders and tenant farmers were more able to access 
bank credit at cheaper rates as compared to the interest rates offered by informal 
moneylenders (Pillarisetti and Mehrotra, 2009). However, in general, it has been argued 
that the results of many of interventions in credit access have been disappointing, which 
has partly been attributed to the inadequate understanding of the workings of rural 
credit markets (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). 
 
Collective action and social capital 
Farmers’ organizations and collective action are often seen as key factors in enhancing 
farmers’ access to credit and markets (Hellin, Lundy and Meijer, 2007). The success of 
collective action depends on various factors. For instance, there is evidence in literature 
that shows that the success of collective action partly depends on the type of market 
being accessed by the smallholder farmers (Markelova and Mwangi, 2010). Local 
markets have less competition from larger producers and may therefore benefit 
minimally from collective action since each farmer can sell individually. Similarly, the 
type of products also matter. Staples, such as maize, are easy to store and transport, 




consumption. Also, the marketing of staples in rural Africa is associated with high 
transaction costs and lower revenue (Barrett, 2008; Alene et al., 2008). Even though 
collective action may have advantages in terms of bulking and storage, quality control 
and access to inputs, the marginal benefits from collective marketing may not be enough 
to offset the higher transaction costs and lower revenues. 
 
There are various conditions that have been shown to influence the success of collective 
action initiatives. Lin and Nugent (1995), based on Olson’s theoretical analysis of a static 
game, argue that collective action will be feasible depending on the group size 20 , 
homogeneity of origin of members, membership period, social and physical proximity, 
level of goal differentiation and inequality in wealth or power among participants. Thus, 
the time group members spent together and their “geographical or sectoral 
concentration” makes the nature of collective action more dynamic. Further, the success 
of collective action is influenced by environmental circumstances in which members 
find themselves, availability of “political entrepreneurship,” success or failure of other 
similar groups and expertise in the management of collective action. Another influential 
factor is the type of prevailing property rights; for example, the lack of secure access to 
resources undermines participation in collective action. Poteete and Ostrom (2003) 
further elucidate the conditions for success of collective action by arguing that collective 
action is facilitated by the characteristics of the collective problem, characteristics of the 
group, institutional arrangements, technology and the actions of national governments 
and other external actors. Using examples from natural resource management that can 
also be relevant for smallholder marketing, Markelova and Mwangi (2010) argue that 
the effective formation and functioning of groups largely depends on three broad 
categories of factors: characteristics of the resource (boundaries, size); characteristics of 
the user groups (shared norms, level of social capital, endowment heterogeneity); and 
institutional arrangements (access and management rules, enforcement mechanisms, 
accountability structures).  
 
                                                          
20 Smaller sizes are preferable because of ease of communication among members and also because of 




In line with collective action, the presence of social capital has also been found to foster 
development (Bastiaensen, De Herdt and Vaessen, 2002; Woolcock and Narayan, 
2000)21. Social capital influences development through: better information flow, more 
effective and cheaper contract enforcement, fostering collective action and prospects for 
the development of informal mutual insurance mechanisms. In relation to the role of 
social capital in rural development interventions, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) argue 
that technical and financial soundness is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
acceptance of a project by poor communities. Understanding how proposed policy 
interventions affect the power and political interests of the stakeholders is important, 
given that all policy interventions occur in a social context characterized by a mix of 
informal organizations, networks and institutions.  
 
Two key aspects are important when linking social capital to development interventions 
(Bastiaensen, De Herdt and Vaessen, 2002). First, development interventions are 
embedded in different structures each with their own rules and culture. Local 
embeddedness is necessary for the achievement of the right level of synergy with local 
institutions. Second, an external organization that implements the development 
intervention would require some level of independence and organizational integrity in 
order to maintain the comparative advantage in the development process. Further, the 
effect of the development intervention is determined by: (i) the precise articulation 
between the intervention and the local institutional environment, (ii) the specific 
intervention strategies that determine the scope and path of local change and (iii) 
project design principles such as ownership, participation and collective action. 
 
4.4 Methodology  
 
This section provides an overview of the analytical framework and the method of 
analysis of the study. The analytical framework is mainly guided by New Institutional 
Economics and the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Ostrom, 2011). 
                                                          
21 For instance, the developmental performance of Northern Italy was attributed to a higher endowment 




The framework provides an overview of the process of institutional change following the 
implementation of MVP interventions and how the outcomes of institutional change 
affect the realization of the MVP goals of increasing agricultural productivity and 
household income. Further, the section on method of analysis outlines the estimation 
techniques that are used in assessing (i) the impact of transaction costs on market 
access and (ii) the determinants of access to credit. 
 
4.4.1   Analytical framework 
The analytical framework looks at the process of institutional change from one level of 
equilibrium to another level of equilibrium and provides an assessment of the 
implication of the institutional change on effectiveness of MVP interventions. It is 
mainly guided by New Institutional Economics (focusing on transaction costs, collective 
action and imperfect information) and also based on the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework as discussed by Ostrom (2011). The analytical framework 
takes into consideration what are perceived as the most important elements of the 
institutional debate concerning development and poverty alleviation (Bastiaensen, De 
Herdt and Vaessen, 2002). The overall goal is to link the institutional perspective with 
the theme of development intervention in the field of poverty alleviation and local 
development.  
 
The analytical framework is shown in figure 4.2. The first step of the analysis is to assess 
the structure of the initial market conditions before MVP interventions. The idea is to 
ascertain the rationale of institutional change by identifying specific characteristics that 
have rendered the markets inefficient. Given the difficulty in assessing the relative 
performance of institutions, the proposed approach does not identify any efficiency 
criteria but seeks to assess whether the institutional arrangements produce desirable 
outcomes. In addition, further analysis using the transaction costs analysis framework is 
used to analyze the efficiency of output markets. If the institutional outcomes are not 
desirable, then institutional change would be necessary to be able to reach a more 
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The second and third steps of the analysis entail further interrogation of the process of 
institutional change in order to understand the factors affecting the structure of the 
institutions and how they evolve over time, taking into consideration how earlier 
outcomes affect future perceptions and strategies. Specifically, the second step involves 
the choice of institutional interventions that necessitate movement to a new equilibrium 
level. If the institutional arrangement is regarded as a bottleneck, then a choice can be 
made from the existing institutional alternatives to ensure that a more efficient outcome 
is derived. 
 
As Herrera, Van Huylenbroeck and Espinel (2005) put it, the choice of the institutional 
alternative will entail interaction of different individuals with different interests, who 
will work together to either improve on the existing institutional arrangement or build a 
new and more efficient arrangement. In our framework, we apply the transaction costs, 
imperfect information and collective action theories to analyze whether the institutional 
changes that were initiated by the MVP resulted in more efficient outcomes. 
 
Other factors that determine successful movement to a new institutional arrangement 
include: the embeddeness of the new institutional arrangement into existing structures, 
perceptions of smallholder farmers regarding the costs and benefits of the change and 
participation and ownership of the process. The overall project design is also key, given 
that chances of success of a poorly targeted intervention (without adequate 
understanding of the socio-economic structure of the rural community) are minimal 
(Bastiaensen, De Herdt and Vaessen, 2002). 
 
An assessment of whether the resulting institutional outcomes are more efficient than 
the initial institutional structures is carried out by looking at the level of transaction 
costs and information asymmetry. The new institutional arrangements will be more 
efficient if they have lower transaction costs and better information flows. We take note 
of the possibility of reversal back to the initial institutional structure. For example, 
enhanced access to input markets will not be sustained if smallholder farmers revert 





Lastly, the framework assesses the implications of the institutional changes to the 
overall MVP goals of increasing agricultural productivity and household income, and 
consequently of poverty reduction. A movement to a more efficient institution will most 
likely promote the achievement of the MVP goals. For instance, it is expected that 
increased access to inputs and credit would enhance agricultural production and 
consequently lead to higher agricultural surplus. With more efficient output markets, 
the agricultural surplus is translated into higher household cash income, thus ensuring 
the effectiveness of the MVP interventions. 
 
4.4.2  Method of analysis  
This study largely uses both descriptive and analytical methods of analysis. The focus of 
the analysis is on the institutional environment that is relevant to agricultural 
development within the millennium villages, which includes interactions within (i) input 
markets, (ii) output markets and (iii) credit markets. Institutional changes in this study 
are measured as differences in institutions between the before and after of the MVP. 
Following from the design and implementation of the MVP interventions, we 
hypothesize that the expected institutional changes following the implementation of the 
MVP interventions in agriculture are: 
i. There is increased access to inputs, given the creation of linkages between farmers 
and input sellers (agro dealers). 
ii. There is increased access to credit for purchasing inputs and for investing in a 
diversified portfolio, given the creation of inter-linkages between the farmers and 
credit institutions. Access to credit is also enhanced through increased collective 
action. 
iii. With generation of agricultural surplus resulting from increased productivity and 
the MVP interventions in market access, the markets for output are expected to be 
enhanced and more efficient, with possibly higher output prices, a reduction in 
transaction costs and improved information sharing. The theory of change, 
therefore, entails increasing access to output markets with better prices (mainly 
through encouraging stocking of output and selling when prices are high).  
iv. There is enhanced collective action, mainly through farmer groups who come 




markets. A good illustration, which can be seen as an institutional innovation, is 
the case of cereal banks where farmers jointly stored output and sold the output at 
higher prices. 
 
Quantitative analysis is used to assess the effect of transaction costs on marketing of 
output and determinants of demand for credit.  
 
Transaction costs in output markets and their effect on market access 
Following from Maltsoglou and Tanyeri-Abur (2005), transaction costs that are 
incurred in output markets can be classified as information, negotiation and monitoring 
and enforcement costs.  
i. Information costs (ex-ante) relate to the costs incurred in obtaining information 
relative to the undertaking of the transaction (price information, market location, 
etc.). They are measured by the time lag between market prices becoming known 
and the time of sale, i.e. whether the farmer gets to know the price before going to 
the market or after arriving at the market.  
ii. Negotiation costs represent the costs incurred while the transaction is being 
carried out (negotiation terms of exchange, drawing up the contract, etc.). 
Negotiation costs can include the cost of transport incurred when transporting 
goods to the market. The damage to the goods during transportation and the time 
spent at the market waiting to sell the produce is another form of negotiation cost.  
iii. Monitoring and enforcement costs (ex-post) are the costs incurred once the 
transaction is completed and in order to ensure that the terms agreed upon ex-ante 
are adhered to (payment arrangements). The number of times that the farmer has 
to approach the merchant to get paid can vary, and as it increases, the costs 
incurred to set time aside to go to the merchant to obtain the payment increase. A 
second monitoring cost is the loss incurred when the final sale price obtained is 





To assess whether transaction costs influence access to output markets and market 
integration22, the transaction costs are regressed on:  
(a) the quantity of output sold using a log-linear model as shown in the equation below.  
 
LogQ = α0 + α1P + α2Point + α3LowP + α4Damage + α5Wait + α6Pay + ε  
 
Where I	 is the random error term and is assumed to be normally distributed. 
 
(b) the type of market accessed (as a proxy for market integration) using a logit model, 
which is a commonly used approach for binary dependent variables.  
 
MA = β0 + β1P + β2Point +β3LowP + β4Damage + β5Wait + β6Pay  
 
where: 
Q is the quantity of output sold; P is the price of maize; Point is the point at which the 
prevailing price is known; LowP is selling goods at a lower price than anticipated; 
Damage is damage to goods during transportation to the market; Wait is waiting time at 
market before selling goods; Pay is payment period; and MA is market access. See Table 
4.2 for the definition and measurement of variables. 
 
The type of market accessed is represented by a dummy, where 1 represents local 
markets (both retail and wholesale) and 0 represents other markets. It is hypothesized 
that the existence of a significant effect of transaction costs on output markets implies 
that the output markets are not efficient and therefore measures are needed to change 




                                                          
22 Note that this analysis is only for the period after the MVP because of a lack of baseline data. While the 
analysis does not reflect institutional changes, it sheds some light on whether transactions are still an 




Determinants of access to credit 
An assessment of the factors that determine access to credit is carried out to provide an 
understanding of the functioning of the credit markets in Sauri. To assess the factors 
that determine whether households access credit and the choice of the source of credit, 
we estimate a logit equation with the question on whether a household head had ever 
applied for credit or not as the dependent variable. The factors affecting the demand for 
credit 23  are categorized into two: the individual/household characteristics and the 
attributes of the financial institutions, such as the terms of credit. The 
individual/household characteristics that influence the demand for credit include: 
(i)  Sex of the household head – because of the status of ownership of assets in most 
rural African cultures, female-headed households are less likely to access credit as 
compared to their male counterparts. 
(ii)  Age of the household head – based on life-cycle hypothesis, the younger the 
household head, the more likely they will be able to access credit. 
(iii) Education of the household head – more educated household heads are more 
likely to access credit than the less educated household heads. 
(iv)  Size of land – land is an important source of collateral for most rural credit 
systems. Thus higher land sizes are associated with a higher likelihood of accessing 
credit. 
(v)  Status of land ownership – legal ownership of land is required if land is to be used 
as collateral. Therefore, household heads with formal land title deeds are more 
likely to access credit than those without. 
Among the attributes of the financial institutions that may affect an 
individual’s/household’s decision to access credit facilities are: 
(i) The cost of borrowing – higher costs of borrowing are expected to lower the 
demand for credit.  
(ii) Terms of credit; for example requirement of collateral is a major impediment to 
accessing credit. 
(iii) Distance to the financial provider (accessibility) – more accessible financial 
institutions increase the demand for credit. 
                                                          





4.4.3  Definition and measurement of variables 
Table 4.2 describes the variables that were used in the analysis and their measurement. 
 
Table 4.2: Definition and measurement of variables 
Variable Type and definition Measurement 
Sex of household head Dummy, sex of 
household head 
1 if male, 0 if female 
Age of household head Discrete, age of 
household head in 
years 
Age of household head, measured by 
number of years 
Years of education of 
household head 
Discrete, number of 
years of education of 
household head 
 Number of years of education of 
household head 
Land Discrete, size of land 
holding 
The size of land owned by household in 
hectares 
Land ownership Dummy variable 
representing legal 
ownership of land 
1 for land with title deed, 0 for land 
without title deed 
Access to financial 
institutions 
Dummy variable 1 if not easily accessible, 0 if easily 
accessible 
Borrowing costs Dummy variable 1 if high borrowing costs, 0 if low 
borrowing costs 
Collateral Dummy variable 1 if lack of collateral is a constraint to 
access credit, 0 if it is not a constraint 
Application for credit Dummy variable 1 if an individual applied for credit, 0 if 
individual never applied for credit 
Quantity of output for sale Discrete, number of 
bags of maize for sale 
Number of bags of maize available for sale 
after fulfilling home consumption needs 
Market access Dummy variable , type 
of market accessed 
1 for local market (wholesale and retail), 0 




Price Discrete, price of maize 
output 
Price of maize per gorogoro24 in KES 
 
Transaction costs 
Type of transaction cost Proxy used Measurement 
Information Point at which the 
farmer gets to know the 
price 
 A dummy variable – 1 is before going to 
the market; 0 is at the time of sale 
If ever sold goods at a 
lower price 
A dummy variable – 1 is yes, sold at lower 
price; 0 is never sold at lower price 
Negotiation costs Whether farmer has 
ever damaged goods 
while transporting to 
the market 
A dummy variable – 1 is yes; 0 is no 
Time taken at 
marketplace before 
selling goods 
A dummy variable – 1 is less than 6 hours; 
0 is more than 6 hours 
Monitoring and 
enforcement 
When the farmer 
receives payment for 
the goods 
A dummy variable – 1 is immediately; 0 is 
later 
 
4.5 Research Findings 
 
This section provides an overview of our research findings. The section is organized in 
three subsections covering (i) access to input markets, (ii) access to output markets and 




                                                          




4.5.1 Enhancing access to input markets 
Before the MVP’s inception, access to inputs (seeds and fertilizer) was limited. There 
were only two input stockists within the millennium villages, with some farmers having 
to travel far to access inputs, which increased transport costs. Demand for inputs was 
also low, which was mainly attributed to lack of financing. To meet the low demand of 
the improved farm inputs and make the inputs more affordable, stockists would package 
the inputs into smaller units, such as one- or two-kilogram packs.  
 
As part of the MVP interventions in agriculture, access to inputs was initially increased 
through the input subsidies that were provided in phases across the villages (Nziguheba 
et al., 2010). During the first year of the MVP, farmers received a full subsidy of inputs 
(fertilizers and certified seeds). The Sauri community received a total of 800 of 50-
kilogram bags of DAP and 800 50-kilogram bags of Urea in 2005 (MVP, 2006). Inputs 
were acquired through local distributors (agro-dealers), who received supplies directly 
from the major distributors in the region. To make the inputs affordable, farmers were 
allowed to repay their loans using a proportion of their farm produce. They were 
required to give 10 percent of the surplus from their harvest as payback for the inputs 
(fertilizer and maize seeds) they had received, which would be used towards the school 
feeding program. About 7 percent of the farmers did not give any payback because they 
had large families and small farm sizes, and hence their surpluses were marginal, and 
some even had food shortfalls for the year (MVP, 2006). Estimates from the MVP 
showed that payback for the inputs in 2005 averaged 8.3 percent of the total surplus 
and 3.5 percent of the total maize produce. Given that the cost of inputs (fertilizer and 
improved maize seeds) was US$ 69,465.00, the payback was equivalent to US$ 
7,690.00, representing a total subsidy after payback of 89 percent. 
 
As a measure to ensure sustainability, the project in the second year reduced the amount 
of input subsidy given to the farmers. The farmers were required to access credit for 
purchasing inputs through microfinance institutions and later through formal banking 
institutions (mainly Equity Bank). However, our survey results show that access to 
inputs through formal credit financing (discussed in detail in section 4.5.3) had limited 




only a small proportion of farmers were able to acquire credit for inputs. According to 
the MVP (2009b), only 67 farmers acquired loans through Equity Bank totaling 817,310 
KES (US$ 11,300) for enough fertilizer to apply to 1.5 acres of land per farmer. A total of 
125 vulnerable farmers received subsidies in the form of farm inputs. This accounts for a 
very small proportion of the total number of households within the Sauri cluster, which 
was estimated at 13,92325 households in 2009. From our survey, the farmers indicated 
that lack of tangible collateral and cost of financing were the main barriers to accessing 
credit. The only available collateral was the small parcels of land, which the farmers 
were not willing to use as collateral because of the fear of losing the land in case of 
default in loan repayments. As a result, most farmers had to revert back to their initial 
position of individually sourcing inputs, which depended mainly on whether a farmer 
could afford the inputs. Some farmers also reverted back to use of local seeds. Statistics 
from Sauri indicated that about one third of the sampled households (324 out of 1,160 
households) used local seed and no fertilizer or very little fertilizer (MVP, 2009b).  
 
Further measures were put in place by the MVP to increase access to inputs through 
formation of farmers’ cooperatives, i.e. Kilimo ni Uhai26  and Indigent (vulnerable) 
farmers’ cooperatives. Kilimo ni Uhai was meant to help their registered members have 
access to farming inputs at subsidized prices. In Kilimo ni Uhai, the farmer was to 
deposit a bag of maize produce or cash to the cooperative society in exchange for farm 
inputs. To be a member, farmers were required to contribute 270 KES (about US$ 3.2) 
as membership fees and a minimum of 10 shares, equivalent to 2,000 KES (about US$ 
24). The farmers collected inputs from MVP stores at the market service center after 
paying the required fees. Where farmers were not able to travel to the market centers 
individually, they contributed money through Kilimo ni Uhai committee 
representatives, who then purchased the inputs on their behalf. The Indigent society, on 
the other hand, helped vulnerable farmers to access their farm inputs from a revolving 
fund and accepted repayment in the form of agricultural produce, mainly maize output. 
                                                          
25  Republic of Kenya. 2010. Kenya population and housing census: Population distribution by 
administrative units (Vol. 1A). Nairobi, Kenya: Government Printers. 




Each cooperative society had its own bylaws and drew representation from the 11 
millennium villages.  
 
From the survey findings, we can deduce that the low access to credit for purchasing 
inputs and the use of local seeds reflects the inadequate access to credit by the 
smallholder farmers after the phasing out of the input subsidies. Further, it is also 
possible that uptake of access to inputs through cooperative societies will be very low. 
This is because the membership fees were likely to be unaffordable by many households, 
given that our data indicates about one third of the sampled households had a monthly 
income of less than 2,000 KES (about US$ 24). Overall, our results indicate that the 
changes in access to inputs that were initiated by the MVP were not sustained, which 
has implications on the sustainability of the productivity gains. Further, the fact that 
some households reverted back to their traditional farming methods of using local seeds 
and no fertilizer is an indication that inefficiencies in input markets were still present 
after MVP interventions. 
 
4.5.2 Enhancing access to output markets and role of collective action in 
the marketing of produce 
 
4.5.2.1  Changes in the marketing of produce 
Before the MVP, the supply of farm produce was limited by low agricultural 
productivity, which was attributed to limited use of improved agricultural inputs. Sale of 
available farm produce was mostly carried out individually to individual community 
members and through the nearby local market.  
 
After the MVP, there were specific interventions aimed at enhancing output access. This 
was necessitated by increased agricultural productivity following the implementation of 
MVP interventions in agriculture. Our data reveals that more households in the 
millennium villages had surplus for selling, as compared to the control group. 109 
farmers out of 223 sampled farmers in the millennium villages indicated that they had 
surplus for selling as compared to only 41 farmers out of 180 sampled farmers in the 




that they had agricultural surplus for selling, our data shows that about 25 percent of the 
households in the millennium villages sold the output even when the supply was not 
adequate, i.e. the supply could not last until the next harvest season. This was mainly 
because the households needed cash to finance other household needs – for example, 
selling some of the maize cereal to get cash to pay at the grain milling machine to 
process maize flour or buy other household necessities. 
 
To increase access to output markets, the MVP encouraged collective action in the 
marketing of farm produce, which was expected to lower transaction costs and also 
ensure that farmers sold their produce at better prices. After the first bumper harvest 
following the full input subsidy, the concept of cereal banks was introduced in 2006 in 
Sauri to ensure that farmers sold their produce at higher prices and also to reduce 
exploitation by middlemen. A cereal bank was basically a store room (rented by farmers) 
that was strategically placed around the market area, where members stored their 
produce so that they could sell when prices were more favorable. A sample of farmers 
was taken for a study tour of existing cereal banks in the region and also trained in 
opening and managing cereal banks. A total of 11 cereal banks were established by 2007, 
with each village having one cereal bank. The MVP provided start-up funding of 
500,000 KES (about US$ 5,950) for each cereal bank group to start a cereal business, 
which was to be repaid within 2 years (MVP, 2009a).  
 
Cereal banks operated through a management committee, which was elected during 
Barazas27. The management committee comprised 12 members (chairman, secretary, 
treasurer, organizing secretary, assistant treasurer and seven other officials representing 
sectors such as health, education, water, roads, energy, enterprise and environment). 
These officials mobilized the community for the annual general meetings (AGM) and 
contributions. Share contribution was in form of cereals, i.e. 20 kilograms of maize as a 
share contribution for membership and then top-up would be accrued to shares. The 
cereal banks operated by selling agricultural produce, for example through tenders to 
schools and hospitals. The profits earned would be shared among the members in the 
                                                          




form of dividends, which were dependent on the amount of shares (determined by 
output quantity) owned by individual farmers. Average membership of cereal banks was 
about 180 members. The cereal banks were guided by a constitution that was drafted by 
the management committee, with assistance from the MVP. 
 
The performance of cereal banks varied. Only one cereal bank (Marenyo Cereal Bank) 
with membership of about 260 members was still functional in 2009. Information 
collected from key informants and focus group discussions highlighted various reasons 
for the success of Marenyo Cereal Bank. Some of the reasons included: 
(i) Management of the operations of the cereal bank was transparent, with frequent 
meetings for status updates and collection of shares. 
(ii) There was proper record-keeping, which ensured accountability of all proceeds. 
(iii) There was timely payment of dividends to members. 
(iv) They were able to enhance their stock by outsourcing cereal produce from other 
regions to supplement the supply from members. 
(v) They diversified their portfolio to include supply of both farm inputs and outputs, 
which they sold to both members and non-members. 
(vi) Because of good performance, they were able to access credit from a bank (they 
received 250,000 KES (about US$ 3,000) from Equity Bank), which enabled them 
to transition from small-scale retail business to bulk buying and selling of farm 
inputs and produce. The additional credit also enabled them to transform into 
Marenyo Farmers’ Cooperative. 
 
On the contrary, the collapse of the other 10 cereal banks was mainly attributed to the 
following: 
(i) Lack of transparency in the management of the cereal banks. Most members were 
not aware of the activities of the cereal banks of which they were members, which 
created a high sense of mistrust and dissatisfaction.  
(ii) Poor governance and mismanagement of the cereal banks. Most farmers 
indicated that they never received any dividends even after contributing their 




(iii) There was poor record-keeping, which made it difficult for members to ascertain 
the status of the cereal bank’s operations. 
(iv) The constitution was weak in terms of enforcement measures, i.e. there were no 
explicit redress measures to be taken against committee members who 
mismanaged funds, which discouraged most members from contributing further 
to the cereal banks.  
 
Further, after the collapse of most of the cereal banks, the MVP developed a Market 
Service Centre (MSC), which was aimed at improving farmers’ market access through 
the collective and centralized marketing of produce (MVP, 2009b). Its objective was to 
enhance the collective centralized marketing system (farmers selling as a group) 
through the bulking of produce for bulk sale and value addition. Cooperative societies 
were established to enhance the operationalization of MSC, including societies for bee-
keeping, poultry, horticulture and fish and the Kilimo ni Uhai/Indigent society. Each 
society had its own by-laws and representation from the 11 millennium villages. See the 
appendix for an example of by-laws for Gem Poultry Farmers’ Cooperative Society 
Limited. The by-laws explicitly identify rules of operation of the farmers’ cooperative, 
including the society’s core principles and values, qualifications for membership, 
formation of management committee and conditions for eligibility, requirement for 
attendance of meetings, etc. Even though operationalization of the MSC was at the 
initial stages in 2009 when our fieldwork was carried out, our discussions with key 
informants and focus group members revealed that the MSC was facing the challenge of 
inadequate supply of produce for bulking and selling, which was partly attributed to 
insufficient production due to the small land sizes. Further, it was not clear whether any 
lessons were drawn from the failure of the cereal banks, especially in terms of group 
dynamics that could have undermined the success of the group initiatives. 
 
In addition to enhanced collective action for the marketing of produce, there was 
increased formation of common interest groups, which were involved in various 
activities for empowerment. With the focus on “agriculture as a business” during the 
second year, several producer groups were formed where farmers were to produce 




sensitization from the MVP, farmers formed three main enterprises (for growing 
bananas, tomatoes and onions). 
 
4.5.2.2  Assessment of the effect of transaction costs on the marketing of output 
In accessing output markets, our data reveals that majority of the farmers who sold their 
produce at the local market for both millennium and control villages knew the 
prevailing price before going to the market. On the contrary, a larger proportion of 
farmers who sold their goods at the local market in both millennium (58 out of 82) and 
control villages (24 out of 37) indicated that despite having knowledge of the market 
prices for the goods prior to going to the market, they sold their goods at a lower price. 
This implies that they did not get the anticipated price of the commodities. Fewer 
farmers accessing local markets in both millennium (14 out of 72) and control villages (6 
out of 38) indicated that they had ever damaged their goods while transporting them to 
the market. In terms of waiting time before selling goods at the local market, a majority 
of the farmers in both millennium and control villages indicated that they sold their 
goods in less than six hours. In addition, a majority of the farmers indicated that they 
were paid for the goods immediately when the transaction took place. 
 
We used regression analysis to assess whether transaction costs significantly affected 
access to output markets. The results obtained by regressing quantity of output sold on 
various measures of transaction costs by using a semi-log function are shown in Table 
4.3. The model is estimated for the total sample and the MVP because the sample of 
households in the control group who were found to participate in output markets was 
very small. For the total sample, the results reveal that only transaction costs associated 
with the waiting time at the market before selling goods and when actual payment is 
made significantly affected the quantity of output sold in the market. This implies that a 
farmer would sell less output if they had to sell their produce within a few hours of 
arrival at the market and also if payment was required immediately. For the MVP, the 
results reveal that only transaction costs associated with the point at which the price is 
known and when actual payment is made significantly affected the quantity of output 





The results imply that farmers would sell more when they got to know the price before 
going to the market. However, when the payment for the goods was required 
immediately, less volumes of output would be sold. This implies that more output would 
be sold if the transaction was on credit, which points towards the households’ liquidity 
constraints and reliance on credit purchases.  
 
Table 4.3: Effect of transaction costs on market access 
  
Log of output sold Type of market accessed 
Total sample MVP Total sample MVP 
Price of output -0.001 0.003 0.08*** 0.064 
Point where prices are known 0.313 0.399** -19.05* -17.979* 
Selling at lower prices 0.201 0.165 -1.253 -1.259 
Damage to goods 0.116 0.152 -2.806* -2.802* 
Waiting time at the market -0.474** -0.378 -2.31 -2.415 
Payment for goods -0.643** -0.615*** 2.537 2.437 
Constant 2.181* 1.884* 19.587* 19.242* 
Number of observations 111 93 111 93 
F ( 7, 101) 3.12 2.24 
 
 
Prob > F 0.0075 0.047 
 
 
R-squared 0.119 0.115 
 
 












*, ** and *** stand for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
Note that the standard errors are robust. 
 
The results of the logit estimation of the effect of transaction costs on market integration 
are also shown in Table 4.3. For the total sample, the results show that the price of 




damage to goods significantly affected the choice of markets. The likelihood of selling at 
the local markets is higher when prices of output are higher. Also, knowing prices before 
going to the market reduces the likelihood of selling at the local markets. This shows 
that the knowledge about prices enabled the farmers to make a choice regarding where 
to sell their produce. Lastly, higher transaction costs that are associated with damages to 
goods during transportation significantly affected the choice of markets. Higher 
damages are associated with markets that are beyond the local markets. Thus, farmers 
were likely to sell their produce in local markets to reduce the likelihood of damaging 
goods during transportation to more distant markets. This finding demonstrates the 
importance of good infrastructure for the marketing of agricultural produce in rural 
areas. For the MVP, only the transaction costs associated with the point at which the 
prices were known and the damage to goods during transportation significantly affected 
the choice of markets. 
 
4.5.3 Enhancing access to financial services  
Our data reveals that about 55 percent of the sampled households in the millennium 
villages would source credit from their friends and families, as compared to about 70 
percent of the sampled households in the control villages. About 10 percent of the 
sampled households in the millennium villages would source credit from savings and 
credit cooperative societies (SACCO), as compared to 4 percent of the sampled 
households in the control villages. Banks and informal lenders accounted for only 6 
percent and 9 percent of credit access by the sampled households in the millennium 
villages, respectively, as compared to 2 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of credit 
access by the sampled households in the control villages. An earlier survey by the 
millennium villages corroborated this finding of limited use of formal sources of finance 
by showing that most households relied on informal savings and remittances as their 
main sources of finance (MVP, 2006).  
 
To enhance access to finance by the MVP, table banking was initiated in Sauri in 2006 
with an aim of empowering mostly women, who could access credit from their groups at 
favorable terms of payment (low interest rates and tailor-made repayment plans). 




money within the group through accumulation of shares, which was then loaned to 
members at low interest rates and operated as a revolving fund. This concept has been 
widely used in Kenya (both rural and urban) over time, especially among women and 
youth groups. 
 
Further, there were efforts to link farmers to a savings and credit organization 
(microfinance) at an initial stage of phasing out of the input subsidy. Farmers were 
linked to a microfinance institution called SAGA. SAGA offered three main products, i.e. 
savings, credit and check clearance. Membership was through payment of a 
membership fee (350 KES – about US$ 4) and submission of relevant documentation. 
The institution offered loans only to groups, with minimum membership of five. The 
group members were required to save for at least three months to be eligible for a loan. 
The interest rate on loans for farmers was 2 percent per month over a six-month 
repayment period. The inability to pay within the six months attracted a penalty of 5 
percent of the loan per month. The 2 percent interest rate was high, given that the 
average lending rate for most savings and credit organizations in Kenya is about 12 
percent per annum. 
 
SAGA concurrently operated the MVP lending program together with their normal 
SACCO business. The performance of the two programs was varied, with MVP loans 
recording very low repayment rates as compared to SACCO’s main lending programs. 
Table 4.4 gives a summary of SAGA repayment rates for the MVP loans for the 11 
villages. Only two villages (Jina and Gongo) had repayments rates that were slightly 
above 50 percent. Millennium villages with the lowest repayment rates were Uranga (29 
percent), Ramula (23 percent) and Anyiko (16 percent). The overall repayment rate was 
38 percent, which was quite low. The low repayment rate had implications for further 
funding for interventions in agriculture in the MVP, given that there were no additional 








Table 4.4: SAGA loan repayment rates by millennium villages in US$ (as of 2009) 
 Millennium village Amount of loan Net repayment Repayment rate 
Nyawara 44,221 19,877 45% 
Nyandhiwa 52,633 25,986 49% 
Sauri 60,498 21,312 35% 
Jina 48,255 25,586 53% 
Nyamninia 51,244 22,029 43% 
Marenyo 58,958 27,886 47% 
Ramula 80,365 18,572 23% 
Lihanda 52,504 25,314 48% 
Gongo 53,680 28,830 54% 
Uranga 48,286 13,903 29% 
Anyiko 80,076 12,901 16% 
Total 630,719 242,197 38% 
Source: MVP records 
 
The varied performance between SAGA and MVP loans can be attributed to two issues. 
First, MVP credit support was individual-based, while SACCO only loaned to groups, 
which minimized the credit risk. Because of limited information on the credibility of the 
borrowers, the rate of defaulting was expected to be higher for individual lending as 
compared to lending to groups. Secondly, we found that the transition to the credit 
system by the MVP was not properly done. A majority of those interviewed alluded to 
the fact that the MVP did not sensitize the farmers on the terms and conditions of the 
loans and some farmers were recruited into the scheme without payment of the required 
membership fee. Apparently, the MVP was working within set timelines and targets and 
therefore underestimated the risk of giving out loans without proper evaluation of the 
individuals’ ability to repay the loans. As a result, some farmers deliberately failed to 
repay the loans because they felt that it was free money, while some were genuinely 





The MVP also linked farmers to another microfinance institution called the Rabuor 
Sinaga Community Fund. The fund was launched in 2002 with the objectives of 
mobilization of financial resources and enhancement of access to finance. It offers 
services such as deposits of savings, credit facilities, money transfers and financial 
advisory services. Credit facilities include loans for business, school fees, financing asset 
acquisition, agricultural diversification (bee-keeping and poultry), installation of 
electricity and emergency loans. Membership fees were about US$ 4, in addition to 
group meeting minutes, if group registration. It had over 2,000 members in 2009, 
consisting of individual members, youth groups, women’s groups, church organizations 
and community-based organizations. Individuals/groups could save as low as 50 KES 
(US$ 0.57) and withdraw anytime, with withdrawal charges being 20 KES (about US$ 
0.2) for withdrawals of less than 10,000 KES (US$ 115) and 100 KES (US$ 1.1) for 
withdrawals over 10,000 KES. Members also paid a quarterly account maintenance fee 
of 20 KES. These charges were quite low compared to average formal bank charges in 
Kenya. In addition to lower charges, members did not require collateral to get loans, 
which were approximated at four times the amount of shares/savings. Interest on loans 
was 10 percent for a repayment period ranging from six to nine months and 15 percent 
for a repayment period ranging from nine months to one year. These lending rates are 
higher than the average lending rates by SACCOs in Kenya (an average of 12 percent per 
annum) but lower than the lending rates by commercial banks. The fund has been 
attractive, given its potential of generating resources through mobilization of rural 
savings, which is necessary for investment in income generating activities, which would 
in turn lead to poverty reduction and rural development. 
 
The Rabuor Sinaga Community Fund collaborated with the MVP in enhancing access to 
credit for farming, especially bee-keeping and poultry. The MVP sensitized farmers on 
diversification into bee-keeping and poultry and linked them to the fund to acquire 
credit for the investment. Consequently, the fund saw an increase in membership and 
also in the scope of activities. However, with increased credit facilities, statistics from 
the fund showed that repayment rates declined from about 100 percent before the MVP 
to about 65–75 percent after the MVP. For MVP activities (bee-keeping and poultry 




by August 2009. The low repayment was largely attributed to two reasons. First, farmers 
depended solely on returns from agriculture to repay the loans, which implied that they 
could not repay the loan when the harvests were poor. Also, some ventures such as bee-
keeping required longer periods to reach maturity, which delayed repayments. Secondly, 
like the case for loans through SAGA, it was felt that the farmers were not properly 
sensitized before taking the loans, given that they thought it was an MVP subsidy that 
did not require repayment. 
 
The fund, on the other hand, had clearly established procedures for dealing with loan 
defaulting. Initially, the defaulter would be given a chance to explain the reasons for 
defaulting and, if satisfactory, would be granted an additional repayment period and 
have the interest payments waived. If the reasons were not satisfactory, then the 
member would be granted additional repayment time but the interest payments would 
not be waived. Loan defaulters would be summoned for a maximum of two times, after 
which the fund would engage debt collectors to recover the money and the respective 
members would be disqualified from the fund. 
 
By the third and fourth year of MVP interventions, farmers were linked to a commercial 
bank (Equity Bank) to source loans for financing inputs (MVP, 2011). However, there 
have been conflicting reports by the MVP with regard to the number of farmers who 
were able to access credit from the banking institutions. According to the MVP (2009a), 
about 927 farmers were able to access loans from Equity Bank and more than 7,000 
farmers were linked to commercial financial institutions. Another MVP report (MVP, 
2009b) indicated that only 67 farmers received loans for purchasing inputs from Equity 
Bank in 2009. The MVP (2009b) further acknowledges that relatively few of the farming 
households were able to benefit from credit from financial institutions because of a lack 
of marketable collateral and personal guarantee requirements. It is in light of these 
constraints that the operation of small revolving funds and village saving and loan 
programs among groups were facilitated (even though most of them were in existence 
before the MVP), with an aim of the administration of small loans to members. No 
collateral is required for the village savings and loan groups, and loan repayment has 





Our survey results reveal that more households in the millennium villages accessed 
credit as compared to the control villages. About 29 percent of the sampled households 
within the millennium villages accessed credit, as compared to only 10 percent of the 
sampled households within the control villages. The test of significance of the difference 
in means in access to credit between millennium villages and control villages showed 
that access to credit was statistically significantly higher in millennium villages than in 
the control villages, with a t-value of 4.86. Thus, it can be seen that MVP interventions 
enhanced access to credit within the millennium villages. However, even though there 
were gains in access to credit, these gains were not sustained, as discussed above.  
 
We carried out regression analysis using logit to assess the factors that determined 
access to credit in Sauri. Regression results are summarized in Table 4.5. We estimated 
equations for the total sample, millennium villages and the control group. The results 
for both the total sample and millennium villages reveal that more educated household 
heads with larger parcels of land were less likely to apply for credit than the less 
educated ones with smaller parcels of land. Land ownership is a significant factor 
influencing access to credit in millennium villages. This is because land is the most 
common tangible asset that could be used as collateral for loans, but only if there is legal 
ownership (through a title deed). 
 
High cost of borrowing was found to be a key constraint to access to credit in the control 
group and total sample. It was not a significant constraint among the millennium 
villages mainly because the households did not consider the cost of borrowing when 
applying for credit, given the notion that the MVP had subsidized the loans. Lack of 
collateral was also found to be a significant deterrent to access to credit in both 
millennium villages and the control group. It was revealed that most households were 
hesitant about using their small parcels of land as collateral because of fear of losing 
them in case of loan defaulting, which would lead to a loss of their main source of 
livelihood. Access to a credit facility was also a significant deterrent to access to credit in 
the control group but not in the millennium villages. Lastly, male-headed households in 




households. This is mainly because assets which can be used as collateral (such as land) 
are registered in men’s names within Sauri, which is a customary tradition. 
 
Table 4.5: Logit regression of determinants of access to credit 
  Total 
Millennium 
villages Control 
Sex of household head 0.493  0.728***  0.659  
Age of household head -0.201 -0.229 -0.188 
Education of household head -0.092** -0.103*** -0.009 
Land size -0.430*** -0.667*** 0.192  
Land ownership 0.178  0.690***  -0.355 
Cost of borrowing -0.954** -0.070 -2.718* 
Collateral -1.108* -0.908** -1.800** 
Access to credit facility -0.556 0.537  -2.538* 
Constant 2.887*  1.790  3.504  
Number of observations 391 215 176 
LR chi2(8) 34.03 27.5 15.18 
Prob > chi2 0.0 0.001 0.056 
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.106 0.136 
*, ** and *** stand for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 




Following the findings from Chapter 2, this paper sought to assess whether 
inefficiencies in economic institutions (specifically input, output and credit markets) 
could have undermined the effectiveness of the MVP in enhancing agricultural 
productivity and income for the households. From our findings, we conclude that some 
institutional bottlenecks undermined the achievement of the MVP goals. While the MVP 




was undermined by inefficiencies in input and credit markets. Further, the translation 
of increased agricultural productivity into cash income depended on access to efficient 
output markets. 
 
From Chapter 2, the gains in increased agricultural productivity were mainly attributed 
to enhanced access to farm inputs (seeds and fertilizer). Efforts were made by the MVP 
to increase access to inputs through an input subsidy in the first year and increased 
access to credit for purchasing inputs from the second year. While significant gains were 
made when a full subsidy on inputs was granted in the first year, the transition into 
credit financing for inputs through the formal banking system was not successful, given 
that fewer than 10 percent of the farmers were able to access formal credit for inputs. As 
a result, most farmers who could not afford to purchase inputs reverted back to 
traditional farming methods. This greatly undermined the efforts to increase 
agricultural productivity through increased use of improved inputs. An assessment of 
the evolution of the use of input subsidy programs in Sub-Saharan Africa reveals three 
important aspects that are important for the success of interventions in access to inputs. 
First, while there is consensus that use of inputs (especially fertilizer) must be increased 
for Africa to meet its agricultural growth and poverty reduction targets, low input usage 
is not the only problem plaguing African agriculture. Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne and Shively 
(2013) argue that the question of whether inputs (specifically fertilizer) should be 
subsidized is a “wicked problem,” given that such programs are multidimensional and 
their impacts are difficult to isolate or measure. While interventions to increase input 
usage might be necessary, they must have a longer term perspective as opposed to short-
term interventions aimed at causing immediate and temporary increases in input usage, 
which have been found to be ineffective (Morris et al., 2007). Further, input subsidies 
have been shown to offer limited prospects of a lasting solution to inadequate input 
access because simply making available cheaper or free inputs does not provide a basis 
for the development of sustainable market-led input distribution systems. Second, as 
part of being a smart subsidy, subsidies should be targeted at households that are not 
using the inputs but would find it profitable to use them (Morris et al., 2007; Jayne and 
Rashid, 2013). There is wide consensus that universal input subsidies in Africa were 




reducing poverty (Morris et al., 2007). Third, there is a need for a clear exit strategy that 
ensures that the gains from the input subsidy are sustained. Denning et al. (2009), in 
their review of the input subsidies in Malawi, concurred that abrupt downscaling of 
subsidies would reverse the gains made in enhancing food security and called for 
gradual reductions in subsidies that would be replaced by smallholder-focused rural 
credit systems. Even though empirical support is scant (Jayne and Rashid, 2013), our 
findings support the argument that smallholder farmers are likely to revert back to pre-
subsidy behaviors and welfare levels unless a clear and sustainable exit strategy is 
implemented. The reversal would undermine the effectiveness of agricultural 
interventions that are aimed at enhancing agricultural productivity and boosting 
household income, as experienced by the MVP. In addition to input subsidies, it has 
been shown that the timing of income at harvest and purchasing of inputs also matters 
(World Bank, 2015). Farmers typically receive income after harvest, but they are 
required to purchase inputs at a later date, sometimes after several months. 
Interventions aimed at offering free delivery and purchase of inputs at the time of 
harvest have proven successful, as demonstrated by Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2011, 
cited by World Bank, 2015) in their experiment in rural Kenya. 
 
We have also shown that credit constraints still remained major impediments to the 
achievement of MVP goals. Access to credit in Sauri before the MVP was largely through 
informal sources and remittances. We found that one of the major constraints to access 
to formal credit was the lack of collateral, which was not adequately addressed by the 
MVP when making the transition into credit financing through the formal banking 
system. Institutional innovation in terms of providing alternatives to tangible collateral 
is necessary for such interventions in access to credit to succeed. We consider the 
example of Grameen Bank, which developed its own method of tackling the problems of 
asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement that characterize rural credit 
markets by providing substitutes for collateral, such as lending to groups, whereby local 
social capital is used as a substitute for wealth as collateral (WDR, 2008; Hossain, 1988; 
Khandker, Khalily and Khan, 1995). The shared liability of loans reduces risks of 
defaulting through a more a rigorous peer selection of group members. Under Grameen 




would only receive their loans if their fellow group members who were the first to 
receive their loans met their regular repayment schemes. In this way, a combination of 
peer pressure and solidarity form an important and effective source of collateral 
(Develtere and Huybrechts, 2002). Consequently, loan repayment for Grameen Bank 
has been estimated to be over 90 percent. Some of the successful input credit programs 
in Africa have also used crops as collateral for input loans (Morris et al., 2007), even 
though collateralizing crops would work better for cash crop farming as opposed to 
subsistence farming. Stored output (like for the cereal banks) can also be used as 
collateral for short-term credit, which can be used to cover post-harvest expenditures as 
opposed to selling output at low prices. In addition to innovations for collateral, 
Grameen Bank also succeeded because of several factors, including: taking the bank to 
the people rather than taking the people to the bank, supervision of loan utilization, 
recovering of loans in small weekly installments and developing collective funds with 
compulsory savings from individuals (Hossain, 1988; Khandker, Khalily and Khan, 
1995).  
 
The MVP encouraged group savings and financing by linking farmers to community 
savings and credit organizations, following the low uptake of formal credit. However, 
there was also low loan repayment in the community savings and credit organizations, 
occasioned by over-reliance on agricultural ventures to repay the loans, some of which 
took longer periods to mature. Also, in line with empirical support (Besley, 1994; Ray 
1998), credit markets in Sauri can be said to be segmented, as the farmers faced similar 
shocks, given the over-reliance on agriculture. Previous evidence reveals that efforts to 
increase smallholder farmers’ access to credit must take into consideration particular 
characteristics of African farming systems, including: variable or seasonal production 
systems, limited collateral to secure loans, weak institutions for contract enforcement 
and higher transaction costs (especially information and administrative costs) for small 
credit transactions (Morris et al., 2007). Experience has also shown that SACCO’s 
lending to groups will work better if the credit is channeled towards a diversified 
portfolio of activities, as opposed to crop activities that share the same weather 





In addition, we found that the input and credit markets were interdependent, with 
inefficiencies in credit markets greatly undermining the success of interventions in input 
markets. Previous evidence revealed that enhanced access to inputs (seeds and 
fertilizer) in Asia and parts of Latin America was successful because it was accompanied 
by complementary investments, especially in financial services and marketing 
infrastructure (World Bank, 2007). These complementary institutions are small or 
nonexistent in most African countries. For Sauri, we noted that the interventions in the 
complementary institutions were not successful. 
 
Our evaluation of output markets reveals that most farmers produced for self-
consumption and had limited surplus for selling. Most farmers who sold their produce 
sold low (immediately after harvest), bought high and largely depended on the nearest 
markets, with higher cases of informal trading arrangements with neighbors. Because of 
over-reliance on agriculture, most farmers sold low and bought high mainly because of 
liquidity constraints. Stephens and Barrett (2011), in their study on smallholders in 
western Kenya, also found that of the nearly 30 percent of the sample that were net 
maize sellers in the harvest period, 62 percent were net maize buyers a few months later, 
a trend that was prevalent in 113 of 137 villages in the sample. These findings have been 
supported in literature by Barrett (2008), Alene et al. (2008) and Jayne, Mather and 
Mghenyi (2010), who showed that there is a low level of participation in markets for 
staples by smallholder famers in East and Southern Africa, which is mainly constrained 
by low surplus production. Even though regular and sharp price fluctuations are a 
common characteristic of staple grain markets like for Sauri, smallholder farmers are 
not able to take advantage of the inter-temporal arbitrage opportunities, as they often 
sell their output at low prices after harvesting and buy back similar commodities after a 
few months at higher prices (Stephens and Barrett, 2011). Stephens and Barrett (2011) 
also attribute the selling low and buying high to liquidity constraints that drive poor 
households to use commodity markets as a substitute for their inadequate access to 
financial markets. 
 
Further, transaction costs are important in determining the efficiency of output 




knowing the price before going to the market, the ability to pay for the goods 
immediately (which largely reflected liquidity constraints) and damaging of goods 
during transportation to the market were significant determinants of market access. 
There is evidence that has shown that access to agricultural markets, related 
improvements in rural infrastructure and marketing institutions that lower transaction 
costs are essential for the development and transformation of subsistence-oriented 
smallholder agriculture (Zeller, Diagne and Mataya, 1997). However, for Sauri, we find 
that in general, marketing of output was not a key impediment to the achievement of 
MVP goals. Inadequate supply (as discussed in Chapter 2), which was mainly attributed 
to small land sizes and large household sizes, largely undermined the translation of 
increased agricultural productivity into higher household incomes. This finding has also 
been supported in literature by Shiferaw, Obare, and Muricho (2006), who found that 
collective marketing activities in Eastern Kenya were constrained by low volumes and 
price variability. 
 
With regard to enhancing output markets by creating marketing cooperatives, we found 
that the cereal banking concept was not successful. However, as the MVP transitioned 
from the cereal banking concept to the market service center, it was not clear whether 
the challenges that were faced by cereal banks were addressed when setting up the 
cooperatives. Research has shown that cooperation in market access through collective 
action is crucial for poor smallholder farmers to overcome challenges related to 
unfavorable policies and market conditions and to create sustainable livelihood options 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2009; Wiggins, 2009; Alene et al., 2008). However, experience 
has shown that collective action requires an enabling environment to succeed, especially 
with regard to the characteristics of markets and products, characteristics of groups and 
the institutional environment. Collective action will not offer significant gains if 
smallholder farmers largely sell their produce (especially staple foods) in local markets, 
as was the case of Sauri (Markelova and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Alene et al., 2008; Jayne, 
Mather and Mghenyi, 2010). Group dynamics also play a significant role in the success 
of collective action. Most successful groups have an average group size of 20-40, with 
similar socio-economic status (Markelova and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). However, the size 




that succeeded had membership of about 260. Lastly, the success of collective action 
efforts also depends on the establishment of proper accountability and enforcement 
mechanisms. For Sauri, while each cereal bank was guided by a constitution that was 
drafted by the members (with input from the MVP), the mechanisms for accountability 
and enforcement were either weak or lacking. This was a major factor that contributed 
to the collapse of the cereal banks.  
  
In conclusion, while enhancing agricultural productivity, commercializing agriculture 
and promoting the nonfarm economy are important in enhancing rural household 
income and reducing poverty, our findings show that access to rural markets (input, 
credit and output) could provide the missing link. If not adequately addressed in the 
design of rural development interventions, inefficient markets could act as significant 
deterrents to the achievement of intervention goals.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions, Lessons and Areas for Further Research 
 
The Millennium Villages Project had far-reaching objectives, with an overall goal of 
ensuring that the target villages achieved the millennium development goals by 2015, 
which marked the end of the project. While the project entailed a substantial amount of 
resources, there was no rigorous impact evaluation over the 10-year period. The 
publicity with regard to the quick gains of the project was the main motivation of this 
thesis, which sought to assess the impact of the MVP on two key outcomes: agricultural 
productivity and household income. The thesis also assessed the mechanisms used to 
provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the project. 
 
The thesis found that the project had a significant impact on agricultural productivity, 
which significantly increased self-consumption and consequently improved food 
security and nutrition. However, we found that the effect on household cash income was 
insignificant. The important link of translating the increased agricultural productivity 
into higher income, which was necessary for the transition from subsistence farming 
into commercial farming and diversification into the nonfarm economy, was missing. 
This was further explained by structural factors, mainly large household sizes and 
smaller parcels of land. Further analysis revealed that the MVP did not succeed in 
enhancing diversification among Sauri households, with key push factors still being the 
household size and the size of land. We also found evidence of households with higher 
levels of diversification benefiting less from the MVP interventions, which pointed to the 
MVP’s emphasis on agricultural interventions. Even though access to markets was 
necessary to enable a transition from subsistence farming to commercial farming and 
diversification into the nonfarm economy, we found that inefficiencies in the input and 
credit markets still existed after MVP interventions. The smallholders were still not able 
to afford the purchase of inputs, as they could not access credit, largely due to a lack of 
collateral, which the MVP did not address during the interventions. Interventions in 
output markets, especially the cereal banking concept, was also unsuccessful. We 
provide a summary of the conditions before and after the MVP with regard to the areas 




Table 5.1: Summary of interventions and outcomes 
Before MVP MVP Interventions After MVP 
Low agricultural 
productivity 
Increased use of fertilizer 
and improved seeds 
Significantly higher 
agricultural productivity 
Low access to inputs Enhanced access to inputs 
through input subsidy and 
increased access to credit 
for purchasing inputs 
Gains were not sustained. 
There was a reversal to the 
initial status of using 
traditional farming 
methods and low-input 
usage, mainly attributed to 
financial constraints. 
Reliance on subsistence 
farming 
Diversification into higher 
value crops and nonfarm 
economy 
No significant change. 
Low access to credit Enhanced access to credit 
through microfinance 
institutions and banks 
No significant change 
because initial constraints 
(lack of collateral and high 
borrowing costs) were not 
addressed. 
Inefficient output markets Set up cereal banks and a 
market service center 
10 of the 11 cereal banks 
collapsed. The market 
service center was at its 
initial stages of operation at 
the time of the survey, but 
there were indications that 
it would face similar 
challenges as those the 
cereal banks did. 
Low household income and 
high poverty 
Income was to increase 
through increased 
agricultural productivity 




and diversification into 
higher value crops and the 
nonfarm economy 
 
We acknowledge, however various limitations of our study. First, given that the MVP 
was not an experimental project, there was no baseline data. The use of matching 
methods does not provide accurate and precise estimates as compared to experimental 
designs partly because of the failure to take into consideration the effect of unobserved 
variables. Secondly, the study would have benefited from a larger sample size, given that 
larger sample sizes lead to lower standard errors. Also, the use of longitudinal data 
would have yielded better outcomes. However, the study used a one-period smaller 
sample largely due to financial constraints. The MVP end project evaluation is also likely 
to face the limitations of using non-experimental designs.  
 
Several key issues emerge from our evaluation of the MVP. First, the design of the study 
is important in facilitating the impact evaluation of the project. The true impact of the 
project can be derived from well-designed projects that are experimental (randomized 
controlled experiments) and that incorporate the collection of longitudinal data 
(including baseline and periodical data on the various indicators of measurement). The 
MVP’s design provides various challenges for impact evaluation not only because of the 
lack of a baseline, but also because most of the midterm reports focused more on a 
narrow range of indicators (especially health outcomes) as opposed to providing a 
measure of indicators such as expenditure and income that are crucial in assessing 
whether the objective of poverty reduction was achieved. A good example of a 
randomized controlled experiment is BRAC’s project on “Challenging the Frontiers of 
Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra Poor (CFPR-TUP).” 
 
Secondly, a key factor that has been shown to undermine the effectiveness of rural 
development interventions is the failure to test the assumptions of the theory of change. 
For Sauri, we have shown that the assumption of translating the gains in agricultural 




and reviewing of mechanisms can facilitate the re-design of projects in the midterm to 
ensure project effectiveness. Finding the most effective interventions requires an 
experimental approach that includes testing of different approaches (World Bank, 
2015). 
 
Thirdly, a key concern of rural development projects is sustainability. We look at 
sustainability in two ways. The first is whether the gains of the project can be sustained 
beyond the project period. For Sauri, we found that the gains in agricultural productivity 
were sustained. Even though the use of inputs declined, the sustained average 
productivity gains can be attributed to improved soil fertility as a result of the use of 
fertilizers (though in smaller proportions) and also the knowledge gained from training 
in improved farming practices (e.g. intercropping with high-nutrient crops). The gains 
in markets (especially input and credit markets) were not sustained mainly because of 
the failure to address the key existing constraints, especially the lack of collateral to 
access credit and the low loan repayments occasioned by over-reliance on agricultural 
ventures (resulted in higher lending risks). Second, sustainability beyond the project 
period can be made possible through (i) increasing household incomes beyond 
subsistence and building an asset base and (ii) collaboration with respective 
governments to ensure that governments take over the role of running the project at the 
end of the interventions. For Sauri, we conclude that sustainability will not be 
guaranteed. First, household incomes did not increase beyond subsistence levels, which 
is partly because diversification into both commercial farming and the nonfarm 
economy was not achieved. Second, while the MVP envisaged collaborating more closely 
with the local government and also positioning its efforts in line with the government’s 
rural development plans to ensure further scaling-up and sustainability, this was not 
achieved in Sauri. The local government offices within Sauri were located in close 
proximity to the MVP offices. However, there was no collaboration between the two 
offices, except when government officials were called upon to welcome high-profile 
visitors. Further, there was no evidence of linking MVP to the rural development plans. 
A look at the Integrated Development Plan for Siaya County (where Sauri is located) 
acknowledges the existence of the MVP within the county but does not make an effort to 





A key area for further research is an independent end-term evaluation of the MVP, with 
greater focus on changes in household income, poverty and overall well-being of Sauri 
households. A detailed cost effectiveness analysis would also be important in shedding 












The objective is to organize and promote the welfare and economic interests of its 
members. In particular, the society shall undertake: 
a) To arrange for co-operative marketing processing, grading, packaging and 
transporting the members produce and such other operations as may be necessary for 
the most profitable disposal of the produce; b) to arrange for the purchase and resale of 
farm inputs and chemicals and other similar requirements of the members; c) to take 
measures to control pests and diseases; d) to foster education and training to members, 
committee members and employees; e) to provide co-operation and good will between 
members and the society; f) to co-operate with other co-operatives in order to promote 
members interests and in furtherance of the society’s objectives. 
 
Co-operative principles and values 
In order to achieve its objects the society shall act in accordance with the following Co-
operative principles and relevant values. 
Principles 
(a) The society shall always be guided by the principle of voluntary and open 
membership in its member recruitment drives without political, religious, ethnic, 
gender or social discrimination. (b) The society will be fully controlled by members who 
will have equal voting rights on the basis of one member one vote. (c) Members shall 
contribute equitably to the capital of the society and share in the results of its 
operations. (e) The society shall operate on mutually acceptable terms with its 
stakeholders who will ensure its autonomy and independence. (f) The society shall 
foster reciprocal, on–going education programs for members, leaders, staff and the 
community so that they can teach and learn from each other or from the appropriate 
resource persons in understanding and carrying out their respective roles. (g) In order 








The values shall be self-help, mutual responsibility, equality and equity. It shall practice 
honesty, openness and social responsibility in all its activities. 
 
Membership 
A person shall be eligible for membership if he/she: 
a) Ordinarily resides or owns land within the society’s area of operation, namely Gem 
District, Siaya County; b) is of good character and sound mind; c) has attained the age of 
18 years except in case of a minor who is heir to a deceased member; d) grows or has 
products capable of being marketed in accordance with these by-laws, namely poultry 
and poultry products; e) is not a member of another co-operative society carrying out 
the same activities in the same area of operation; f) pays entrance fee and minimum 
share capital as prescribed in these by-laws. Every member shall hold at least 75 shares 
of KES 20 each as shall be fixed by the General Meeting. However, no member shall 
hold more than one-fifth of the total shares of the society. 
 
Transfer of shares 
a) With the approval of the Management Committee, a member may at any time 
transfer his shares to another member but not to any other person. Such transfers must 
be in writing and at nominal value. The transferee shall be charged for the  transfer. 
b) All transfers of shares between members shall be registered with the society and no 
transfer shall be valid unless so registered. A fee of KES 500 shall be payable by the 
transferee for each such transfer. 
 
Rights of members 
A member of the society shall have the right to: 
a) Attend and participate in decision-making at all general meetings of the society and 
vote; b) be elected to organs of the society, subject to these by-laws; c) enjoy the use of 




legitimate information relating to the society, including: internal regulations, registers, 
minutes of general meetings and supervisory committees, reports, annual accounts, 
inventories and investigation reports, at the society’s registered office. 
 
Funds of the society 
The funds of the society shall consist of: entrance fee; share capital; administration fees 
and penalties; statutory reserve fund and any other reserve fund as may be kept by the 
society; surplus resulting from the operation of the society; and any donations, gifts 
from other bodies, organizations and individuals. 
 
The funds of the society shall be applied to the promotion of the stated objects of the 
society as set out in these by-laws and purpose set out in the Act and Rules and shall be 
invested in: 
a) Investments and securities as are authorized for the investment of trust funds; b) the 
shares of any other co-operative society; c) any bank licensed under the Banking Act; d) 
the stock of any statutory body established in Kenya or in any limited liability company 
incorporated in Kenya or in any other manner approved by a resolution at a general 





Appendix 2: Household Questionnaire 
  
Part I: Household Characteristics 
1.1 Area of residence (village)  
1.2 Sex of respondent Male 1 
Female 2 
1.3 Are you the head of household? Yes 1 
No 2 
1.4 If not the head, what is your relation to 











1.6 What is your age?   
1.7 If respondent is not a household head, 
what is the age of the household head in 
years? 
  
1.8 Level of education of household head None 1 
Primary school 2 
Secondary school 3 
College 4 
University degree 5 
1.9 What is the occupation of the household 
head? 
Not employed 1 





Support staff 5 
Other (specify) 6 
1.10 Household size   Male Female 
0 - 5 years     
6 - 18 years     
18-55 years     
> 55 years     
1.11 Number of children schooling   Boys Girls 
Primary (Std 1-4)     
Primary (Std 5-8)     
Secondary     
College     
University     




members of the household Unpaid family worker     
Self-employed/small-scale 
business 
    
Wage employment      
Other (specify)     
1.13 Number of non-active members of the 
household 
Males   
Females   
1.14 What is the reason for being inactive? Too young 1 
Too old 2 
Sick 3 
Disabled 4 
Other (specify) 5 






 Temporary (grass roof and 
mud wall) 
3 





Mobile phone 4 
Water tanks 5 
Motor vehicle 6 
Other (specify) 7 
Part II: Socio-economic characteristics 
2.1 What is the key source of livelihood for 
the household? 
Agriculture 1 
Small scale business 2 
Wage employment 3 
Other (specify) 4 
2.2 What are the major constraints to your family’s well-being? 
2.3 Do you practice farming? Yes 1 
No 2 
2.4 What is the acreage of the farm?   
2.5 How many plots of land do you have?   
2.6 Who owns the land? Household head 1 
Extended family 2 
Leasehold (rented) 3 
Leasehold (sharecropping) 4 




2.7 If land is owned, how did you acquire 
the land? 
Inherited 1 
Bought it 2 





Part III Production activities    
3.1 In terms of crops, what are the main 
crops that you grow? 
Maize 1 
Beans 2 









Other (specify) 12 
3.2 How much on average do you spend on 
the following production activities for 
one planting season of, say, maize? 
  Qty-Kgs/no. 
of days 
KES 
Seeds     
Fertilizer     
Land preparation     
Planting      
Weeding     
Harvesting     
Other (specify)     
3.3 If purchasing inputs, where do you 
source the inputs? 
Local market 1 
District headquarters 2 
Outside district 3 
3.4 What would you say are the constraints 
you face in terms of access to inputs? 
High cost of inputs 1 
Too few sellers 2 
Poor quality of inputs 3 
Other (specify) 4 
3.5 What is the main source of labor for 
your farm?  
Unpaid family labor 1 
Hired labor for pay (money) 2 
Hired labor for payment in 
kind 
3 
3.6 How many days does it take to cultivate 
your land? 
  
3.7 How much on average is the daily wage 
rate for working on the farm? 
KES 
3.8 How much on average are you able to 
harvest on your farm annually? 
  Yield (Kgs/bags) 
Maize   
Beans   




Bananas   
Cassava   
Sorghum   
Millet   
Ground nuts   
Kales   
Tomatoes   
Onions   
Other (specify)   
3.9 If in the MVP, how much on average 
were you able to harvest on your farm 
annually before the MVP? 
  Yield (Kgs/bags) 
Maize   
Beans   
Sweet potatoes   
Bananas   
Cassava   
Sorghum   
Millet   
Ground nuts   
Kales   
Tomatoes   
Onions   
Other (specify)   
3.10 From the output, how much on average 
is for home consumption? 
  Yield (Kgs/bags) 
Maize   
Beans   
Sweet potatoes   
Bananas   
Cassava   
Sorghum   
Millet   
Ground nuts   
Kales   
Tomatoes   
Onions   
Other (specify)   
3.11 On average, how long does this food 
supply last you (in months) before the 
next harvest season? 
  
3.12 If the output does not last for a full year, 
how many months on average do you 
have to look for additional cereals, such 
as maize? 
  
3.13 What quantity on average do you buy 
per month (for instance, maize)? 
  
3.14 Would you rely on relatives and/or 





in case your supplies ran out? No 2 
3.15 Do you have surplus for selling? If no, 
skip to section IV. 
Yes 1 
No 2 
3.16 If yes, where do you sell your output? Small traders at local 
market 
1 
Wholesalers at local market 2 
National cereals board (local 
branch) 
3 
Traders within district 4 
Traders outside district 5 
Export outside Kenya 6 
3.17  How much did you sell last year, for 
instance?  
  Quantity (Kgs/bags) 
Maize   
Beans   
Sweet potatoes   
Bananas   
Cassava   
Sorghum   
Millet   
Ground nuts   
Kales   
Tomatoes   
Onions   
Other (specify)   
3.18 How much, on average, is the price of 
the output? Indicate the unit of 
measurement (e.g. per kg, korokoro, 
debe (approximately 16kgs), 50kg bag, 
90kg bag, etc.). 
  Price (KES) 
Maize   
Beans   
Sweet potatoes   
Bananas   
Cassava   
Sorghum   
Millet   
Ground nuts   
Kales   
Tomatoes   
Onions   
Other (specify)   
3.19 Who determines the price of the output? Myself 1 
The buyer 2 
Both buyer and seller 3 
3.20 What constraints do you face when 
accessing markets to sell your output? 
Poor output prices 1 
Lack of adequate demand 2 
High transport costs 3 




3.21 If you had output to sell, do you always 
know the prevailing market price before 
going to the market? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
3.22 At what point do you get to know the 
market price? 
Before going to the market 1 
At the time of sale 2 
3.23 Have you ever sold your produce at a 




3.24 Have you ever damaged your goods 
when transporting them to the market? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
3.25 If yes, please quantify the damage (in 
quantity (kgs) or KES. Please specify the 
type of commodity. 
  
3.26 How long do you usually wait at the 
marketplace before selling your goods? 
<6 hours 1 
>6 hours 2 
3.27 When selling your produce, when do 
you get paid for the produce? 
Immediately 1 
Later 2 
3.28 If later, how many times do you have to 
go and see the merchant before 
receiving your payment? 
1 - 3 times 1 
> 3 times 2 
3.29 Have you at any point had to recover 









Part IV: Participation in MVP project 
4.1 Are you a beneficiary of the MVP? If no, 
skip to part V. 
Yes 1 
No 2 
4.2 How many years have you benefited 
from the MVP? 
  
4.3 What kind of support have you directly 
received from the MVP? 
Supply of agricultural inputs 1 
School fees bursary for 
children 
2 
Access to health care 3 






Access to loans/micro 
finance 
5 
Other (specify) 6 
4.4 In terms of crops, what are the main 













Other (specify) 12 
4.5 Did you receive any of the following 
inputs? Circle where appropriate. 
Seeds Yes (1) No (2) 
Fertilizer Yes (1) No (2) 
Other (specify)   
4.6 If yes, how much did you receive over 
the years? 
  Seeds (kgs) Fertilizer 
(kgs/bags) 
2005     
2006     
2007     
2008     
2009     
4.7 After receiving inputs from the MVP, it 
is a requirement that you give back to 
the project some output. Over the years, 




4.8 If yes, what quantity did you give back 
after last year's harvest (indicate unit of 
measurement)? 
  
4.9 If no, why did you not give back? Not willing 1 
Inadequate output 2 
Other (specify) 3 
4.10 Who enforces the requirement of giving 
back the output? 
  
4.11 Are there any penalties for failure to 
comply with the requirement? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
4.12 If yes, what is the penalty?   
4.13 A cereal bank was developed to help in 
storage of output. Have you ever made 
use of the cereal bank? 
Yes 1 
No 2 




4.15 What would you say have been the 
greatest benefits of the MVP? Multiple 
answers allowed. Rate your choices. 
Increased food supply   




Better education for 
children 
  
Improved health care   
Creation of employment 
opportunities in farms 
  
Creation of nonfarm 
employment opportunities, 
e.g. in business 
  
Improved access to inputs   




Other (specify)   
4.16 Would you say that the MVP has 
enabled you to generate additional 
income and save money? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
4.17 Since the inception of the MVP, have 




4.18 If yes, what did you invest in?   
4.19 Suppose the MVP project ends; would 




4.20 If yes, why? I acknowledge the benefits 
of the program and I would 
work hard to ensure the 
project continues. 
1 
I have generated savings 
and I can now afford the 
inputs. 
2 




I can access 
credit/microfinance. 
4 
Other (specify) 5 
4.21 If no, why? I don’t find it necessary to 





I don’t have adequate 
income flow to sustain 
myself. 
2 
Credit facilities are not 
available. 
3 
Other (specify) 4 
4.22 What measures have you put in place to 
ensure environmental sustainability? 
Planted trees 1 
Improved fallows 2 
Mixed cropping 3 
Made gullies 4 
Other (specify) 5 




4.24 If yes, how? 
4.25 How do you communicate with the MVP 
staff? 






Hold meetings with MVP 
staff 
3 
Other (specify) 4 




4.27 In your understanding, how are the 
members of the committees selected? 
  
4.28 Would you say every member of the 
society is given an equal opportunity 
when electing members of committees? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
4.29 Would you freely discuss your 
grievances (if any) with MVP committee 




Part V: Income, expenditure and savings 
5.1 What are your main sources of income? Agriculture 1 




Small-scale business 4 
Other (specify) 5 
5.2 On average, how much income do you 
get from the following sources in a 
Selling output from crops   




month? Working on a farm   
Carrying out small-scale 
business 
  
Employment   
Being sent money by 
relative 
  
Other (specify)   
5.3 How much on average do you spend on 
the following items in a typical month? 
  KES 
Food   
Household items   
Other expenditure   
5.4 Do you usually save any money? Yes 1 
No 2 
5.5 How much on average are your monthly 
savings? 
  
5.6 Do you have a bank account? Yes 1 
No 2 
5.7 Are you a member of any savings and 




5.8 If yes, specify. 
5.9 Have you carried out any investment in 
the past 3 years? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
5.10 If yes, what did you invest in? Tick 
where appropriate. 
Household asset, e.g. radio, 





Bought land 3 
Started a business 4 
Other (specify) 5 
5.11 How much did you spend on the 
investment? 
 KES……………… 
5.12 What was the source of finance for the 
investment? 




Informal money lenders 3 
SACCO  4 
Bank 5 
Other (specify) 6 
5.13 Have you ever applied for a loan from 
any financial institution? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
5.14 If in need of cash, where are you most 
likely to seek credit? 
Family/friends 1 
Informal money lenders 2 





Other (specify) 5 
5.15 What constraints do you encounter 
when applying for credit? 
Financial institutions are 
not easily accessible 
1 
High borrowing costs 2 
Lack of collateral 3 
Other (specify) 4 
 
 
 
  
 
